THE RUSSIAN FACE OF GERMANY

AN ACCOUNT OF THE SECRET MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GERMAN AND SOVIET-RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTS

BY
CECIL F. MELVILLE

FOREWORD TO SECOND IMPRESSION

SINCE the first impression of the Russian Face of Germany was published last June, events in Germany have confirmed the book's warning that the militarists at Berlin are working for the rebuilding of the Prussian military machine which was destroyed in the War. During the past few months the military-nationalists camarilla—for long the real rulers in the background —have emerged into the open, and have confronted Europe with a demand for equality of military status, i.e. German re-armament.

General von Schleicher, the Minister of Defence, and "strong man" of Herr von Papen's Government, has made it clear that Germany intends to re-arm, with or without the assent of the Treaty Powers. General von Schleicher is one of the "political generals" who, with General von Seeckt, at the Reichswehr Ministry, conducted the policy of the Abmachungen, the secret military understanding between Germany and Russia, as is made clear in this book.

Such responsible organs as the Morning Post, the Sunday Times and the Saturday Review drew attention to the link between my revelations and the present militarist aims of Germany; but the Manchester Guardian, in a review by their Berlin Correspondent, whose despatches on the Abmachungen are quoted in these pages, questioned the continued existence of

the Russo-German connection. I would point out to the Manchester Guardian that during May this year important emissaries from Berlin paid secret visits to Moscow and Leningrad in connection both with the Abmachungen and a projected Eastern Entente.

Germany is still pursuing a double policy. Herr von Papen may be anxious to secure German rearmament by means of negotiation with the Western Powers. But just as in the days of the late Dr. Stresemann's "Western policy" there was the "Eastern policy" of Baron von Maltzan, Count Brockdorff Rantzau and General von Seeckt in the background, so to-day, as an alternative to Herr von Papen's "Western Policy", there is the "Eastern Policy" of General von Schleicher, von Seeckt's old colleague at the Reichswehr Ministry, to fall back on. The Abmachungen is ready to be made use of when required; and the "Western" or "Eastern" strings of policy are played in accordance with the exigencies of Realpolitik.

Germany's re-armament menaces Europe with another conflagration, and it behoves democratic elements in Germany and the democratic states of Europe to be on their guard. In preparing this second edition of my book, therefore, I find that I have nothing substantially to alter. Events have but confirmed my original thesis. With the exception of one or two minor adjustments, I have left the book as it was in its first impression.

London, September, 1932. G. F. MELVILLE.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION

THE object of this book is to bring to the notice of British public opinion the menace to the peace of Europe constituted by the secret military relations between the German and Soviet-Russian Governments.

Outside a small well-informed circle the British people are unaware that anything untoward is going on behind the scenes at the War Offices of Berlin and Moscow. We are not addicted, as a race, to suspicion of our neighbours, preferring to take outward appearances for granted and give the other fellow the benefit of the doubt. This being the case, there has been a very real faith in this country during the post-War years that the old militaristic Germany we fought upon the battlefields of Flanders passed with the dethronement of the Hohenzollerns, a faith which has been shaken but not destroyed by the recent Hitlerist phenomenon. British public opinion, therefore, has not been on the look-out for new manifestations of the militaristic spirit in Germany.

Yet these manifestations are taking place to-day, but under cover of the greatest secrecy; and the German military chiefs are slowly but surely building

up a new and formidable war machine in collaboration with the military chiefs of Soviet Russia.

This revelation will doubtless come as something of a shock to the many people in this country who associate the "new" Germany with the memory of Stresemann. They may know that the Soviets are avowedly militarist; but they honestly believe that Republican Germany has forsworn militarism. To such people it must therefore seem incredible that the bourgeoise Germany of to-day, with its highly developed capitalist organisation, should have any community of interests with Communist Russia.

On the surface this idea of the reactionary Prussian staff officer conniving with the Russian "Reds" is admittedly paradoxical. But the paradox is superficial. For if one takes the trouble to penetrate below the surface it will be found that the Russo-German collaboration (the Abmachungen) is a reality; and that not the least real thing about it is just this seemingly paradoxical fact that it is not based on a furtive liaison between the Russian and German communist parties, but upon a plan carefully elaborated between the Reichswehr and the Red Army against a background of political understanding between certain elements in the Wilhelmstrasse and the rulers in the Kremlin.

Indications of the capital role played by the German reactionaries and militarists in the inauguration and development of the Abmachungen have already been given in the occasional reports of a circumstantial nature which have filtered through from Germany

from time to time, reports from which it has been evident that while the German Socialists condemned the Russo-German collaboration, and the German Communists maintained a discreet silence about it, the German militarists and nationalists constituted themselves its apologists. The indications given in these reports will be confirmed and amplified by the authenticated facts and hitherto unpublished details which will be marshalled in the following pages.

There could not be a time more opportune than the present for a full realisation on the part of British public opinion of the real nature of the Abmachungen, and the extent of their political, diplomatic, industrial, military and naval ramifications. Europe is passing through a period of political and economic disintegration, in which the international conception is giving place to a revival of nationalism, and new groupings and alliances are already in the embryo stage. The writing is on the wall for those who have eyes to see. It would seem that we are drifting back to the atmosphere of 1914, albeit under new conditions and with new orientations, and it is in just such a drift as this that the new politico-economic-military groupings in Europe, of which the German-Soviet understanding is the most concrete example, assume their most alarming aspect.

It is not without some diffidence, however, that I have decided to make public these disclosures of the Abmachungen; for I have a considerable admiration for the German people, whose many sterling qualities have enabled them to achieve an astonishing renais-

sance. But I agree with Count Keyserling, the German philosopher, that whereas when Germany has given the world the things of the spirit she has enriched the world and her own soul, whenever she has forsaken the spiritual mission for the material she has inevitably brought disaster, to herself as well as to the world.

The disaster of 1914-18 was an instance of this truism; and now again Germany is taking the lead in a movement which can but result in another and even greater disaster.

In these circumstances, I feel that my personal feelings of attachment to the German people and their culture should not act as a deterrent upon the duty of publishing this warning of Germany's new campaign of revenge, a campaign which she is preparing in collusion with her principal partner in the embryo bloc des malcontents, Bolshevist Russia. For this campaign, if not arrested in its present stage, will inevitably lead to another and more dreadful war, which will bring about the political and economic destruction of Europe, followed by a widespread social upheaval, and terminating in the hoisting not merely of the Red Flag of Bolshevism but of the even more dreadful Black Flag of Universal Anarchy.

The story I shall unfold in these pages is the story of Germany's two faces, the one turned towards Western Europe, the other turned towards Soviet Russia. As I trace the origin and growth of the German "Eastern School" of policy, with its concrete manifestations in the material relations between the Reichswehr and the Red Army, it will become clear

to the British reader that my attribution of this policy to the German militarists and nationalists is founded on facts vouched for largely by these very German militarists and nationalists, these same military chiefs whose aim is to overthrow with the help of the Soviets the status quo created by the Peace Settlement, and to achieve not only Treaty revision in respect of lost territories but to realise also those earlier dreams of aggrandisement which were destroyed in 1918 in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.

It may be urged, and rightly, that the authors of this German Eastern policy are playing with a fire in which they themselves will eventually be burned; or, to vary the metaphor, that they are assuming the role of a Frankenstein, and creating a monster which will devour them in their turn.

This is true enough. But it should be borne in mind that the Prussian temperament, for all its solid sense of organisation, was ever lacking in those natural qualities of political instinct and foresight which distinguish our own people. Keyserling once wrote that the British "think with their fingers". The Germans have not this psychological sense of "touch". Politically the Prussian mind—with the exception of Bismarck and of Stresemann in his later phase—has rarely shown itself capable of seeing beyond its nose. This Prussian political shortsightedness was strikingly demonstrated when the Berlin military camarilla sent Lenin in a sealed train into Russia, and again, more recently, when Herren Bruening and Curtius essayed their ill-timed project for the Austro-German

Customs Union. Both these actions resulted in subsequent trouble for Germany, which the German Governments of the day entirely failed to visualise at the time.

The Reichswehr chiefs who are conducting the Abmachungen delude themselves that they can use Bolshevist Russia to help them in their hoped-for war of revenge against Europe, and then, in the hour of victory, hold the Bolshevists at bay, and keep them in their place. The more subtle psychologists at the Kremlin, of course, know better, but are wise enough to keep their knowledge to themselves. The fact, however, that this German-Russian plot will, in the end, bring about the destruction of Germany, will not in any way reconcile Europe to its own destruction at the hands of Germany and Russia together.

Those Englishmen who think that all this may be of moment perhaps to countries like France or Poland or the Little Entente but hardly any concern of Britain are living in a fool's Paradise. For Britain could not keep out of a new European conflict, and even if she could she would be ruined economically just the same. There will be no safe place for onlookers in the next war.

Even before the stage of physical war could be reached this country would become the victim of the economic putsch of the Russo-German combine. Germany, released from her reparations debts either by repudiation or arrangement, and having in consequence an internal debt per head of population infinitely less than that of Britain, would be able to

confront our industries with a superbly equipped and highly organised industrial competition against which we should be unable to hold our own (as was explained, perhaps unwittingly, in a recent statement by Sir Walter Layton, the eminent British economist; and the moral of which was underlined in timely manner in a leading article in the Daily Mail). At the same time Soviet Russia, with the development of her Five Year Plan, a plan made possible in the first instance by her own debt repudiation, would be able to undercut us industrially, especially in the great markets of the East. The combination of such an economic alignment with a military and political partnership must inevitably constitute the gravest potential menace to Europe in general and to Britain in particular.

Britain, I repeat, cannot afford to adopt the attitude that all this is not her concern. It will concern this country perhaps more than any other. To be forewarned is to be forearmed. Hence my reasons for giving the story of the Russo-German plot from its inception until to-day.

A word as to how I came into possession of the facts given in this book, and concerning the sources upon which I have drawn:

I first came upon the track of the Abmachungen when—as diplomatic correspondent and special correspondent of the late Liberal daily newspaper, the Westminster Gazette—I undertook a mission of enquiry in various countries of Central and Eastern Europe during 1927. Later, as a special correspondent at

Geneva covering the League of Nations Assembly, at one time for the Westminster Gazette, and at another for the Starmer Group of provincial daily papers, I came into possession of additional information. Finally, in 1929, as special correspondent for the Sunday Referee, on a mission which took me to Berlin and further east in Europe, I gathered more evidence.

My reporting instinct was aroused. To me, in those days, the Russo-German plot was a story. I doubt whether at the time I quite realised its full implications, or the grave potentialities it harboured for the peace of Europe. That realisation was to come to me later.

During that period—the years 1927, 1928, 1929— I did not publish anything on this subject. But during the summer of 1930, at the time of the generally reported scandal in connection with the death of the German officer, Captain Amlinger, in Russia, I published in the Sunday Referee a disclosure of some of the military arrangements secretly arrived at between the Reichswehr and the Red Army.

These revelations in the Sunday Referee were widely quoted in the leading papers of Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, Vienna and Moscow. A detailed quotation was given in the Echo de Paris, which gave also supplementary information on the same subject. The repercussions continued for some time afterwards, including a denial on the part of the Reichswehr Ministry, which in turn was followed by more accusations from the German moderate Left. In Britain the Sunday Referee disclosure was referred to editorially in the Manchester

Guardian, which paper—by no means either anti-German or anti-Russian—had on a previous occasion published revelations of the Abmachungen.

From this time onwards I became more and more interested in the Russo-German affair, and as my interest deepened it came upon me with increasing conviction that there was much more in it than a newspaper story of a passing political scandal, and that the ramifications of the Russo-German collaboration went further and had deeper roots than I had at first supposed. This led me to the realisation that as a responsible journalist it was my duty to explore the whole matter thoroughly.

The results of this further exploration into the labyrinth of the Abmachungen intrigues are gathered together and presented in the following pages. With the exception of the conclusions presented at the end of the book, in which I endeavour to give what I hope is a fair and accurate summing up, the material in these pages is mainly a recitation of facts. The authorities are quoted and the sources of information given, and in the majority of cases it will be found that these authorities and these sources are German. In some instances I have given the original German text, together with the English translation, of speeches and writings on the subject by leading German officials and military leaders. It has hardly been necessary to seek authorities outside of Germany, for the Germans themselves—and very often the actual German directors of the Abmachungen, including the heads of the Reichswehr—have supplied more than

enough evidence to secure a verdict of guilty before any impartial tribunal of public opinion. The reason for this lies mainly in the exigencies of internal German politics. Accusations were made from time to time by the Democratic and Social Democratic elements in Berlin which necessitated defensive replies from the Reichswehr Ministry, and more often than not these replies were a case of "he who excuses himself accuses himself".

The utterances of German Ministers, officials, generals, deputies of the Reichstag, publicists, etc., are presented in these pages in their proper sequence, and it is from these utterances that much of my evidence has been taken.... This evidence has formed the basis for a series of detailed enquiries which have resulted in some astonishing facts coming to light. These facts I have given fully, but it is safe to assume that even these disclosures represent but part of the whole truth, for the whole truth is not known even to the German Parliament, but is locked up in the confidential archives of the Reichswehr Ministry and the Russian Commissariat for War.

But enough of the Russo-German picture is given to show the very serious extent of the Reichswehr-Red Army connection, and the extensive manner in which the Russo-German collaboration has succeeded in building a whole network of organisations, the object of which is to produce the materiel and potentiel de guerre both for the German and the Russian armies in the next war, in respect of arms, ammunition and military training. The locale of these organisations

is in Russia. The technical direction and, in the main the financing is in German hands. By these means is has been possible for the German military and industrial leaders to keep within the letter of the law of the peace treaties, as far as their activity on German soil is concerned, by the simple means of transferring the manufacture of war material forbidden by the Versailles Treaty from Germany to Russia.

The manufacture of German and Russian war material in Russia under German technical direction, together with the sending of secret German military missions to Russia, and the technical collaboration between the general staffs of the two armies, all this is the reality behind the political "Eastern" policy of those who really direct the destinies of Germany behind the facade of the ordinary organs of the Reich Government. The old military caste, albeit with new personalities, is still a potent force in Germany, and it works according to its own perspectives, sometimes in collaboration with the official government of the day, sometimes in spite of it. In Russia the situation is less complicated, for in that country there is no need to erect a facade, the dictatorial nature of the Soviet system making it possible for the supreme junta of the Communist Party which really governs the Soviet Union to work out its plans without let or hindrance from any Conference of Soviets, such conferences being in existence to ratify and not to debate the decisions of the executive.

The foregoing should suffice to explain the general nature and intention of this book. It now only remains to say a word as to its method.

The scheme of the book falls into three natural divisions—(1) the origins and development of the German "Eastern policy", (2) the evidence and factual matter relative to the "Abmachungen"', and (3) the conclusion.

In a short survey of this nature, however, I have felt it best not to divide the book into three hard and fast sections. The story runs naturally through the three stages; I have therefore confined the divisions to the usual groupings in chapters. In the Annexe will be found documents to which reference is made in the text, and a literal translation of a memorandum of the Executive of the German Socialist Party on the subject of the German-Russian collaboration.

In conclusion I would like to express the hope that this book, by throwing the searchlight of publicity into the dark places of the Abmachungen, may perhaps succeed in doing something to arouse public opinion in the Western democracies, and also in Germany, to the existence of this menace to international peace implied in the underground Russo-German military collaboration.

London,
April, 1932.

CHAPTER I

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

SOON after the conclusion of Peace, the Allied and Associated Powers began to disagree among themselves. The ink was hardly dry on the Treaty of Versailles before the peace settlement, which had been so dearly bought, and so laboriously put together, began to show the first signs of disintegration.

While the Treaty of Versailles was still on the way to its numerous ratifications there took place the first dramatic happening in that long chain of events which was to lead to the gradual break-up of the so-called Allied unity. The United States withdrew from Europe. In the tradition of their inflexible Constitution the Americans banged the door behind them, leaving only the box-office wide open.

The trend of the numerous diplomatic conferences, held during the thirteen years since the conclusion of Peace, showed that their results had generally only a theoretical value which found but little practical

application in the everyday relationships of the various States concerned. For, as a rule, these conferences were conducted upon the basis of a co-operation between groups of Great Powers which changed from one occasion to another, attracting a correspondingly variable grouping of the smaller States. Pre-war alliances and war-time friendships, even if they had withstood the ordeal of the stormy discussions of the Big Four and the Big Three over the final text of the Treaty, later suffered a gradual demise.

Under the constant pressure of ever new problems even the policies of Britain and France—the two Powers whose perseverance had made ultimate victory possible—began to move in divergent directions, until it was possible to coin the ugly bon mot of "rupture cordiale" in place of "entente cordiale".

Periods of mutual rapprochement and estrangement between the three principal Allies, Britain, France and Italy, followed each other with the frequency of the lunar eclipses of Jupiter's satellites, but unlike those events in that distant planet they were almost incalculable in their consequences. Even the most minute and painstaking political calculation could not define precisely the new forces which created mysterious disturbances in the firmament of world policy, while all the known forces were inadequate to explain the disturbances observed.

The Treaty of Versailles generated such forces, which upset the smooth working of the post-War European system and prevented the stabilisation of the main lines of the policy of the Great Powers,

thus making it impossible for these Powers to coalesce into coherent groups even for a few years, let alone for a few decades as was the case before the War. The Treaty had many shortcomings, but of these none proved so productive of undesirable consequences - consequences in direct conflict with its original aims—as the gaps left in the two most important questions, i.e., reparations and disarmament.

Mr. Wickham Steed records that at the Peace Conference:

> "President Wilson, and, to an even higher degree, Colonel House, had the conviction that the best aspects of the Treaty were those which rendered possible its gradual modification by means of the Reparations Committee and the League of Nations."

Mr. Wickham Steed did not himself share this opinion. He and many other experienced and acute observers have always maintained that, on the contrary, the German Reparations Debt should have been fixed from the outset at a level within Germany's capacity.

It is clear that the numerous misunderstandings between the Allies, which, arising from the reparations problem, led to multifarious other political controversies, could have been avoided, or at least limited to this one question. Instead, since 1920, there was a whole series of international conferences which, even if they sometimes led to a partial settlement of the most pressing problems of the moment, invariably aggravated friction at the most sensitive points of contact in the policy of the various Powers called upon to be the guardians of the new order of Europe.

Germany, from the very outset, and with great skill, took advantage of the clefts and fissures appearing upon the one-time solid front of the Allies. She based her whole post-War policy upon the absence of cohesion among the victors—who lacked a uniform policy as a body, and failed also to achieve continuity even in their individual policies.

Moreover, it must be considered that very early in the day, while the Paris Peace Conference was still in being, a new force, that of International Finance, made its influence felt upon the course of evolution of international affairs, this influence gaining in strength with each so-called settlement of the question of reparations. Now, the principal business of International Finance is to make the biggest possible profit. When this is considered together with the fact that the personal elements in International Finance were, on the whole, sympathetic to Germany, then the final turn given to the Reparations question becomes intelligible.

Germany achieved a long list of concessions, including three successive reductions of the Annual Reparations payments, two successive reductions of the total amount due, the division of the annual payments into conditional and unconditional portions, three huge loans, and, most important of all, an earlier liberation from the territorial pledges which had been intended as security for Reparations payments. Then, after having made these payments with funds borrowed from the victors, and using the loans for the strengthening of her economic power she created a financial

crisis within the economic crisis by "freezing" millions of short-term credits. And after all this, Germany to-day declares that she will not pay any more Reparations!

For thirteen years the former Allies were unable to reach a common line of action, either in the question of Reparations (supposed to be secured on the total national assets of Germany) or in the question of their own debts owed to the United States which now weigh so heavily upon their own mortgaged national assets.

It may be that Germany as a nation is to-day technically in a state of insolvency, but she is not bankrupt, and will be able to tackle the artificial insolvency of her own making the moment when some new accomplished fact or a new so-called settlement will relieve her of the whole Reparations debts.

In spite of the disastrous unemployment rampant in Germany, in spite of the misery in which millions of German working- and middle-class families live, the economic potentialities of Germany to-day look much brighter than those of any other nation, France included. Thanks to certain financial machinations which if indulged in between private individuals would be regarded under law as fraudulent, Germany has the means to inflict smarting financial and economic blows upon the military victors of 1918. If in the case of a cessation of German Reparations payments the United States refuse to cancel the Allied debts, England, France and Italy will find themselves between the devil and the deep sea. The position

of the United States itself will be equally unenviable. One is almost tempted to praise German magnanimity in desisting, up till now, from claiming relief from the payment of the commercialised portions of Reparations (the Dawes and Young loans), and of those hundreds of millions which, thanks to the Hoover moratorium, Germany paid into the Bank of International Settlements, only to withdraw them immediately in the form of loans granted to the German Railways. The illusory promise "the Boche will pay for everything" has become transformed into the hard reality of negation: two or three generations of the Western nations will be staggering under the burden of costs and damages suffered in their "War of Liberation "; while Germany, unencumbered by such burdens, with her total debt reduced by inflation to only a trifle more than it was before the War, and her gigantic industrial and economic equipment reconstructed by means of moneys borrowed from the credulous Allies, will be able to flood all the markets of the world with cheap goods, and in this way render the plight of her neighbours still more intolerable.

Thus have been fulfilled in the economic sphere the worst forebodings of those political writers who as far back as 1919 warned us that the lack of an agreed common policy between the Allies, the absence of efficient control over the fulfilment by Germany of the conditions of the Peace Treaty, and the inclination of certain of the Allies to grant far-reaching concessions to Germany, would lead to the gravest dangers in the future.

The victorious Allies not only abstained from preventing Germany reconstructing all the elements of her economic hegemony, but, on the contrary, aided her in this task by continuous concessions and loans. They not only had to go without the reparations due to them, but by their short-sighted policy deprived themselves of the means to reconstruct their own economic machinery.

The Thirteen Years' War for Reparations is approaching its end, and it is obvious that even if a compromise should be finally found, it will end in a German victory. The limits to the scope of this victory will be set by the good will and good faith of Germany alone; for the Allied and Associated Powers prepared their own financial and economic defeat.

The Allied Nations will be able to look back on four achievements of this war: an added experience of the value of Germany's signature upon international treaties and conventions; German bonds which tomorrow may be worth exactly as much as the Imperial Russian bonds; profits running into millions made by international financiers on loans granted to Germany, and last, but not least, the interest and amortisation of the hundreds of millions expended upon the cost of war and war damages. The history of war has never yet registered such a paradox—that the costs of victory are to be paid, not by the vanquished but by the victor.

Equally poor and similarly paradoxical are the results of the policy of the Allies in the question of

disarmament. Here, as in the case of reparations, warnings were not lacking while there was still time, when before the signature of the Treaty it was possible to avoid its fatal consequences. Here, too, the vanquished of thirteen years ago is raising claims that he himself and not the victors shall determine the conditions for the limitations of armaments.

The accumulated mistakes of commission and omission in the policy of the former Allied and Associated Powers are so numerous and flagrant, and the warnings uttered with clearness and precision at the very moment of their perpetration have been fulfilled so literally, that it may be permissible in a matter of such gravity to recall at the present moment the statements made by a renowned political writer in 1919.

M. Auguste Gauvain (whose daily articles in the Journal des Debats from the Bosnian annexation crisis in 1908 onwards to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on January 16th, 1920, form in their fourteen volumes the most complete register of contemporary political and diplomatic history) has been the prophet who has foreseen practically all the consequences which were bound to follow and actually resulted from the omissions of the Versailles Treaty in the question of the disarmament of Germany.

Thus, in the Journal des Debats of April 8th, 1919, M. Gauvain wrote that while the Allied Powers protested their intention to prevent Germany being in a position again to take the offensive against her neighbours, they nevertheless made decisions, the

effect of which was to allow Germany to escape from their control and slowly regain her old position.[1]

In a further article, dated July 4th, 1919—referring to Mr. Lloyd George's justification, at the time, of the decision allowing Germany a professional army of 100 000 long-service volunteers in place of the 200,000 short-term soldiers originally envisaged—M. Gauvain wrote: "We are profoundly convinced that this change was a serious blunder, and that the hundred thousand professional will constitute the cadre of a dangerous force."

But perhaps the most potent warning was in the article M. Gauvain published on the occasion of the

[1] " Individually each one of the Four pretends to desire to disarm Germany and put her in the position in which she would be unable to undertake the offensive against her neighbours. . . . But when they meet the Four make decisions, the fatal consequences of which will be to allow Germany to escape from the control of her conquerors and regain step by step her former position. . . . One is left wondering how it was that certain heads of Governments let themselves be dragged towards solutions which are diametrically opposed to the aims which their peoples set out to attain when entering the war. Of what use will it be to England and the United States to have made immense sacrifices if Germany consolidates—with a few relatively unimportant territorial exceptions—all her former spoils, and if she adds to her Empire the German domains of the Hapsburgs?

"One may well multiply the technical precautions on parchment, but one will never achieve the disarmament of Germany unless the nations round her will be determined to nip her designs in the bud by the precaution of adequate force. If one is to judge these precautions by the quite recent exhibitions of inexplicable weakness, they are no sooner stipulated than they become useless. . . . Nobody will go to war in order to impose respect for obligations contracted towards us; the utmost that can be expected are futile protests and the maintenance of our rights on paper. Now is the moment to secure immunity not only against offensive relapses but also against the breaking of solemn undertakings. Only lunatics can trust the word of Germany. It is therefore necessary to preserve the sanctions . . . until all the obligations will be fulfilled."

resolution in the Chamber of Deputies of October 3rd, 1919, instructing the French Government to arrange with the other Allied and Associated Powers for the effective disarmament of Germany and her allies by means of the prohibition of war industries in those countries. M. Gauvain wrote predicting that the new Germany would create a general condition of malaise and diplomatic confusion which would enable her to make progressive violations of the Peace Treaties; and he indicated the means by which she would be able to re-arm herself, hinting at the possibility of forbidden war material being stored in a neighbouring country acting as an accomplice.[1]

[1] " . . . A country enmeshed in the net of military obligations may escape from them and create a state of affairs almost as dangerous to its conquerors as if it had retained full liberty of action. It will suffice such a country to find accomplices in one or more neighbouring countries ready to receive clandestinely stores of war material and to hold them ready for employment in case of need.

" Granted, the danger would not be as great as if that material were concentrated in the country itself. Nevertheless two considerations of first importance must be taken into account. First of all: that the next conflict with Germany, if it breaks out, will not take place in the conditions of 1914. Germany in that year was in the full possession of all the means of action perfected to the highest degree of power, and it was to her advantage to begin with a lightning attack. Should the new Germany desire to give vent to her aggressive intentions she would act in an entirely different way. She would attempt to create a state of such general malaise and diplomatic confusion that infractions of the League Covenant and of the Versailles Treaty—at first slight, but growing gradually stronger—would be committed without any group of Powers being able to decide on the suppression by force of these progressive violations.

". . . It will thus not be very difficult for a cunning, patient and evil-intentioned Germany to prepare the material wherewithal of aggression, having at her disposal material means of action considerably exceeding those to which she would be entitled by the Versailles Treaty.

In this article M. Gauvain foresaw the attempt of Germany to escape from the consequences of her defeat and build a new military machine, probably with the connivance of a neighbouring State. That this attempt was to be so successful was due to the disintegration of the Peace settlement. For it was during this period of disintegration that Germany saw her chance to evade her treaty obligations and later to seek outside help in her endeavours to carry her policy from mere evasion to definite revangisme.

Out of this revangisme came the birth of that "Eastern " policy, with its corollary of the Russo-German military

"Besides, for the moment a new theory of war seems to be gaining ground as dangerous as that which existed in France and other countries before 1914. . . . With well trained and determined men, it was said, one can successfully tackle any kind of material. The results of that doctrine are well known. To-day, on the contrary, it is being declared that the next war will be a war of material, and that the number of effectives will be of secondary importance. This is another error which may lead to disasters.... It would be an unpardonable mistake to rely henceforth on the superiority of war material and to put the question of effectives in the background. If, at a given moment, Germany should have a marked superiority of effectives which could be used with an inferior equipment she would be able to carry out a coup deforce which would put in her hand a part of the enemy's material.

" Moreover, it will be well not to forget that for more than ten years Germany will possess without any violation of the Peace Treaty an important army capable of taking the field at short notice, and as many millions of men who fought for several years during the war will be at her disposal. She would not need new recruits for mobilisation.

"We do not mean at all to discourage those who demand new material guarantees. But it would be necessary to forewarn the Allied governments and public opinion against the deceitful security obtained by such kind of guarantees. They will not be efficacious at all unless the neighbours of Germany refuse their complicity or unless the League of Nations, or, in its place, an analagous international body, be constituted in such a way as to be able to suppress immediately by force tne encroachments of States showing aggressive tendencies."

co-operation, which to-day constitutes a menace to the stabilisation and pacification of Europe.

The day of definite, formal alliances between groups of Powers has admittedly passed. Since the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles no definite group of Powers has come into being comparable with the alliances which existed before the War, and which— even immediately following the Balkan wars—were able to foregather at the common table of the Ambassadors' Conference to shape international polity according to their several interests. There is to-day, for instance, no equivalent of the old German-Austrian-Italian Triple Alliance, or the pre-War Franco-Russian Alliance. The only alliance of Great Powers which outlived the European War was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and that was finally dissolved, as being out of harmony with post-War conditions of world polity.

The place of the so-called European Concert and the more recent Conference of Ambassadors has been taken by the League of Nations. With regard to the League, while even the most inveterate pessimists must admit that it has achieved a certain number of successes, nevertheless even the most incurable optimists can hardly deny that most of its successes were preceded by the action of two, three or more Great Powers, which were often joined by the smaller ones. Indeed, in many cases much of the merit for such successes should be laid at the door of the "old" diplo-

macy. This "old" diplomacy, in its calculating, subtle way (which should not be mistaken for modesty) very often sees to it that its own products, when ready, should be stamped with the trade mark "Made in Geneva".

It may be said, therefore, that although an international facade had been erected to screen the workings of individual diplomacies, and nothing like the alliances on the pre-War model has been revived, nevertheless new international groupings are to be vaguely perceived, as for instance, in the case of the clandestine arrangement between Germany and Russia.

This new form of grouping is more dangerous than the old open alliances, particularly because in these days it is not fashionable to call things by their proper names.

We have seen recently, in the Far East, the case of a war which was not called a war; a war in which fighting actually took place without even the usual formality of the declaration of a state of war. Similarly in post-War Europe there is to be observed this new method of international polity to which no definite name is given.

Such a situation manifestly provides opportunities for secret war preparations which in the old days of open alliances would have been impossible on the same scale. In the old days the first hint of mobilisation, for instance, was the signal for a virtual state of war. Indeed, in 1914, it was precisely these mobilisations—in Austria, in Russia, in Germany— which announced the inevitability of the European war, and which set in motion the French mobilisation,

and, later, the non-dispersal of the British Fleet after manoeuvres.

To-day conditions are such that a war machine may be made ready for action without necessarily attracting the attention of the world at large. Particularly is this the case with regard to the manufacture of war material. Much of this may be manufactured under the cloak of industrial or scientific purpose. The conversion of workshops and laboratories from industrial and scientific purposes to the requirements of war industries is a simple matter. The same applies to the question of civil and military aviation. The military purpose may be pursued under the cloak of ordinary civil work.

Moreover, by dint of the secret understanding, in place of the formal alliance, it is now possible for countries forbidden by treaty from manufacturing or storing war material within their own borders, to manufacture or store it within the borders of a neighbouring State, with which such a secret understanding exists, and thus defy outside control and mask the real purpose.

Such is the case of the secret Russo-German military understanding, which has no name, and the details of which are known only to a small circle; that secret understanding which M. Gauvain almost foresaw when he indicated the possibility of Germany finding "accomplices" in a neighbouring country "ready to receive clandestinely stores of war material and to hold them ready for employment in the case of need".

CHAPTER II

THE BIRTH OF GERMANY'S "EASTERN" POLICY

THE articles by M. Auguste Gauvain, referred to in the preceding chapter, threw light upon the future intentions of Germany with regard to the development of her armed forces. But this distinguished French writer later went further into the fields of prophecy, and actually forecast, in other articles, the birth of Germany's "Eastern" policy and the subsequent Russo-German collaboration.

The last link in M. Gauvain's chain of argument is to be found in the following excerpt from an article he published during October, 1919. I give here the opening and concluding paragraphs:

> "The reports," wrote M. Gauvain, "from the Baltic countries are confused and contradictory. Nevertheless, certain definite facts can be gleaned from them:— In the first place the German military leaders took advantage of the weakness of the Conference—which had authorised their continued occupation of Esthonia and Latvia after the Armistice of November 18th—to take root in these countries even against the orders of their Governments. In the second instance there is the obvious desire of the former Pan-Germanists to keep the means of action in those regions which they have always considered as a German fief. Thirdly,

> there exists in Germany a general idea that the salvation of the Reich will result from a close co-operation with Russia, from a kind of colonisation of the reconstituted former empire of the Tsar. Soon, the Germans will persuade the world that in reality it is they who have won the war. And, indeed, they will finally become the victors if they descend upon Russia in order to exploit her."

In the preceding excerpts from the articles of M. Auguste Gauvain we find the actual resume of the fundamental trend of German policy from 1920 to 1931—but a resume written and published as far back as 1919. But, most important of all, we have here a categorical announcement that Germany will escape from the outside control of her armaments, and a general definition of the means by which escape will be realised. We have the outlines of that military policy of Germany which has been observed both in regard to military effectives and war material. And last, but not least, we have the accomplice of Germany's preparations for the next and "last" war clearly described by name. The forecast is complete, including even the results of those five years which were to follow, when the foreign policy of Germany, directed by the late Dr. Stresemann, would be able under the cloak of moderation and peacefulness, to create a state of such general malaise and diplomatic confusion that infractions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Treaty of Versailles—at first slight, but growing gradually stronger—would be committed without any group of Powers being able to decide on the suppression by force of these progressive violations.

The result is that if Germans have not yet persuaded the world that they are the victors of the Great War, they have succeeded already in persuading their own people that in any case they were not really defeated, that the war is still going on (by now, already, for seventeen years) and that they have only to endure again as they were told to endure from August, 1914, till October, 1918, in order that the final victory should be theirs. The danger of such a policy of a "cunning, patient and evil-intentioned Germany" was expressed by the French publicist in this one sentence: "indeed they will finally become the victors if they descend upon Russia in order to exploit her". This forecast of co-operation with Russia—whether a restored Tsarist Russia or the established Bolshevik one—is all the more remarkable in that it dates from a period when not only the attitude of Germany to Russia seemed to be subjected to constant oscillations, but when the true shaping of this attitude was still a jealousy guarded secret of the Berlin military and Junker clique, and while the people in the west of Europe suffered from the illusion that Bolshevik rule in Russia was only a passing phase. M. Gauvain himself was not always free from such illusions, as may be gathered from many of his articles. But if he deluded himself as to the supposed impending downfall of the Red Tsars he still retained his unerring political instinct and his profound knowledge of history, for he foresaw even for the "restored empire of the Tsar" a close co-operation with Germany and some kind of German "colonisation"'.

There cannot be any doubt that the Prussian militarists and Junkers to-day would prefer, instead of an understanding with the Bolsheviks, a co-operation with a re-established Tsarist Russia against Europe, for such a co-operation has been traditional to Prussia since the times of Frederick William I and of Peter the Great, and was interrupted only once by a brief episode during the Seven Years' War. As, however, Germany herself was unable to rebuild the former Russia of the Tsars, and the attempts of France and England dragging on till 1920 also failed to achieve this purpose, Berlin decided unhesitatingly to "lay its hand upon Russia and exploit her" such as she was. It must be admitted that Germany was not disappointed, for she found the Red Tsars of the Kremlin perfectly willing to co-operate, or, as it will be seen in the course of this account, to continue to co-operate.

There is not a shadow of doubt that the ultimate aims of this common Prusso-Russian political and military activity are perceived differently by its leaders in Berlin and those in Moscow. But there does not exist any ambiguity as to the true essence of this complicity. Prusso-Germany is out for the political and economic conquest of Europe at all costs. Her imperialism, temporarily checked by the defeat in the War, has revived in all its former vigour. It has recovered all the sooner and more strongly because the militarist clique governing Germany found out that already during the negotiations for the Armistice there was not sufficient unanimity

amongst the victors to carry their victory to its true completion, and that after the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace there was likewise not sufficient unanimity to enable them to safeguard the fruits of the peace.

It is thus understandable why the plans of the Prusso-German imperialists for the near and more distant future do not differ in the slightest detail from their pre-War plans. As for Soviet Russia, she, too, aims at the (revolutionary) conquest of Europe, and her proletarian imperialism differs from the Pan-Slav imperialism only by the increased voracity of its appetite.

After the War the imperialistic policies of the two "nations of prey", Prussia and Russia, were restored in a slightly altered form. It is understandable, therefore, that very soon after the military defeats of these two imperialisms the two-centuries-old tradition of their co-operation should have re-awakened; and that Berlin should have desired to use Russian imperialism as an instrument for the furtherance of its plans for world hegemony, and Moscow to use German revangisme for the carrying through of its plans for world revolution.

The hopes attached to the outcome of the War, and the peace which followed, by the incorrigible dreamers pursuing their ideals in two opposite directions, were soon dispelled. For equally mistaken were middle-class idealists like Woodrow Wilson, who believed that with the downfall of the Hohenzollern Empire a new Germany would arise from the ashes

of the old, and those other idealists, of the opposite camp, who thought they saw in Red Russia ex Oriente Lux.

But as neither the new Germany or the new light in the East came into being, it soon became clear than an inescapable fatality would revive that mutual magnetic attraction which for two hundred years had united Germany and Russia in the field of international policy.

Casting round for accomplices in the violation of the scarcely signed Treaty of Peace, the Germans turned unhesitatingly towards the quarter in which they always found the utmost willingness to indulge in complicity against Europe. As in the time of Frederick William and Peter the Great, so in the time of Ebert and Lenin, this complicity assumed the form of a military alliance. And this military alliance became the basis for a Prusso-Soviet plot against Europe.

Either Europe must break this conspiracy by peaceful means or crush it by force, or else be reduced under the yoke of the Prusso-Soviet alliance to the role of passive onlooker while the two imperialistic Powers, Prusso-Germany and Bolshevist-Russia, face each other for the final combat. For it goes without saying that in Western European civilisation there is not room for a condominium of both.

Full understanding of the menace overhanging Europe can be reached only by a thorough study of the German-Russian plot and the objectives at which the two accomplices are aiming, and through a proper

appreciation of the fantastic international situations in which it has come to pass that the victorious Powers —by their inability to agree upon a common policy towards Germany—have themselves assisted the two conspirators.

The origin of the relations between Germany and the Bolsheviks goes back to the famous "sealed wagon" in which Hindenburg and Ludendorff had the Bolshevist leaders transported to Russia. It may be that some day the secret documents of the German General Staff will see the light of day, in which case it would then be possible to know whether the sending of the sealed wagon was an improvised imitation of Bismarck's action against Austria in 1866, when the Iron Chancellor organised the Hungarian Legion, or when, in 1870, he threatened Italy with a republican revolution, or whether the underground channels between the red brick building of the General Staff in Berlin and the Red Russian revolutionary exiles existed before that event. This much is certain, that it was the Bolshevik Revolution which finally broke the fighting spirit of republican Russia and guaranteed to Berlin the success of the first Prusso-Bolshevik plot.

From the time of the German-Russian peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk until the invasion of Poland by the Red Army, Germany carried on towards Russia a policy containing the seeds of the future development of the German-Russian collaboration. Although during this period Germany underwent to all appearances a fundamental change, such as the substitution for the Kaiser of an ex-saddler as President

of the Reich, there was no essential change in Germany's policy towards Russia.

At Brest-Litovsk, General Max Hoffmann, excited by Trotsky's resistance to the German peace conditions, was considering the possibility of a final rupture of the peace parleys and the launching of an offensive against the "Reds". He wanted to restore Tsardom by means of the German army, and to conclude an alliance with the new Romanoff regime with a view to strengthening the German divisions on the Western front with Russian reinforcements. The question arises if such a scheme was possible of realisation. It is true that Germany had a much more solid basis for a military action on behalf of the "Whites" than had the Entente Powers, which could give but feeble support to the handful of Russian generals still faithful to the Tsar. But even supposing that the restoration of the Monarchy in Russia had been possible, it would seem doubtful if the Russia defeated in 1918 could have had either the will or the strength for a march to the West such as she undertook in 1813.

During the Seven Years' War, however, after the death of the Empress Elisabeth, when Russia abandoned the anti-Prussian coalition, her very passivity saved Frederick the Great from irretrievable ruin.

In 1918 the United States entered the War on the side of the Allies at a time when the arrival of Russian reinforcements on the German side would have been too late to secure a complete German victory in the West. Nevertheless, a passive Russia, making

possible the release of German troops from the East, might well have saved Germany from a complete defeat in the West.

Some such considerations as these must have influenced the decision of the German General Staff if already at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 they could have entertained the vain hope that the release of the German armies on the Eastern front for service on the West would save Germany from the worst.

At all events, after the interruption of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, the Germans exerted a much milder military pressure to force Soviet Russia to sign their peace terms than had been provided for in the plans of General Hoffmann.

General Max Hoffmann was, early in 1919, entrusted with the task of extricating from the former Russian provinces the German troops still remaining to the east of the rivers Bug and Niemen. He, who only a short time before wanted to crush the Bolsheviks and to erect again the throne of the Tsars, showed that—as they said in Berlin—"he can do the thing in the other way as well". From the General's Memoirs it is known that he carried out the evacuation of German troops under the command of the former "Ober Ost", in close understanding with the Chiefs of the Soviet armies, and in such a way that almost immediately after the departure of the German troops their positions were being occupied by the Red detachments. This initial Prusso-Bolshevik collusion against the interests of Europe, this first completely proved secret

plot, had for its aim, as General Hoffmann himself admitted, the crushing of the Polish Republic at the very outset of its restoration. General Hoffmann proceeded from the assumption which to this very day represents the views of authoritative German military circles, that it will be more advantageous to Prussia as a great Power in Europe to have Russia as a direct neighbour, even should that country remain Bolshevik, than Poland. He entertained the hope that by delivering Poland as a victim to the Bolsheviks he would be able to save for Prussia the provinces of which Poland had been robbed during the partitions.

Neither General Hoffmann nor the German General Staff would desist from carrying out the evacuation in a manner which needs must lead to a war between Poland and Russia, and not even considerations of Poland as the nearest rampart against Bolshevism in Central Europe made them give up their sinister game.

The actual situation at the time was such that the conquest of Poland by Soviet Russia would have thrown open the gates for a Russian march to the west and south-west, and confronted Europe with the problem of the future frontiers of political, social and economic Asia. Would these run along the Vistula and the Carpathian Mountains, or along the Oder and the Danube, or still further to the west? For neither Hungary nor Czechoslovakia was at the time in the position to stem the Bolshevik flood; while the political and social upheaval in Germany was such that the General Staff ran the danger of being unable to lay the ghost it was conjuring up.

Indeed, during the first few months after the German defeat in the west, after the flight of the Kaiser and the ejection of the ruling princes, in practically all the principal German cities there had infiltrated among the masses of demobilised soldiers and workers such multitudes of Communist sympathisers that the Russians, whether invited or not by the Spartakists, would certainly have had no reason, after taking possession of Poland, to respect the Russo-German frontiers of 1914. Yet Prussian militarism, although struggling hard against the Spartakist extremists at home, deliberately closed its eyes to this terrible danger threatening Germany from without.

Thus it happened that until the last phase of the German evacuation of Russian territory General Hoffmann acted in the spirit of the first Prusso-Bolshevik plot against the security of Europe.

CHAPTER III

THE TRIUMPH OF THE "EASTERN" SCHOOL: THE ROAD TO RAPALLO

IN the preceding pages were shown the beginnings of the Eastern policy, the seeds of which were sown during the confusion and uncertainty of the period between the signing of the peace of Brest-Litovsk and the outbreak of the Russo-Polish war. This leads, in historic sequence, to a consideration of the events which led to the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo, at the time of the Genoa Conference.

The Eastern school grew in power and importance and assumed triumphant proportions by the time of the Genoa Conference. In the meantime it made itself felt in various ways during the Russo-Polish war, and soon afterwards it was carefully mapping out the road which was to lead to Rapallo. It may truly be said that the earlier days of the Eastern school must inevitably have led eventually to the situation symbolised in the Rapallo Treaty, even though special and contemporaneous circumstances were responsible for that treaty taking place when and where and how it did.

Until the last phase of the German retreat on the Eastern front General Hoffmann acted in the spirit of

the Prusso-Bolshevik plot against Europe. This plot— as far as the aims of its German authors were concerned — developed so favourably that at the beginning of February, 1919, the Bolshevik troops almost reached the line of the river Niemen, having for their base Vilna, Baranovitchi and Pinsk; and it was only the energetic diplomatic intervention of the Western Powers in Berlin which prevented a further advance of the Reds westward. General Hoffmann had to agree that the least western strip of the Ober Ost, immediately after the departure of the German regiments, should be occupied by the Polish troops (the organisation of which, like that of the Polish Republic at the time, was in an inchoate condition). During February 9th to 14th, 1919, the first Polish detachments took possession of this sector while the exposed Bolshevik troops withdrew without offering any serious resistance. It was only after the Poles had reached the line of the Wiemen that they came into direct contact with the Bolsheviks. From that moment until October, 1920, the Russo-Polish war was carried on uninterruptedly with dramatic changes of fortune in victory and defeat until the culminating point was reached at the Battle of Warsaw in August, 1920, which Lord D'Abernon—at this critical time head of the special diplomatic and military British Mission in Poland—called the eighteenth decisive battle of the world:

> "Had the Soviet forces overcome Polish resistance and captured Warsaw, Bolshevism would have spread throughout Central Europe, and might well have

> penetrated the whole continent. . . . There is abundant evidence that the Moscow Government, in concentrating their forces upon Poland, had views extending far beyond the capture of Warsaw. Their ambition— their confident expectation of victory—extended to the countries west of the Vistula and beyond the Polish frontiers."

This opinion was expressed by Lord D'Abernon in his description of those events. The last sentence of the paragraph quoted above reveals the abysmal divergence of aims separating the authors of the plot to which I have already referred. While for General Hoffmann and the military clique in Berlin—who hoped to extract some advantage for Prussia from their machinations with the Bolsheviks—the paramount consideration was to prevent the restoration of Poland, for Lenin and Trotsky the conquest of Poland by Russia was but of secondary importance, although they considered it to be a decisive first step towards the realisation of a much wider scheme which embraced the whole of Europe. "Our road to the West, to the world revolution, leads over the corpse of Poland." Trotsky made this declaration as far back as November, 1919, and his slogan was repeated in General Tukhachevsky's order of the day addressed to the Soviet armies just before the resumed offensive on July 4th, 1920.

The Germans may pretend that in their plottings with Soviet Russia immediately after the Armistice they had no hostile intentions towards Western Europe. Nevertheless, the whole attitude of the Press during this period, so critical for Poland, proves that if they

cherished the illusive hope that after the military defeat of Poland Bolshevism would stop on the German frontiers, they also had great expectations that the Soviet armies victorious on the Vistula would march to the Rhine under the command of German generals. Moreover the attitude of the German Government and even of the German Radical parties at the time would seem to confirm that the whole of Germany, both the Government and the people, were united in the one overwhelming desire: "Poloniam esse delendam" (Poland must be destroyed).

The reports at the time from diplomatic and newspaper sources of this German jubilation over the Russian victories during the earlier stages of the Russo-Polish war were personally confirmed to the author by a friend who was in Berlin at the time. This eye-witness was Mr. Ronald Braden, an Englishman who was the first business man from this country to enter Berlin after the war. He was engaged in opening up trade with the Germans and therefore had no political axe to grind. He stated that as the news came through of the advance of the Red divisions on Warsaw the Berliners literally went wild with joy. Crowds in cafes and in the streets were crying out the German equivalent of: "Now they (the Soviet armies) will soon be in Warsaw". He added that when these things were said in his hearing, and he was recognised as an Englishman, the excited Berliners would frequently follow up this with: "And then you (the British) will see what we shall do!"

The Berlin Government opposed the transport

through Germany of arms and munitions sent to Poland from the West, while German railwaymen stopped the trains, and German dockers in Danzig tried to prevent the unloading of munitions. Indirectly, in this way, Germans assumed their share of guilt in the intended revolutionary attack of Sovietism on Europe. Lord D'Abernon recorded in " The Eighteen Decisive Battles of the World" under August 11th, 1920, that:

> "News from Paris is to the effect that the German representatives there are constantly fishing for an invitation from the Entente to use German military forces against the Soviet."

Lord D'Abernon is sceptical as to the authenticity of this information. Indeed, until now it has never been either confirmed or denied by any reliable authority. This much, however, is certain, that during the whole session of the Peace Conference the German diplomats constantly used the Bolshevik bluff and that they did so for a double purpose. On the one hand they tried to represent to public opinion and to the statesmen and diplomatists in the Allied countries that the hard terms of the Peace Treaty would force the German people and its Government to throw themselves into the arms of Soviet Russia; and on the other hand they asserted that it was Germany and Germany alone who could become the protective dam of European civilisation against the torrent of Bolshevism, and that therefore this dam should not be weakened.

If the Bolshevik bogy—in this particular form, so

profusely used by the Germans to this very day— had been true, it would have been quite natural if the official and semi-official German agents in Paris had taken steps—which they did not, as it happens, at the time recorded by Lord D'Abernon—to obtain the permission of the Allies for the re-entry of German troops into Poland, under the pretext of an alleged defence of that country against the Soviet advance. As will be remembered, a pretext of this kind served to excuse the adventures in the Baltic of General von der Goltze's troops, the liquidation of whose exploits caused so much embarrassment to the Allies and as many misfortunes to the countries visited by these self-styled saviours.

In the interest of historical truth it must be noted that during General Hoffmann's plotting with the Bolsheviks and throughout 1920 it was extremely difficult for Germany to find, not so much the guiding principles of foreign policy, as the proper methods of policy for the carrying out of a given diplomatic action. For it goes without saying that for the great majority of the German people the fundamental principle of foreign policy could not for a moment remain in doubt, and the men of the new regime in Germany found themselves in perfect agreement with the men of the old Hohenzollern regime as to this principle.

This unanimity with regard to future aims is perhaps the basic cause of the rapid recovery, and even strengthening of its former influence, by the specifically Prussian caste of military officers and Junkers. It is this caste

which coined the slogan for the guidance of German national policy: "Down with the Treaty of Versailles", to which in due course the whole German nation submitted. It submitted all the more readily, persuaded as to the righteousness and justice of such a demand, because for three generations all public education in Germany from the elementary schools to the Universities was impregnated with the Prussian spirit, while for a hundred years the most active part of the German educated classes imbued the soul of the German nation with the Hohenzollern legends. That is why the German people believe that the loss of provinces of which Prussia once robbed her neighbours is a wrong inflicted upon Germany. It explains also why the Germans equally believe that the Reparations are a similar wrong because—as they see the question—the damages were caused in a just and defensive war which Germany carried on against a greedy Entente.

Upon the skillful and incessant exploitation of this psychology the men who before the War were responsible for the destinies of Germany—helped by the new elements which came to power after the War — based the perpetuation of their foreign policy; the selfsame policy of Prussian imperialism and militarism which Hindenburg expressed in his admonition addressed to German youth: "Was deutsch war, muss wieder deutsch werden" (What was German once, must become German again), and which is contained in the formula that Germany must regain her former powerful position in the world.

Ever since 1920 the German Press carried on a discussion as to the best methods for the realisation of such a programme of foreign policy. Various so-called "orientations" confronted each other, concerning which everyone claimed that his doctrine should be accepted as the official policy of the German Reich. There was, for example, the so-called "continental " orientation, which proceeded on the assumption that the realisation of a rapprochement between Germany and France, and the conversion of the French politicians and nation to the belief that in future France would have nothing to fear from Germany would soonest permit Germany to satisfy her revangiste tendencies on her other frontiers. There was another, an "English" orientation, later inflated into an "Anglo-Saxon" one, which, on the contrary, proceeded on the assumption that leaning on England, and perhaps on the United States, offered more efficacious guarantees of success within a wider scope of territorial revision.

The two orientations had this in common that they were both eager to exploit every misunderstanding and friction which could arise, and, indeed, soon began to arise, between the Allies of yesterday. The two orientations, or rather the two variants of the same "Western" orientation, were opposed by the so-called "Eastern" orientation, which based its calculations for the future upon Russia. But the "Eastern" orientation likewise had two variants, in so far as one proposed to build upon Bolshevik Russia while the other cherished the hope of a restored

Tsarist Russia. The hinge upon which the Eastern orientation hoped to fasten all political activity was in the first place the case of Poland.

It is, of course, not surprising that this wealth of orientations should have led in the end to a complete confusion of German public opinion. The most characteristic symptom of this confusion was the fact that General Max Hoffmann, the principal author of the first Prusso-Bolshevik plot directed against the security of Europe, devoted the last few years of his life to the service of an exactly opposite conception, and raised his voice and exerted his influence in order to form a grand coalition of Germany with the Western European countries in a crusade against Bolshevik Russia.

Obviously, in the mind of General Hoffmann there was no place for Poland in this anti-Soviet European coalition, because the extension of German rule over all the territories of Poland was to be the price which a future Russia would have to pay for the restoration of Tsardom. Even to-day there has arisen an heir to this plan of a Franco-German, or united European, crusade against Bolshevik Russia, in the person of Herr Arnold Rechberg, whose sermons on the subject in the Parisian Press are interpolated with threats to the effect that should such a crusade fail to materialise Germany would be obliged to throw herself into the arms of Red Russia.

In the Berlin Government itself these various currents existed for several years side by side without either fighting each other openly or coalescing into one

direction. It was during this period that the German Government hoped that by sabotaging the stipulations of the treaties with regard to Disarmament and Reparations, it would create between the former Allies friction so profound as to permit a complete cancellation of those obligations or their reduction to a minimum.

It must be admitted that these tactics did succeed in hacking out serious fissures in the once solid Allied front, but, contrary to German calculations, they never led to an open conflict, not even during the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. But this occupation brought about the disastrous crisis of monetary inflation in Germany herself which convinced the leaders of German policy that a frontal attack on the Treaty of Versailles could not succeed if undertaken prematurely.

In the light of this experience the methods of the Wilhelmstrasse undenvent a decisive change, inspired and executed in masterly fashion by the late Dr. Gustav Stresemann. He became the symbol of that "cunning, patient" Germany to whom, in the words of the French writer it will not be difficult to prepare the plans of aggression based upon material means considerably exceeding the limits drawn by the Treaty of Versailles.

The late Gustave Stresemann stood head and shoulders above the other post-war German politicians. He was probably the first German statesman of front rank since Bismarck. Nothing, therefore, is further from my purpose than to attempt to belittle anything of his reputation. On the contrary I feel that perhaps

it would be a case of putting that reputation in truer perspective if I hazard the suggestion here that he was more a competent Nationalist during his last phase—the phase of his famous policy of "appeasement and fulfilment"—than during those earlier days when his nationalism found a cruder form of expression. Stresemann was frequently misunderstood by his fellow countrymen; and since his death his memory appears to be singularly under-appreciated in Germany. The reason for this is, I think, as I wrote in the Fort-nightly Review a few years before his death, that Stresemann knew he could arrive at Nationalist ends more surely, and in the end more quickly, by the subtle methods of compromise and negotiation, than could his more loud-voiced and less patient fellow-countrymen in the extreme Nationalist camp. Stresemann, as I wrote at the time, was a better Nationalist than they, but few Germans realised this at the time.

However, before this change set in—which during the scarcely six years long activity of the "new Bismarck" undermined the foundations of the Treaty of Versailles in all its parts without sparing even the Covenant of the League of Nations—there occurred another episode which gives us the key to the supremely subtle political mechanism which rendered possible all the great successes of Dr. Stresemann. The latter, however, was not the engineer who assembled this mechanism; it originated in the German Foreign Office; and its construction proves that the Bismarckian tradition is still alive among the professional German diplomatists, and that in the Wilhelmstrasse it has not

been forgotten yet that the corner stone of Bismarck's greatness was laid by the military agreement—the Alvensleben Convention—concluded with Russia.

I refer, of course, to the Russo-German Treaty concluded at Rapallo on April 16th, 1922, which caught unaware the whole international diplomacy assembled in conference at Genoa and all the big political figures with Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand at their head. To make this episode even more savoury it may be stated that the Rapallo Treaty came equally as a surprise to the exponents of the two shades of the so-called "Western orientation" in Germany (represented in the person of Dr. Walter Rathenau, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich) who were supposed to possess a decisive influence upon the course of German Foreign Policy.

It has been remarked in the preceding pages that for several years there existed in the Berlin Government itself side by side, without actually opposing each other and also without reaching a common ground, various tendencies of the "Eastern" policy. Among the heads of the German Foreign Office there showed itself already during the Great War the tendency to restore that "Berlin-Petersburg wire," against the snapping of which Bismarck had repeatedly issued warnings during his life and in his memoirs. Furthermore there was the alleged Berlin intrigues with the Imperial Russian Court for the conclusion of a separate German-Russian peace during the Great War, giving rise, it was said, to profound anxieties on the part of the Entente diplomacy.

As long as there existed even the most illusory possibility of a restoration of Tsardom, German diplomacy pretended to exorcise even the very thought of any understanding with Soviet Russia, and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau—as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Republic before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles—was the principal representative of this uncompromising policy. But it was the selfsame Count Brockdorff-Rantzau who, after having refused, it will be remembered, to accept the terms of peace in May, 1919, became the most zealous partisan of the Eastern orientation; and who having subsequently become the German ambassador in Moscow, used his great influence in Berlin to obstruct any political moves and conceptions which he considered incompatible with this orientation. He acted in this way ostentatiously even during the time when it seemed that Dr. Stresemann was the all-powerful master of the Wilhelmstrasse, the director of which, Baron Ago von Maltzan, had to remove himself to dignified ambassadorial exile in Washington.

It has never been ascertained what proportions of the share of responsibility for the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo should be allotted to Baron von Maltzan and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau respectively. This much, however, is certain: that the merit was not exclusively theirs nor of the Russophiles in the German Foreign Office. There is weighty evidence to the effect that very early, at least as early as 1921, another agency (less than any other entitled to interfere with the course of Foreign Affairs) worked on the

same lines as Baron von Maltzan. That agency was and has remained until to-day the Ministry of the Reichswehr, which from March, 1920, was under the charge of Dr. Otto Gessler, the only irreplaceable member of all the Berlin cabinets up to 1928. During all this time and almost to the very end, the Minister of Defence, Dr. Gessler, officially professed to be a member of the democratic party. Actually his bourgeois Swabian bonhomie was an excellent screen behind which proceeded comfortably the reconstruction and development of the German military power, contrary to the Treaty and in spite of the vigilance of over five hundred Allied officers employed by the Inter-Allied Commission for the Control of German Disarmament. During Dr. Gessler's term of office there took place in the military sphere that German escape from the control of the victors and that renewed seizure by the "Old Gang", one after another, of the old positions, which M. Gauvain forecasted already in April, 1919. I allude to the building up of Germany's new war-organisation by General von Seeckt.

General von Seeckt, the creator of the Reichswehr, and the protagonist of the Russo-German collaboration, is a military personality much more interesting than the usual product of the German military system. He has the "German Great General Staff mentality" in regard to his efficiency and organising capacity; but he possesses also something which the general staff mentality in Germany has generally lacked— vision! Ludendorff was extraordinarily efficient, but he had no vision, no political instinct; and he could

never get beyond the limitations of the specialist. General von Seeckt has vision, and political instinct to a high degree. In addition to being a specialist of the first rank, he is an intellectual soldier and a political philosopher.

This rather dry looking man, very spick and span, with a glinting monocle in his eye, has systematised into a definite political creed the old pre-War Prussian doctrine of "Might is Right". But unlike his cruder predecessors he has not contented himself with an arrogant assertion. He has made of it a reasoned philosophy and applied it to the conditions of the modern post-war world. As Lord D'Abernon wrote of him, in Portraits and Appreciations, he has "a broader mind than is expected in so tight a uniform, a wider outlook than seems appropriate to so precise, so correct, so neat an exterior."

It was typical of General von Seeckt that he turned the Versailles prohibition of a conscript army to Germany's advantage by creating in the Reichswehr a small, professional force which is more formidable than most conscript armies. It is likewise typical of him that he would, if needs be, use this instrument of his own creation with equal ruthlessness in putting down a Communist rising or collaborating with a Red army in the field.

The presence of a Hohenzollern prince at a military review roused public opinion sufficiently to bring about the retirement of General von Seeckt from his post as head of the Reichswehr. But he created a new military dynasty, and the von Seeckt tradition

will go on. The present head of the Reichswehr, General von Hammerstein, is carrying on that tradition. The personalities may change but the work will go on just the same. For von Seeckt laid his foundations solidly.

Certainly we have not heard the last of this famous soldier. When he retired from his military post he took up politics of a moderate colour. Many competent German observers believe that he may yet be destined to play a big role in the political arena, and prophets are not wanting who will tell you that upon the death of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg the next occupant of the Presidency of the Reich will be General von Seeckt.

If General von Seeckt was able to bring to realisation in a masterly way the prophecy of the French writers, viz. that "the hundred thousand professionals will create the cadre of a dangerous force", he, on the other hand, was not at all content with a merely passive attitude, but on the contrary he served as a very intelligent screen—a screen with initiative. In his hands were the threads of all the secret military formations, of that notorious "black" Reichswehr, which though sometimes an "enfant terrible"' of its Minister (to mention only the putsch in the fortresses of Kiistrin and the so-called Fehme murders), could always be sure of protection from his paternal hand (as instanced by the advancement of the officer who compromised himself in the Kiistrin putsch). In his office there worked on contract the retired Colonel Nicolai, head of the German Secret Service during

the war, who had made all the civil departments of the Empire tremble.

It is common knowledge that ever since 1921 Colonel Nicolai frequently visited Russia, and that until recently other officers of the Reich were visiting Russia, among others Colonel (now General) Schleicher and General Hammerstein-Erqourd, the present Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr. Now, it has been ascertained and repeatedly discussed in the Berlin weekly, Die Weltbuhne, that already in 1921, or a full year before the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo, negotiations were going on between Berlin and Moscow for the transfer of the German aeroplane factories to Russia. It was already, then, that an accomplice was looked for and found in a foreign Power which became the secret receiver of war material kept ready for use in the event of a crisis.

At that time the chancellorship of the Reich was in the hands of Dr. Josef Wirth, while the ministry of Foreign Affairs was in the hands of Dr. Rathenau, both equally profuse and eager in their assurances to the effect that they were carrying out the policy of fulfilment of Germany's Treaty obligations. Can it be reasonably supposed that residing in the Chancellor's palace Dr. Wirth was entirely ignorant of the happenings in the palace in the Bendlerstrasse, the headquarters of the Ministry of the Reichswehr? Or can it be supposed that Dr. Rathenau was ignorant of the fact that the permanent director of his Ministry, Baron von Maltzan, had already drafted a treaty with Russia approved by the rulers of Soviet Russia?

There are too many proofs, circumstantial but convincing enough, to the contrary, for anybody to believe that this was the case. The Germans, however, adopted an attitude of injured innocence. When on Monday, April 17th, 1922, the news spread like a prairie fire in Genoa that Dr. Wirth, Dr. Rathenau and M. Tchitcherin, after a prolonged conference at Rapallo, had signed overnight a treaty between Germany and Russia, the first treaty with the Soviets to be signed after the war, there was amazement, bewilderment and not a little indignation amongst the assembled diplomatists of the Powers. The Germans, accurately gauging the effect created by the Rapallo Treaty, immediately put forward a semi-official version to the effect that Baron von Maltzan was the Mephistopheles who from the hand of the reluctant and obstinately resisting Minister had snatched the signatures under the German-Russian Treaty! Even to this day this version is reverently preserved by both official and unofficial Germany.

Lord D'Abernon once described Baron von Maltzan as "the cleverest man who has worked in the Wilhelm-strasse since the war ". He also wrote of him: "Personally I had a great liking for Maltzan and a sincere admiration for his talents. At the same time it is fortunate that he left Berlin in 1923 to become Ambassador at Washington. He would not have been in key with Stresemann. Had he remained as Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, there would have been no Locarno. He was too wedded to the Russian-connection".

Von Maltzan had an oriental cast of mind, and so his policy ran naturally to collaboration with Russia. Due allowance should be made for this fact, which must have accounted for much of the pro-Russian policy he elaborated behind the scenes at the Wilhelm-strasse. But it is not the entire explanation. Of equal importance is the fact that von Maltzan was in the Bismarckian tradition, the tradition which stipulated good relations between Germany and Russia. Von Maltzan's personal leanings towards Russia but added a deeper colour to what was in any case a definite tradition and a defined policy.

From the point of view of the German protagonists of the "Eastern Orientation", von Maltzan was the best man to conduct German-Russian relations into friendly and collaborative channels. But it is not accurate to attribute to him the role of a Holstein in a new connection. Von Maltzan was but one of a whole galaxy of statesmen, officials and officers who favoured the Russo-German connection. It is only that he was the most subtle of them all.

Those who peruse the Treaty of Rapallo and are unfamiliar with the circumstances in which it was concluded, cannot perhaps make out why official and unofficial Germany should still be looking for a scapegoat who could be made responsible for the signing of the Treaty. Its stipulations, which were communicated to the other powers without delay, were apparently of a purely economic character and their only uncommon feature was the drastic annulment of all that preceded the War and the

establishment of the Communist economic system. This meant that as between Germany and Russia all pre-treaty financial obligations—both in respect to Governments and to private individuals—were to be mutually cancelled. A new leaf was to be turned upon which the economic realities would open new business accounts between a capitalist and a socialist State.

If, then, this seemingly harmless if original document provoked such a storm of protest at the time, there must have been more to it than met the eye. The behaviour of the Germans both at the time and since affords the best proof that this actually was the case. For the Germans protested then, and are still protesting now, that the signatures appended to the Treaty by the responsible directors of the policy of the Reich were secured by a surprise move, a move alleged to have been executed at Rapallo by Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and Baron von Maltzan in collusion with M. Tchitcherin and M. Litvinoff. By obstinately standing by this version its authors admit by implication that the conclusion of such a Treaty at that time and in the existing circumstances was an act of gross and deliberate disloyalty towards Western Europe.

It was Mr. Lloyd George who levelled this accusation there and then. It may safely be assumed, in the light of the close Russo-German military collaboration which followed, that the provisions of the Rapallo Treaty, in spite of their economically innocent air, laid the broad foundations of that detailed association

between Berlin and Moscow which later took the form of the Abmachungen.[1]

There may be many and divided opinions on the plans which the British Prime Minister had in view when convening the Genoa Conference, the first Conference which was expected to lead to a decisive discussion and perhaps also to a modus vivendi between the Soviets and Europe. It is indeed permissible to suspect that Mr. Lloyd George at this particular time attached more importance to the likely electoral effect the Conference might have in England than to the actual result of the Conference itself, and that his indignation at the German surprise move was prompted more by his wrath because of the spoiling of this electoral effect than by the breakdown of the Conference. At all events, the Conference broke down before it had properly begun, because it demonstrated to the Bolsheviks Western Europe's lack of solidarity in adopting a policy towards them.

However, all these secondary considerations do not weaken the opinion expressed towards the end of April, 1922, by the German writer, Morus, to the effect that the Treaty of Rapallo was flagrantly directed against Europe. This is what he wrote in the Berlin weekly Die Weltbuhne of April 27th, 1922:

> "At a moment when after four years of war and three years of post-war confusion, the European Powers have

[1] Since the above was written there has taken place (during April, 1932) a celebration of the Rapallo Treaty. Chancellor Bruning lunched M. Litvinoff at Geneva, and, the Soviet Foreign Office

> assembled in order to take common counsel as to their future, Germany—apart from Russia the one country utterly dependent on the help of others—commits this escapade and isolates herself voluntarily, excludes herself from the Conference table, rises in opposition to all the other Powers, deprives herself of the sympathies gained by her moderation during the first few days of the Conference, and falls again under suspicion that she is the disturber of peace in Europe. In 1907 at the Hague it was a Prussian General of the Guards who frustrated the understanding of nations; now it is the representative of the German Republic who must bear the odium of having destroyed the seeds of a European community of nations. But then it was possible to find an escape with the modest consolation that the fault lay only with the 'Wilhelmian' regime of violence— this time, however, responsibility falls upon the whole German nation. This is the most fatal result of the Treaty of Rapallo."

entertained the German Charge d'Affaires at Moscow, the Soviet officials declaring that it was hoped that in the future it would be possible to broaden the basis of the Rapallo Treaty.

CHAPTER IV

THE ABMACHUNGEN: GERMAN MILITARY INDUSTRIES ESTABLISHED IN SOVIET RUSSIA

THE repercussions of the German escapade of Rapallo upon the opinion of the world were so powerful that the subsequent reports which came through soon afterwards of further German-Russian agreements were received at the time with something like indifference. One report spoke of secret supplementary economic conventions, as, for instance, the leasing to the German banks for a period of fifteen years of great areas for the cultivation of beetroot in the Ukraine and the taking over of the Ukrainian sugar refineries for the purpose of re-organising this industry; another report dealt with the settling of 25,000 German colonists on the Kuban and the Kerch in the Ukraine; another of the Stinnes group taking control of the Don coal basin; still another of great oil concessions in the Caucasus granted to Krupps, and of a delegation of German and Russian officers to manage the production of petrol and coal for international strategic purposes. Finally, there came reports of the employment of German colonists in South-Eastern Russia as a reserve of the Red Armies.

Since this first crop of reports concerning the secret economic and military German-Soviet Treaties which

appeared in April, 1922, there hardly passed a year without similar news coming from many sources and appearing in the Press of all countries, Germany included, which gave sometimes very detailed information with regard to the alleged secret military alliance existing between Germany and Russia. It is obvious that too much weight cannot necessarily be attached to all Press reports, but on the other hand it is difficult to regard their authenticity as being adequately disproved merely by virtue of the repeated semi-official or even official denials from Berlin or Moscow.

For even if it were true that among the valuable acquisitions of the World War could be counted the so-called Open Diplomacy, it would not necessarily follow that among the equally valuable casualties we could include Secret Diplomacy; or that, since the war, War Offices automatically ceased to harbour secrets

Prudence would advise the student of post-War history to wait until the (as yet) secret supplements and additions in the Treaty of Rapallo will be revealed from trustworthy sources, and, until then, to stick to other indications, throwing more light upon the relations between Berlin and Moscow.

Such indications are numerous enough apart from the fact that General Ludendorff openly said of the Treaty of Rapallo that it will serve German ideas of revanche. Since his nervous breakdown in October, 1918, General Ludendorff betrays a striking lack of balance in his opinions; if, at first, the Treaty of

Rapallo seemed to him a useful instrument of revanche, in his latest books he warns Germany that even if she secures the closest war co-operation with Russia she cannot expect a victory.

The words uttered by Count Brockdorff-Rantzau on the occasion of the presentation of his Letters of Credence as German Ambassador in Moscow carry greater weight, as when he said: "All my knowledge and everything I represent I shall throw into the scale in order to prove that the Treaty of Rapallo opened a new era both for Germany and Russia and therefore not only for Europe but also for the whole world".

This declaration of one of the authors of the Treaty of Rapallo has been fully realised both in the political and the economic sphere.

Ever since that memorable Sunday night, when the Chancellor, Dr. Wirth, and his Foreign Minister, Dr. Rathenau, put their signatures to that document, German policy made the world feel on every occasion that the Reich can look upon Soviet Russia as upon a faithful second, just as Bismarck could look upon Tsarist Russia (from January, 1863—the month of the Alvensleben Convention—till the Congress of Berlin in 1878).

There are many proofs of this relationship. For instance, Locarno, the policy of German understanding with France and the alleged German cooperation in the political pacification and economic stabilisation of Europe, found its equivalent in the German Soviet Treaty of Commerce signed on October 13th, 1925. The entry of Germany into the League

of Nations was accompanied by the Treaty of Berlin of April 24th, 1926, which—as far as its contents have been made public—put against the League of Nations and Article 16, of the Covenant, a more clearly defined German-Soviet League, which lends itself much less to dubious interpretations. And if one further proof were necessary that the times of Bismarck's "Turmhohe Freundschaft mit Russland" have come back and that no trifling frictions can undermine it, there was in December 21st, 1928, one more complementary commercial agreement which removed all possible remaining traces of the rancour caused by the treatment of German specialists in the notorious persecution in Schacht.

During all the international political and economic conferences to which Russia has been invited, but mainly during the discussions preparatory to the disarmament conferences, we meet German-Soviet solidarity in striking contrast to the lack of solidarity and the divergence of political methods and purposes displayed by all the other European Powers. This solidarity goes so far that one is sometimes under the impression that the Soviet representatives, not being bound by any scraps of paper with regard to Europe, are only expressing what the representatives of Germany are still feeling too embarrassed to express.

It is a fact, of course, that the German Reich derived from its commercial and financial relations with Soviet Russia no commercial advantages of any importance; on the contrary, one may rather speak of the disappointed expectations of those German circles which

for a time genuinely believed that the sole trader in Moscow—the Government, which monopolised the foreign trade—would be a welcome substitute for the hundreds of thousands of former big and small customers and thus restore the better part of the huge pre-war German commercial transactions with Russia. But this mutually unremunerative balance of commercial relations, not less so for Russia than for Germany, has been repeatedly settled in the political accounts between Berlin and Moscow. For the specific purposes of German and Russian policy the termination of isolation assumed all the more value the more pronounced became the lack of cohesion in the former Western "Entente" Alliance, and the more probable became the possibility that the fissures appearing in this alliance could be widened into a complete rupture. The above list of the German-Russian Treaties and Conventions concluded in full daylight offers a convincing testimony to the skill with which the "good European" Dr. Stresemann was able to exploit quite openly his extra-European connection. His successors also exploited this repeated double bluff, put up with equal skill both in the Press and in private conversations, to the effect that should the concessions claimed by Germany be refused, the Reich will then turn away from Europe and lean on Russia, or, alternatively, that should the Germany people be driven to despair by the "tribute slavery" a Bolshevik revolution in Germany will become inevitable, a revolution which must necessarily lead to the bolshevisation of the whole of Central Europe.

The advantage derived by Russia from the Treaty of Rapallo consisted in the fact that other countries, following the example of Germany, entered into economic and financial relations with the Soviets, leaving in abeyance the problem of pre-War State and private obligations which the Soviets refused to recognise.

It is necessary to add here another item which had an incomparably greater value for the Red Tsars than all the practical possibilities of developing the Communist system with the assistance of Western capitalists. This item is represented by the convenient centre for world agitation which after the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo the Soviets were able to establish in Europe. This "heart of Europe", as the Germans like to call their country, is nowadays pumping the Bolshevik poison into all the arteries of the Continent.[1] It will be remembered that this Communist propaganda conducted from Berlin led to an acute conflict between the Soviet mission and the Berlin police, similar to the Arcos affair in London, and that none other than Dr. Stresemann himself exerted his utmost effort to smooth over the affair.

All the above facts covering political, economic and financial matters taken together present a picture

[1] In more recent years, at the time of the Indian Round Table Conference in London, the leaders of the Third International in Moscow played with the idea of sending propagandist agents to London to get into touch with the Indian delegates. In connection with this scheme they also proposed to transfer part of the activities of the European advance post for Communist propaganda from Berlin to London. The Soviet Ambassador at London, however, protested against the advisability of such a move, and Moscow finally decided against transferring any of the Berlin activities to London.

if not of a complete alliance, then at least of a sufficiently cordial Russo-Bolshevik Entente. Had the world remained ignorant of the treaties upon which is based this restoration of the traditional Russo-German intimacy to the detriment of Europe, the practice of German and Russian policies during the last decade would by itself be an adequate proof of the existence of such treaties.

Military affairs present a similar picture. Here, too, it would be possible to dismiss as superfluous the question whether the Treaty of Rapallo or some subsequent German-Russian agreement contained also secret military clauses or not. For there is a long chain of evidence consisting of incontrovertibly established facts, demonstrating the practice of German-Russian military co-operation extending over many years, which goes to prove that there is no need of an open (or secret for that matter) agreement where a conspiracy suffices.

Let us examine these facts and this practice. In the process of examination I shall use only German sources and select only those facts which have been confirmed by their perpetrators, by official German documents or by debates in the German Parliament. Of the details brought to the notice of public opinion by private individuals I shall consider only those which have never been officially denied although, of course, I do not exaggerate the value of such German denials.

It has been stated in an earlier chapter that the first nucleus of the German-Russian conspiracy activities directed against the interests of Europe was laid by General Max Hoffmann, who, however, later on went over to the anti-Bolshevik orientation. His collusion with the command of the Soviet armies during the German evacuation of the Russian provinces facilitated for the Bolshevists the opening of military operations towards the West. The openly avowed object of these operations was the spread of the Communist revolution across Central and Western Europe, "the export of revolution", as Trotsky described it in November, 1919.

The defeat in the war with Poland caused the taking up of new contracts between the Russian and German military circles. No less a personage than Dr. Gessler, the German Minister of Defence, furnished the most authentic testimony to the truth of this statement. When hard pressed in consequence of the Manchester Guardian revelations of December 3rd, 1926, with regard to the existence in Russia of German aeroplane and munition factories, the German Minister of Defence, Dr. Gessler, declared (February, 1927) in the Reichstag in the presence of the Communist deputies, Torgler and Creutzburg, that "after the unfortunate Russo-Polish war, the Russian Government applied to Germany with the request for assistance in the organisation of the Russian army".

The preliminary negotiations took place in 1921. General von Seeckt participated in them. They formed the basis of all the subsequently effected

armament deliveries. On February 24th, 1927, the Rheinische Zeitung published a report concerning a secret meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag to the effect that the Minister of the Reichswehr, Dr. Gessler, fully confirmed the assertions of the Social Democrats concerning the deliveries of munitions to the Reichswehr from German factories in Russia. At the same time he gave detailed information of the disposition of the immense sums which, during the time of acutest inflation in Germany, were being sent to Russia in payment for munitions. Dr. Gessler himself confessed the existence of agreements concerning munitions and the deliveries of munitions. The Berliner Tageblatt referred with greater circumspection to the same meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and stated that although it did not reveal new information, yet from the declaration made by the representative of the Government of the Reich it could be assumed that the information already published, on the relations of certain authorities of the Ministry of the Reichswehr with the more or less official organs of the Soviet Republic, obviously agreed on the whole with the facts. (See annexe, page 191, the pamphlet Sowjetgranaten published in March, 1927, by the Praesidium of the German Social-democratic Party.)

Direct results of the Soviet request for German co-operation in the reorganisation of the Red Army were, it would seem, the journeys to Moscow of Colonel Bauer, formerly on the General Staff of General Hoffmann (the same who, a few years ago

died in China, where he went on a secret military mission) and of Colonel Nicolai. Afterwards many military officers and technicians went there in order to study the conditions of the Russian army and the possibilities of establishing German war-industry factories in Russia. There followed a long series of conferences between the representatives of the two armies and Governments in Berlin and Moscow, the dispatch of numerous German military and technical instructors and skilled workmen to Russia, and, vice versa, the dispatching of Russian officers and specialists to Germany for purposes of training.

The earliest results of the new contact were that even before the signature of the Treaty of Rapallo the Ministry of the Reichswehr instructed the firm of Junkers Werke, of Dessau, to establish an aeroplane factory in Russia, and that in December, 1921, two representatives of this firm, together with two officers of the Reichswehr, went to Russia for the purpose of concluding an agreement. The provisional agreement was concluded only in 1923, but in the meantime the factory for the serial production of Junkers aeroplanes in Russia had been constructed and put into operation. The story of this first joint German-Russian undertaking, aiming at the circumvention of the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, is very typical and deserves to be known in closer detail.

At the time when German-Soviet military relations were being established, the aeroplane factory of Professor Junkers was the only one in Germany capable of resuming large scale production. This

was the reason why the Reichswehr Ministry applied to it, although all the experts knew very well that Professor Junkers, as inventor and constructor, was far less interested in purely military constructional aims than in civil aeronautics. However, since the War—when, thanks to war funds, the Junkers Werke were established, and their management placed in the hands both of active and retired military officers— Professor Junkers was obliged to agree, in spite of his opposition to the idea, to contracts with Russia. This agreement was forced on him by German military circles. These circles wanted to secure an air force, the possession of which was prohibited to them by the Treaty of Versailles. In particular they wanted an air fleet composed of high-power aeroplanes, the construction of which in Germany was also prohibited up to 1926. Although Professor Hugo Junkers was the first (in 1917) to cause a genuine technical revolution at the front by constructing an all-metal aeroplane with a steel body, better protected against rifle fire than all previous machines, his main attention was always concentrated upon civil aviation.

The defects of the Junkers aeroplanes from the military point of view were known to the Reichswehr Ministry, but the Germans were in a great hurry to obtain a secret air force even of inferior value.

For the financing of the Russian enterprise the Junkers Werke received twenty-one million gold marks. In its financial aspect the Russian enterprise proved to be a complete failure for Junkers. There were several reasons for it. The main reason lay in the commercial

inability of the management of the factory, which was composed, as I have already mentioned, of former military officers, who had retained from the war period a complete contempt for commercial calculations. Professor Junkers' hopes for the development of civil aviation in Russia were not realised. In addition, misunderstandings had arisen between the Government partners of this forbidden enterprise: the Reichswehr Ministry wanted to lay its hands on all machines produced in Russia, while the Russian Government were reluctant to part with them. Finally, the Ministry of the Reichswehr started an unfair competition with Junkers, inviting other German firms to take up similar work outside Germany, such as, for example, the firms of Dornier and Rohrbach, or the Dutch firm of Fokkers. These firms, in opposition to Junkers, perfected types of aeroplanes for military purposes. They received from the German Government immense subsidies, and, thanks to the support of the Government given to the organisation of civil aviation in Germany and other countries, they soon left Junkers behind. Until the end of the inflation period in Germany, during the tenure of office by the Ministers of Finance Herren Hermes (1923), Dr. Luther (1924), and von Schlieben (1925), the Ministry of the Reichswehr from time to time subsidised the Junkers Werke with new funds (whether millions or milliards of paper marks—nobody knows). But the so-called "War in the Ruhr" and the mad policy of billions of paper marks came to an end, and the mark became stabilised. Then the final supremacy in

pseudo-civil but, in reality, camouflaged military aeroplane construction fell to Aero Lloyd Comp., afterwards transformed into the Deutsche Lufthansa. The last blow to Junkers was the consent of the Powers given in 1926 to the abolition of the restrictions concerning the horse-power of German aeroplanes.

Already in April and May, 1926, and long before the Manchester Guardian revelations, the German Press discussed the financial difficulties of Junkers, with cautious allusions to the Russian affair, while a number of Members of Parliament and other personages were in possession of a confidential Memorandum by Professor Junkers containing the most precise information on the secret Russo-German collaboration in the field of aviation. Professor Junkers had no alternative but to write this Memorandum, because in his contracts with the Reichswehr and the Russian Government he had renounced the right, in case of dispute, of recourse to the ordinary courts of law, while arbitration courts appointed by the German Government, and composed of various Ministers, would not satisfy his claims for compensation for losses incurred on the Russian contracts. After the Manchester Guardian published its revelations, the German Press felt free to discuss the matter, particularly in the Republican organs. The Reichstag also debated the affair. It has been established that as far back as 1925 the Junkers Werke received from the Government of the Reich eighteen million marks as compensation for their losses in Russia on condition that they would give up 80 per cent. of their shares

in the Junkers Luftverkehrs-Aktien Gesellschaft, which was amalgamated with Aero Lloyd, into the new Deutsche Lufthansa Comp. This amalgamation led to a further deterioration of the financial position of Junkers—all the more so as the eighteen million marks did not cover entirely the Russian losses. The factories of Junkers in Russia became State property, and by the Spring, 1926, the factory in Dessau was again in debt for another eighteen millions. Under the pressure of the confidential Memorandum of Professor Junkers—and also of the negotiations in Paris on aeroplane construction, in the course of which the Western Powers, and especially Britain, informed of the existence of Junkers factories in Russia, insisted upon guarantees against similar German abuses in future—the German Government decided to pay the rest of the debts.

The importance of the Junkers affair in the policy of Germany has been accurately described by Morus in an article published in the Die Weltbuhne on December 14th, 1926. There we read as follows:

> "A few days before Herr Stresemann had been awarded the Nobel peace prize, the Manchester Guardian published proofs that there existed for the past five years a community of armaments between Germany and Russia, that with the support of the Bendlerstrasse and the knowledge of the Wilhelmstrasse, German firms are manufacturing war material in Russia, that the Reichswehr imports from Russia arms and munitions, and that Herr von Seeckt and his men are in close collaboration with the heads of the Red Army. The reception given this revelation in Germany is utterly depressing.

There is nothing astonishing in the fact that the Press of the extreme Right attempts to set in motion the penal apparatus against State treason, showing at the same time unfeigned joy at the favourable state of German-Russian armaments. But the behaviour of the Left is shameful. The pacifists maintain with a smile of superiority on their lips that the information published by the Manchester Guardian contains nothing new, for the essential material is taken from the Junkers Werke Memorandum, the contents of which has been known since last Spring by every politically educated person and kept by him in his desk. Thus the German-Russian military convention, the existence of which has been a hundred times officially denied by the authorities, but is even now actually in operation, may be regarded as a commonplace. Why, then, all this excitement? But farther to the Left it is being whispered: Children do not talk about it! The whole affair is only a row made by the Social-democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) against the Communists!

"As far as the question itself is concerned it is perfectly irrelevant whether the Socialdemocrats, who made such a fuss about it, had an eye on internal political agitation, partly against Gessler, partly against the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands). Thus it ought to be the duty of other parties to draw the proper conclusions and consider the proofs supplied by the Manchester Guardian for what they actually are from the point of view of foreign policy, namely, irrefutable evidence that in its present form our collaboration with Russia constitutes a great danger of war. I know that for internal political reasons it is being considered unfair on the Left to say anything against Russia. But unfortunately the revelations concerning the military convention only confirm what was said in these pages already after the Treaty of Rapallo and the Treaty of Berlin: that to-day the Western

> policy of Germany means the policy of peace and understanding while the Eastern policy of Germany means the policy of war and revanche.
>
> "It is a fatal mistake for Herr Stresemann and for the many politicians pretending to desire an understanding, if they think that they can oscillate between the Western and Eastern policy and that by leaning on Moscow they can achieve more in Paris. For this much at least ought to be clear: that the Eastern policy in question is being made in the Ministry of the Reichswehr and not in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswdrtiges Amt.) If, however, army generals are given means of power, they are sure to make use of them."

Those few sentences express the characteristics of the double-faced policy of post-war Germany. Side by side with the official policy represented before the world by the German Government of the day, there is being carried out the other unofficial policy, which is being outwardly denounced by the Goverment on every occasion, the actions of which are being formally contradicted, the very existence of which is constantly being denied is spite of actual proofs to the contrary, and the organ of which is the Ministry of the Reichswehr with the knowledge and consent of the Government. It was so before Dr. Stresemann hoisted the flag of understanding with France, and it remained so during his term of office. As long as Germany openly sabotaged the fulfilment of the Treaty of Versailles— mainly with regard to Reparations, until the termination of the "war in the Ruhr"—the German Government remained blind to the existence of the "Black" Reichswehr, to the Fehme murders, to the preparations

going on for an armed conflict with Poland and even with France. It tolerated all the trips of the Reichswehr representatives to Moscow and the holding of military German-Russian conferences in Berlin.

It was exactly after the new policy of Dr. Stresemann had already started, after the Western orientation in the Reich's policy had apparently prevailed, that the "Eastern" orientation had its greatest triumphs in the Ministry of the Reichswehr and became systematically organised. The Reichswehr got rid of those elements within Germany which, as the Kustrin putsch showed, could not be entirely relied upon and were prone to launch on premature adventures, but on the other hand, the official and unofficial relations, both open and secret, between the Reichswehr and Soviet Russia were being established and developed. Parallel with the denials of any military significance attaching to these relations, German courts of law prosecuted as traitors everybody in Germany who dared to speak or to write about the "Black Reichswehr", about the Fehme murders, or about the munition and war material factories, which, beyond the German frontiers, worked under German orders.

In its revelations of December 3rd, 1926, the Manchester Guardian mentioned that even before the final contract with the Soviets was signed, the firm of Junkers was seriously perturbed to learn that the German Reichswehr Ministry entered into similar agreements with other German armament firms for the purpose of manufacture of war material in Russia. It was indeed proved that there

existed a military convention between the Ministry of the Reichswehr and the Russian Government. In spite of all difficulties the agreement was ratified in February, 1923, while on May 5th, 1924, a new agreement was signed between the German Reichswehr Ministry, the Junkers Werke and the Soviet Government.

The factories erected in Russia by Junkers became, after the financial crisis of that firm, the property of the Soviet Government. The radical, republican German Press asserted that as long as these factories remained under the management of Junkers—which means really under the management of German officers and run by German workers sent to Russia— the Reichswehr, contrary to the agreement concluded with the Soviets, was unable to obtain from Russia the delivery of a single machine. In spite of these rather unfortunate experiences with regard to the air arm, the relations of the German army with Russia did not cease. Indeed they continued not only to exist, but also to extend, as I shall show in subsequent chapters.

Herr Carl Mertens, the well-known German pacifist and journalist, who because of the persecution to which he was being subjected in Germany went to live in Geneva, published in September, 1930, an important Memorandum on Germany's Disarmament Policy. In this Memorandum zur Deutschen Abrustungspolitik we read on page 16:

> "Time after time the European Powers are being perturbed by reports that the German Reichswehr,

> contrary to the wishes of the leaders of German Foreign Policy, is maintaining peculiar politico-military relations in Russia. These reports are as a rule being denied, but nevertheless they have been rather dramatically confirmed during the last few weeks by the tragic suicide of the wife of an officer of the Reichswehr, Captain Amlinger, who was ordered for service in Russia and was killed in an aeroplane crash. According to most recent Press reports, there exist justifiable suspicions that Herr Amlinger has been murdered. That the above case cannot be isolated may be assumed from the fact that every year a certain number of German transport aeroplanes, converted into military planes and manned by German crews, fly to Russia to participate in manuoevres. During 1929 twenty transport and sporting aeroplanes converted into military planes went to Russia. Among them were included: the plane Albatros L78, Nr. of Licence (Zulassungsnummer) D 1127, pilot Thuis, Commander (Bordward) Dehman, started July 10th, 1929; a Junkers machine G 24, Nr. of Licence G 878 with bomb throwing apparatus installed, observer Leutert, Commander Schubert, pilot unknown, started June 14th, 1929; and a Rohrbach Roland machine Licence D 991, bombing apparatus and machine guns installed (Machinengewhrbestueckung) pilot Bornstedt, started June 15th, 1929."

To obtain an idea of the extent of German-Russian collaboration in the development of aeronautics it may be pointed out that already the first agreement with the Junkers Werke provided—according to the reports of the German Press — for the construction by the Russian branch of Junkers of 300 aeroplanes annually, of which 240 were destined for Germany. All the costs of installing the factories in Russia were

being ostensibly undertaken by the Junkers Werke, but actually, of course, by the German Government. The firm of Junkers established its first factory in Fili, near Moscow, further ones in Samara and Saratov. It built an aerodrome in Lipetsk (province of Tambov) where special courses for German officer pilots were being held to train them in the handling and piloting of high-power scouting machines, which up to 1926 Germany was prohibited from manufacturing. Germany has also an interest in the Moscow aeroplane factory, in the Leningrad aeroplane works and the Kazan aeroplane factory. Considerable activity is being shown by the Germans in the school for pilots in Borisoglebsk.

Every few months a new Group of officer-pilots is being sent to that school to be trained in the handling of battle aeroplanes. From detailed information published by the German Press it appears that the Reichswehr Ministry ceded to Russia even the plans for the construction of heavy battle-planes built of a special kind of duraluminium and new models of engines using special fuels. This and other data were published by the Munchen daily, Muenchner Post, of January 19th, 1927, which published also the names of those officers of the Reichswehr Ministry who went to Russia in 1926 in order to conclude these agreements. The Public Prosecutor at once instituted proceedings against the paper, accusing it of State treason.

The action of the Public Prosecutor prevented the German Republican Press from giving due publicity to these revelations.

CHAPTER V

REICHSWEHR SECRET ACTIVITIES IN SOVIET RUSSIA BROUGHT TO LIGHT

IF to-day German public opinion is better informed about the gazetting of Reichswehr officers for Russia, it is due almost entirely to the aeroplane disaster of Captain Amlinger, which was mentioned in the foregoing, and to the mysterious suicide of his wife. At first attempts were made to spread through the Press another version, namely, that Captain Amlinger was the victim of an accident in a horse race. When the real cause of his death became known, the Reichswehr Ministry published an official statement to the effect that Lieutenant Amlinger retired from active service on July first, being pensioned off with the rank of captain. Indeed, the Reichswehr Ministry systematically maintains the fiction that the officers gazetted for Russia are really pensioned off, and that they accept military service by private contract, on their own account. In the German Rangliste (army list, active list) there occur frequently cases of officers being retired with advancement to a higher rank. After their return from Russia these officers appear in the Rangliste as officers on active service in the higher rank.

The parliamentary and other political circles in Germany are, of course, always in possession of information about the journeys of German Reichswehr officers to Russia and of Soviet officers to Germany. For it is only necessary for them to read the official reports of parliamentary debates in the Reichstag to know of the permanent relationship existing between the Reichswehr and the Red Army. By way of example it may be mentioned that during the debate on the military budget on May 22nd, 1930, the Rapporteur of the Budget, the Socialist Schoepflin said:

> "That the Ministry of the Reichswehr has maintained for a considerable time past the closest relations with the Command of the Red Army is generally known. The fact was known abroad much earlier than in the Reichstag. . . . You may see, therefore, gentlemen, that the Ministry of the Reichswehr is maintaining contacts or relations in Russia, which are causing doubts and distrust in other countries."

During the same debate Deputy Ersing, a member of the Catholic Centrum, after remarking that in his opinion the Reichswehr is aware that in case of need it will have to make a stand against the realisation in Germany of Communist and Bolshevik tendencies added:

> "The question then whether German officers should go to Russia and Russian officers should come to Germany is altogether different." (Etwas anderes ist die Frage, ob dann deutsche Officiere nach Russland und Russische Offiziere nach Deutschland kommen sollen.)

The Deputy Brueninghaus, a member of the German Peoples' Party (Deutsche Volkespartei) said:

> "Wide circles of the members of our party were somewhat astonished to find it to be true that there existed a lively intercourse (ein immerhin reger Verkehr) between the Soviet Army and our Reichswehr. On one hand the head of the Truppenamt General von Hammer-stein took part in the manoeuvres of the Soviet army while on the other hand a number of Soviet Army officers participated in the manoeuvres of our army on the Elbe."

Even more pronounced was the declaration of the Socialist Deputy Kunstler during the same debate:

> "It is known in well-informed circles that Colonel Heim of the Reichswehr went to Moscow soon after his visit to the head of the Truppenamt, General von Hammer-stein. It is being said that an official banquet was given in his honour, at which the Russian War Commissar Voroshiloff and the highest dignitaries of the Red Army were present. Opposite to the German Colonel of the Reichswehr was seated—as another guest of honour— the German Communist, Max Holz, wearing the order of the Red Flag. ... In August last (1929), the Russian Baltic Fleet paid a visit to the German Fleet Swinemunde. The Russian Admiral Reil raised many toasts in honour of the glorious German Fleet. The Russian Admiral invited the German Fleet to pay a visit to Russia, adding the request that the visit of the German Fleet should not be slow in coming. . . . On the other hand the German General Gladitsch[1] delivered the following speech in honour of the Russian Fleet

[1] A misprint in the German original: General Gladitsch should read Admiral Gladitsch.

> and its Commander Admiral Reil: 'this visit of the Russian men-of-war, representing the symbol of our friendly relations, is a continuation of the already existing close relation between the German and Soviet sea navigations. We are taking a lively part in the work on the reconstruction of the Soviet Union.'"

If the beginnings of the active German Soviet plotting may be traced to matters concerning the air-force, this collaboration was soon extended to a much more important sphere, namely the manufacture of poison gases and munitions in factories erected in Soviet Russia with German money and with the eager and uninterrupted co-operation of German officers, German technicians and skilled German workers.

Similarly as in aerial matters, so in the case of other activities, the collaboration of the Reichswehr Ministry with the Soviets is proved by a number of facts brought to light in Germany herself and abroad. Here again, before all these facts became public property, many of them were known to a great many people in Germany's political and parliamentary circles, apart from the military.

In the first place, rumours about these machinations were being circulated among the German working-class parties. In October, 1926, there arose friction between the Socialists and the Communists among the dock workers in Stettin on account of the unloading of three ships carried out under mysterious circumstances. At that time the approved daily wages of dock workers in Stettin amounted to 7.50-9.75 marks, and, overtime included, not more than 15 marks.

Meanwhile the workers engaged for the unloading of the three steamers were receiving 40 marks daily, and during the whole of the three weeks during which they worked they were quartered on board the ships. When the Committee of the Dock Workers' Union (Betriebsrat) attempted to look into the matter the foreman declared that it was a Government affair, about which he was bound to keep silent, while the Communist members of the Committee prevented the dockers engaged upon the work from appearing before the Committee to be cross-examined. It was left to the Manchester Guardian to state openly in its revelations that several steamers arriving from Russia were unloaded in Stettin, and that their cargoes consisted of arms and munitions obviously destined for the Reichswehr. On December 17th, the Deputy Filip Scheidemann delivered a speech in the Reichstag in which he said:

> "We are informed by an absolutely trustworthy source from Stettin that the import of Russian munitions has taken place, by several steamers which at the end of September and the beginning of October arrived from Leningrad. They belonged to the 'Stettiner Dampferkompanie.' Their names were Gotthenburg, Artushoff and Kolberg. The fourth steamer, the name of which is unknown to me, was sunk. The steamers discharged their cargoes off Stettin and the cargoes were put on rail."

This information of the Deputy Scheidemann met with categorical denials from the Communist deputies and the Communist Party. The grotesque situation

thus arose that the German Communists in denying the transport of munitions from Russia to Germany, were actually defending the Reichswehr Ministry; the same Ministry which had declared that in case of necessity it would use all its armed forces to suppress a Communistic outbreak, and which actually did so during the disturbances in Thuringia and Saxony! On such occasions, moreover, the Reichswehr would not be restricted to the use of munitions manufactured exclusively in the Reich! Truly a Gilbertian state of affairs! It seems that in this case German Communists evidently cared less for their own skins than for the interests of the Russian Communists and for the concealment of the military collaboration between the Soviets and Germany.

This clumsy Communistic help in the attempts to smooth over the Stettin affair was of little use to the Reichswehr Ministry, for the Social Democratic Deputy, Kunstler, went to Stettin and interviewed the dock workers on the spot. He published the interviews subsequently and reprinted them in the pamphlet, "Sowjetgranaten-Sowjetrussland als Munitionslieferant fur die Reichswehr:"[1] published in Berlin in March, 1927, by the executive of the German Socialdemocratic Party (Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands). It appears from the interviews of the Deputy Kunstler that the German Communists knew exactly what the steamers from Russia brought into Stettin. The Communistic cell among the dock workers knew it as well as the well-known Communist,

[1] See Annexe: page 178.

Max Holz, at that time member of the Stettin Dock Workers' Committee, who during the meeting of the Council declared explicitly that he knew what was going on in the port. The Deputy Kunstler established that this one shipment of goods consisted of about 3,000 tons of artillery munitions, or (estimating the weight of a shell at 15 lbs.) of at least 350,000 shells. A part of these munitions were trans-shipped to Kiel, and the rest transported by rail farther in the country.

The workers questioned by the Deputy Kunstler declared emphatically that the cargo actually consisted of shells, which they were able to find out because of cases of breakage during the unloading. It seems that the breakages were not quite accidental, because, as one of the workers put it: "We caused breakages purposely as we sometimes do. All this mystery seemed to us so ridiculous." (Wir haben Bruch gemacht, wie das so Ublich ist. Die Geheimniskramerei kam uns so lackerlich vor.)

In his speech of December 17th, 1926, the Deputy Scheidemann spoke also of the poison gas factory erected by the Germans in Trotsk—in the province of Samara. The construction of this factory was begun in 1923 by the organisation specially created for this purpose, the "Society for Promoting Industrial Enterprises" (Gesellschaft zur Forderung gewerblicher Unternehmungen), which was known under the abbreviation of "Gefu". This firm, with a relatively small capital, was founded by the Reichswehr Ministry as a commercial link between the Ministry and the German war industry

in Russia. The "Gefu" carried out, without exception, all the transactions, beginning with the erection of the Junkers factory in Russia, and including the erection of the poison gas factory in Trotsk, the transport of munitions, the forwarding of chemicals from Germany to Russia, and, at last, but not least, the whole financial manipulation in which very considerable funds were involved.

The "Gefu" acted as mediator in supplies, and engaged military experts and specialised workers for employment in Russia, and exercised a direct control over the poison gas and munitions factories established in Russia. The "Gefu" was under the direct control of the Armaments Department (Heereswaffenamt), of the German High Command (Heeresleitung). At the head of the "Gefu" was the retired General von Borries, the former Chief of the General Staff of the XVI Army Corps in Metz, an active member of the Historical Commission of the Archives of the Reich. (Historische Kommission des Reichsarchives). The management of the "Gefu" was composed of the retired Colonel von Lucken, Major Spangenberg and Major Tschunke. The absolute dependence of the "Gefu" upon the Ministry of the Reichswehr and the Chief Command of the Reichswehr was a fact notoriously known to everybody who came into touch with German military activities in Russia. When at the time of their financial difficulties the Junkers Werke made a complaint to General von Seeckt about the methods of the "Gefu", the General replied in a short letter that he entirely approved of the methods

of the "Gefu", that he did not see any reason for making the changes in the organisation of the "Gefu" proposed by Junkers and that on the contrary the "Gefu" was in every respect living up to its duties and proving itself entirely efficacious (this letter was reprinted many times by the German Republican Press and also in the Social-Democratic publication Sowjetgranaten.) In another letter from the Ministry of the Reichswehr, Lieut.-Colonel Senftleben, of the Heereswaffenamt, declared that the "Gefu" is charged with the representation of the interests of the Reichswehr Ministry (see Sowjetgranaten.) Colonel Buchholz, still on active service, and Major Spangenberg, were the permanent delegates of the Heereswaffenamt for dealing with the "Gefu". Not only the management but the entire staff of this company was composed of active and ex-officers.

No less notorious are the financial transactions of the "Gefu" with Soviet Russia. At regular weekly or fortnightly intervals the Company remitted to Moscow, either to the Prombank or the Statebank, sums amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars. The "Gefu" had accounts with the Dresdner Bank and the Darmstadter National Bank running into hundreds of millions of marks. The accounts were being managed by former officers, who retained their connections with the Reichswehr Ministry. During March, 1926, rumours began to circulate in Berlin with regard to these accounts and the numerous remittances to Russia, which were very annoying to the Reichswehr Ministry. Thereupon all the accounts were trans-

ferred to the alleged personal account of Lieut.-Colonel Senftleben. During May of the same year the possibility of the unmasking of the "Gefu" and its activities led to the liquidation of this company and to its substitution by a new company, the Wirtschaftskontor, "Wiko" for short, which took over all the "Gefu" affairs and to which all the accounts in German banks were transferred. The Deputy Kunstler produced proofs in the Prussian Parliament in December, 1926, to the effect that important amounts were being remitted from these accounts to Moscow. (For particulars see Annexe Sowjetgranaten.)

About the same time, in December, 1926, Deputy Kunstler met in Germany several workmen who had worked in the poison gas factory in Trotsk and published his conversation with them. (See Sowjetgranaten). It appears from these interviews that the factory was known as the Russian-German Bersol Factory, Bersol being a kind of explosive salt. The factory was run by the firm Dr. Hugo Stolzenberg, which a few years ago gained world-wide notoriety in connection with the poisoning of several hundred people in Hamburg with fosgen gas.

The same gas was being produced in Trotsk in addition to Lostgas; both gases were known during the war under the names "Yellow Cross" (Gelbkreuz) and "Blue Gross" (Blaukreuz). An idea of the size of the factory may be obtained from the fact that the filling room (Fullraum) was capable of filling with gas one million grenades by one operation.

The workmen received wages in German money

amounting to 700-900 marks per month, of which a part was paid to their families in Germany and a part consisted of an insurance bonus against poisoning. All these accounts, including the payment of taxes paid by the workmen in Germany, were conducted by the "Gefu", which settled them afterwards with the Stolzenberg Company. There were several disputes with regard to these payments and accounts. Wages in Russia were not being paid quite regularly and the families of workers left in Germany also were not receiving their share of the wages punctually. The workmen in Russia threatened to take the matter to the German courts. The ultimatum proved successful because the "Gefu", which means the Reichswehr Ministry, was afraid that such a lawsuit would produce a great political scandal. When some of the workmen, after they returned to Germany, claimed the payment of arrears, General Borries declared that the "Gefu" had settled accounts with the Stolzenberg Company, and advised them to apply to that firm with their claims. However, when the workmen threatened to apply to the Industrial Court (Gewerbegericht), General Borries ordered the "Gefu" to pay them out. During their employment in Russia these workmen were subjected to the most rigorous control. Admittance to the factory was by special permit only, the letters they wrote home were censored, and they were forbidden to subscribe to Socialist papers. They were under contractual obligation to keep silent on everything they heard in Russia, of the nature of their work, etc., under pain of immediate dismissal and

other penalties. As a privilege, they were entitled to elect to the local Soviet a workman who, of course, did not understand Russian. The factory had attached to it two military doctors on active service in the Reichswehr. The factory was under the management of German Experts and military officers sent there by the "Gefu", one of which was Colonel von der Liedt and another Major Tschunke, who was already mentioned as a member of the "Gefu" Board, but who acted in Russia under the assumed name of Teichmann.

All the information collected by Deputy Kunstler and published by him was confirmed by an interview with a workman of Halle published in the Hallesches Volksblatt of January 20th, 1927. This workman was engaged by the firm of Stolzenberg for the execution of some "big assembling works" in Russia, and worked in the gas factory in Trotsk. (See Sowjetgranaten.) Some of the workmen, but only very few, succeeded, on their departure for Berlin, in retaining the special permits or passes issued by the Trotsk factory. These permits were reproduced in facsimile in the pamphlet published by the Executive of the German Socialist Party, and belong to the collection of documents irrefutably proving the German-Russian armaments complicity.

The establishment of German military industries in Russia and their running up till now required— and requires—immense sums of money, which are

out of all proportion to the published German military expenditure, or even to the expenditure which can be deduced from a detailed examination of the total Budget of the German Reich. An approximate idea of the expenses of the Reichswehr in Russia may be obtained from the speech delivered on February 25th, 1927, by the Socialist Deputy, Dr. Breitscheid, during a confidential meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Reichstag. He declared in the presence of the Reichswehr Minister, Dr. Gessler, that during one—the last—quarter of 1926, Germany spent in Russia on the production of arms and munitions 250,000,000 marks (£12,500,000 at par). This sum amounts to one-third of the official budget of the Reichswehr for 1928-1929, and it is out of the question that it could have been included in the smaller budget of the Reichswehr for 1926-1927. It is true, that within the official budget of the Reichswehr, transfers of funds from one item to another are permissible up to almost one third of the total, but detailed examination of all the budget items made regularly by experts in the Republican German Press have shown long ago the purposes for which the Reichswehr spends the funds saved on these transferable items.

These calculations, too, do not make it possible to believe that such large funds could remain free for meeting the costs of the German conspiracy with Russia. The deduction follows automatically that the Minister must be covering those expenses from other secret funds. These funds may be those concealed

in the other administrative Ministries of the Reich, or others, which cannot be traced in the Budget at all. During the confidential meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag mentioned above, the Minister of the Reichswehr, Dr. Gessler, declared that "the maintenance of the factories established in Russia for the manufacture of arms and munitions and the import of same is absolutely indispensable to the interests of the Fatherland". He added also that "the manufacture of munitions in Russia was the only guarantee of defence against the attacks which threatened Germany from Poland".

It will be remembered that a similar argument was used by the successor of Dr. Gessler as Reichswehr Minister, General Groener, in his secret memorandum on the necessity of building the "pocket battleships" published in the January, 1928, number of the London Review of Reviews.

In consequence of the discussion in the Foreign Affairs Committee and at the request of the Socialists in the Reichstag, a parliamentary enquiry was to be held to find out whether the German Reich was still interested in the manufacture of munitions in Russia and whether the Reichswehr had not undertaken new obligations towards Soviet Russia. In fact, a preliminary conference of the representatives of the parties in the Reichstag had taken place. At the outset of the conference, the then Chancellor made the reservation that a thorough discussion of the Russian affair would only be possible on condition of its absolute secrecy. Nevertheless, the well known German pacifist, Herr Otto Lehman Russbueldt, obtained

enough information on the discussion which had taken place at the Conference, to be able to publish in 1930 a pamphlet entitled The Reichswehr. It appears from this publication that in the course of the Conference the Minister of the Reichswehr, Dr. Gessler, admitted again the accuracy of the Manchester Guardian revelations, and as the principal motive for this German-Soviet collaboration—as well as for the equipment by the Reichswehr of the nationalist bodies such as the Stahlhelm with arms and munitions—he indicated the alleged threat of an attack on Germany on the part of Poland. The Conference ended without any practical results, apart from the promise given by the Minister, Dr. Gessler, to the effect that the munition agreements with Russia would be terminated.

Indeed, the military relations between Germany and Russia have ever since assumed forms in which the responsibility of the German Government is more carefully camouflaged than before, by the use of the services of German commercial and industrial companies of an apparently entirely private character. But the agreements have not been actually terminated. On the contrary, the relations have become even more intimate. One of the most important of these Companies is the "German-Russian Notgemeinschajt" (Deutsch-Russische Notgemeinschqft), the main task of which is the recruitment in Germany and the dispatch to Russia of various experts, principally chemists, officers and instructors. Of course they go to Russia over and above a number of officers who are being

sent there on behalf of the Reichswehr either for control or inspection duties or in order to take part in the regularly held conferences of the General Staffs of the two armies, or finally to participate in the manoeuvres of the Red Army. There is full reciprocity with regard to these conferences and manoeuvres. They are frequently being held in Berlin, while numerous Russian officers always take part in the manoeuvres of the German Army.

Since the opening of German Soviet military relations, the number of German officers remaining in Russia has been constantly increasing. While in 1921 there were about 250 German military officers in Russia, their number at present amounts to about 800. In spite of the fact that since 1926 Germany has been released from the restrictions in the construction of high-power-engine-aeroplanes, and that the schooling of pilots in all the requirements of commercial flying in Germany does not now encounter any difficulties, the sending of pilot-officers to Russia for the purpose of military training continues.

It has already been mentioned that after the disaster of Captain Amlinger, the Reichswehr Ministry attempted to persuade public opinion that this officer had been retired from active service in Germany, and accepted service in Russia in his private capacity. This system of concealing military collaboration with Russia is still being continued by the German Government. Already at the beginning of this co-operation

Baron von Maltzan, answering a question put to him in the Reichstag with regard to the sending of German military instructors to Russia, replied to the effect that the German Government refused in principle to supply the Soviets with military instructors, but it could not prevent German subjects accepting private employment in Russia.

When, in connection with the reports of the Amlinger scandal, I published in the London newspaper, the Sunday Referee, in the issue of August 31st, 1930, a disclosure of permanent contacts between the German Reichswehr and the Russian Army, and the Echo de Paris supplemented this disclosure by publishing the names of some of the German officers involved, the Reichswehr Ministry issued a dimenti to the effect that the officers in question had retired from active service years ago.[1] The value of such a denial can best be appreciated by a comparison of the following facts:—in supplementing the report of the Sunday Referee, the Echo de Paris stated that during January and February, 1929, among the German officers staying in Moscow was also General Ludwig, of the Heereswaffenamt. The Reichswehr Ministry declared, however, that these officers "had years ago" retired from active service in Germany. Yet a consultation of the German official Rangliste (Army List) proves that General Ludwig was pensioned off or retired from active service on May 1st, 1929.

It transpired from the debate in the Reichstag on

[1] See Annexe, page 205 for text of Sunday Referee disclosures.

May 22nd, 1930, that the journeys of German military officers to Russia continued after the revelations of the Manchester Guardian. In spite of the secrecy with which the German military authorities attempted to surround the journeys—the officers travelled under assumed names and with forged passports—they were known in wide circles, and reports about them appeared sometimes in the Republican Press in Germany.

From the various sources the following excursions to Russia became known. In August—September, 1928, a group of high officers went to Moscow, including General von Blomberg, chief of the Truppenamt (General Staff), at present Commander of the Army Command I. (Wehrkreiskommando I) in Koenigsberg; Colonel Feiherr von dem Busche-Ippenburg, head of the Wehramt in Berlin; Major Behschmitt, head of the Russian section of the Heeres-statistische Abteilung T 3 (Intelligence Branch of the General Staff); Captain Gallenkamp, aide-de-camp of General von Blomberg. This group of officers had several conferences in Moscow, visited the summer camp of two regiments, visited the German factories in Russia and participated in army manoeuvres in the Kieff area. In December, 1928, again two high German officers had taken part in the war games of the Kieff army corps, while General von Blomberg again participated in a conference of the General Staff in Moscow. Altogether, General von Blomberg was one of the most frequent visitors to Russia. During the following year, 1929, he went there again several

times, always in the company of other officers of high rank, to inspect the fortifications of Kieff, which had been extended under German direction and according to the plans of German military engineers. He also took part in the exercises of the garrison of KiefF, near Vinnitsa; and he visited Kostov, the basin of the Don, and the studs in the Soviet Ukraine.

During August and September, 1929, General Freiherr von Hammerstein-Equord (the then Chief of the Truppenamt, General Staff, at present the successor of General Heye, in the command of the Reichswehr) in the company of Colonel Kuehlenthal, the head of Heeres-Statistische Abteilung, went by sea from Kiel to Leningrad, whence he travelled further on to Moscow, Astrakhan, Kharkov, Kieff and Zhitomir, where he took part in the fortnightly manoeuvres. In 1930, General von Hammerstein sent Colonel Heim on a special mission to Moscow.

The list could be considerably lengthened by the addition of other names and ranks. However, it must be pointed out here that the close contact which exists between the German army and German air-forces and the Soviets has a parallel in the domain of naval armaments. This relationship started at a somewhat later date in 1922, when the German naval Captain, Lohmann—the same, whose name a few years afterwards became notorious in connection with a film affair in Germany, and the construction of German submarines in Vigo (Spain)—went to Leningrad on a special mission, to study the dock and port equip-

ment in Northern Russia. This mission has been strengthened by the dispatch to Russia of several German naval engineers, and as a result of their studies an agreed plan, for the reconstruction of the Russian naval forces with Germany's assistance, has been fixed.

On July 28th, 1931, the Paris daily, La Liberie, published the general outlines of this plan, and certain details concerning its execution. This plan comprised both the Baltic and the Black Sea. It provided for the completion of cruisers and battleships, the construction of which was started but not completed in the Baltic and Black Sea dockyards, and the construction of new torpedo-boat destroyers and mine-layers, all with the material and technical assistance of Germany. Neither has the construction of submarines been neglected in this programme. The component parts of undersea boats were being manufactured in various German factories and shipped to Russian naval yards, where the assembling of the boats took place. During the last few years there were sent from Germany to Russia several million tons of manufactured material for the construction of the men-of-war and submarine craft; and the German steamer Alma Kaiser and the Russian Taifun II transported to Leningrad from the naval dockyards "Vulkan", of Stettin, a whole series of parts of torpedo boats, the construction of which had been started but not completed during the world war, and which were then assembled in the Leningrad yards.

Similarly, repairs and the finishing of Soviet fleet units, the extension and the modernising of Russian naval ports, the equipment of the Russian navy with Diesel engines, with boilers, and with all kinds of spare parts is being regularly supplied from Germany.

The banquet, given in honour of the Russian war-fleet in Swinemunde, which I have already mentioned, was only the external symbol of an intimate collaboration, the practical expression of which is to be found in the joint annual naval manoeuvres of the two fleets in the Baltic. The fact that such manoeuvres have been taking place has been established by careful observation from the German and Polish coasts for a number of years.

In his speech the Deputy Kunstler only confirmed what had been known to the population of the Baltic coast; a population accustomed to the regular appearance on the horizon, every year, and at a given season, of the Russian and German fleets.

M. Rene Marchand, in his article published by La Liberie on June 18th, 1931, stated that on one such occasion a powerful Russian squadron, the composition of which he exactly described, approached the Polish coast to within a distance of two sea-miles, and started a wireless conversation with the German station at Pilau, using for the purpose the Russian naval code. There can be no doubt that there exists an inner relationship between this intimacy of the German and Russian naval forces and the recently effected transference of the principal German naval base from

Wilhelmshafen on the North Sea to Kiel on the Baltic. At the same time Russia transferred her two strongest units of the Baltic Fleet to the Black Sea, after having obtained from Turkey the permission for the passage of those ships through the Straits.

CHAPTER VI

POTENTIEL DE GUERRE

UP till now I have been dealing mainly with the historical development of the illicit military relations between the German Reich and the Soviets. But the paramount significance of these German-Russian machinations, its menace to the peace of Europe, lies in the fact of the gigantic dimensions which, with the lapse of years, this collaboration has now assumed. It can be said, without any exaggeration, that from 1921 till the present day Russia has been able, thanks to Germany, to equip herself with all kinds of arms, munitions, and the most up-to-date war material for an army of several millions; and that thanks to her factories manufacturing war material in Russia, Germany has been able to assure herself not only of secret supplies of war material and the training of officers and other ranks in the use of this material, but also, in the event of war, the possession of the best stocked arsenals in Russia. From these arsenals she can receive without any interruption and over secure maritime routes, inexhaustible reserves of arms and munitions, which will be more than sufficient to cover the needs of the German army on a war footing, at least until the time when German industries will go

over to intensive war manufacture, and when the industrial potentiel de guerre of Germany will be thrown into the scales to decide the mechanical battles of the future.

It would be advisable before proceeding further in this account, to give here an approximate idea of these two aspects of German-Russian complicity—namely, its importance in relation to the war preparations of Soviet Russia against Europe, and its importance in relation to the war preparedness of Germany.

Even during 1921, at the time of the Inter-Allied control, when the German Government was giving solemn assurances that it was conscientiously destroying all surplus arms and munitions and doing everything in its power to make sure that no prohibited stocks should be left with the civil population or in the arms factories, even at that time all kinds of supplies of war material were being sent from Germany to Russia at breakneck speed. This was the period in which the moderate German parties were not yet dazed, as they are to-day, with the "patriotic" revisionist propaganda; the period before the rise of the militant associations of the Stahlhelm type which to-day count within their ranks millions of members; the period when millions of Germans back from the front still seriously proclaimed the slogan "Nie wieder Krieg" (never again war).

This psychological atmosphere was reflected until 1924—25 in numerous German Republican journals in which one could often read articles under such telling titles as "Gewehre auf Reisen" (travelling

rifles), which described the flourishing state of the clandestine world-wide commerce in German arms and munitions of every description released from stock. This gun-running was taking place in China, Syria, Afghanistan, Arabia, Persia, Morocco and South America, but mainly in Soviet Russia, which was supplied with arms of German manufacture and even arms which were taken during the war in enormous quantities from the defeated armies of the Tsar.

While the Inter-Allied Disarmament Commission considered it to be a great success if they succeeded in discovering and confiscating a few thousand rifles, a dozen machine-guns, and some thousands of cartridges; while the Commission were vainly searching for the long distance guns, but could not find them; all the time German gun-runners had at their disposal, ready for prompt expedition at the order of a foreign buyer, hundreds of thousands of rifles, hundreds of millions of cartridges, thousands of light and heavy machine guns, hundreds of cannons of every calibre, armoured automobiles, tanks and aeroplanes. Holland, the Scandinavian countries, East Prussia and the Baltic were the most convenient stages of this gun-running, while the conferences of the German traders and their clients were being held in Stockholm and other ports for the purpose of agreeing upon the most successful means of transport. Rotterdam, Hamburg, Lubeck, Stettin were the principal forwarding centres.

The following facts may be quoted in order to show how efficaciously the officially non-existent stores of arms in Germany were being distributed: in May,

1921, the Russian Government ordered in Germany 400,000 rifles and 120,000,000 cartridges. Immediately after the conclusion of the contract the Germans dispatched to Rotterdam 150,000 rifles and the whole of the 120,000,000 cartridges. The remaining portion of the order was executed within a very short time and the whole transport reached Russia by sea without any difficulties whatsoever. It is perfectly obvious that transactions of such magnitude at that particular time could not have been possible but for the collusion of the German military authorities and the German Government itself.

It is enough to peruse the book entitled The Flying Dutchman, the author of which is the renowned Dutch airman and inventor Fokker, in order to understand how the whole German State apparatus was tuned up for exploits of that kind. Fokker himself, as he confessed in his book, succeeded in exporting from Germany to Holland twenty trainloads of aeroplanes and aircraft material, although according to the terms of the Armistice, all this material was to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers. As far as it was possible to ascertain from the abundant but still incomplete information on the subject issued from various sources, it may be said that in the course of a single year, in 1921, Germany exported to Russia about 900,000 rifles, 3,000 heavy machine-guns, 40 cannons, 1,000,000,000 cartridges, over 150 minethrowers and some 400 aeroplanes. The above are only minimum figures, and the actual exports of German arms and munitions into Russia in that year

was considerably higher in every one of the items quoted.

In addition to the ready-made arms and munitions Germany exported to Russia, during the same year, considerable quantities of explosives and chemicals for the manufacture of explosives, numerous armoured and ordinary automobiles, engines and machinery for the factories of arms and munitions, military clothing material and other articles of military equipment of every description.

Year after year, and month after month, these German exports to Russia went on without interruption.

These exports consisted of munitions and munitions material, tanks, and aeroplanes in parts transported together with such iron and steel manufactures as agricultural implements and machinery; explosives labelled as "chemicals" or "pharmaceutical" materials; chemicals for the requirements of war industries; lubricants and fuels for the use of aviation; and abundant railway material for the repair and improvement of Soviet railways and all the material necessary for bridge construction. During 1923, 101 ships left Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, Flensburg, Stettin and Rostock for Russian ports carrying: 2,163 tons of tanks, 2,075 tons of munitions, 1,384 tons of radio-telegraphic material, 4,032 tons of aeroplanes and parts thereof, 7,522 tons of explosives, 14,794 tons of chemicals, 25,146 tons of nitrates, 14,606 tons of sulphuric acid, 4,793 tons of sulphur, 8,955 tons of lubricants, 11,694 tons of petrol, 3,161 tons of military

cloth, and 3,687 tons of iron and steel manufactures. During the year 1926, 164 ships left Germany for Russia by the same transit route through the Baltic ports which carried 139,521 tons of cargo, in which the following quantities were included: 452 tons of machinery and artillery wheels, 1,358 tons of military cloth, boots and putties, 2,223 tons of aeroplanes and parts, 6,623 tons of explosives, 419 tons of ship-construction material, 370 tons of army tents, 1,560 tons of material for the construction of submarine boats, 1,986 tons of material for motor boats, 3,049 tons of gas balloons material, 2,306 tons of military transport equipment, 457 tons of stamping machines for the manufacturing of cartridges.

The above list is not complete because there are included in it solely transports through the Baltic ports, and not the direct transports to Leningrad, of which one was already mentioned, namely the transport of torpedo boats from the "Vulkan" dockyards in Stettin, transported on the Almac Kaiser and Taifun II. It would be too tedious to adduce further annual figures from these statistics. But in order to give an idea of the subsequent development of this traffic, a few figures referring to individual months of the later years may be useful. Of course the figures quoted refer only to supplies for military use to the exclusion of the enormous transports of other supplies required for the reconstruction and extension of all branches of industry in Russia which indirectly enhance the Soviet potentiel de guerre. Thus in March, 1926, there were transported 7,438 tons of steel and parts for the

construction of ships, aeroplanes and spares thereof, explosives, military hospital supplies, heavy machine guns and carriages for 3-inch guns, military boots and skis. In July, 1926: 1,317 tons of telephone and telegraph cables for military purposes, 724 tons of small scouting aeroplanes, 2,074 tons of material, captive balloons and gas masks, 599 tons of equipment for military hospitals, 1,517 tons of compressed fosgen and chloride. In January, 1927: 1,510 tons of aeroplanes and parts thereof, 505 tons of steel for the manufacture of cannons, 692 tons of armoured automobiles and tanks, 422 tons of poison gas, 1,257 tons of chemicals for the manufacture of poison gas, 634 tons of military hospital supplies, 483 tons of signalling equipment and 1,431 tons of dynamite and Bickford fuels.

It may be repeated that all the above figures refer only to the transports passing through the Baltic ports. It has been ascertained that transports of German war material into Russia were passing overland through Polish Pomerania, or through the "Corridor", as the Germans are pleased to call it. German nationalists are unceasing in their complaints to the effect that East Prussia is being threatened by the neighbourship of Poland and the loss of a common frontier with Russia; and General Groener officially backed these complaints in his Memorandum on the construction of the "pocket battleship" for service in the Baltic. The German Nationalists also complain that Poland cut off their communication with Russia. Such complaints sound rather strange in view of the Russian

invasion of Eastern Prussia during the Great War, and still more strange in view of the fact that Germany is exporting to Russia such immense quantities of goods valued at several hundred million marks annually and, moreover, such immense quantities for the manufacture in Russia of war material clearly meant for the starting of a conflagration, which if it once starts in Europe will certainly not stop at the German frontiers.

A number of German forwarding companies are now specialising in the transport of war material into Russia. It will be easily understood that these transports require expert handling in view of the fact that the German exports of war material are prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles, and that the German authorities are bound by Treaty to prevent them. The fact that these authorities fail to do so, is only one more proof of the existence of a Russo-German plot. A number of new forwarding companies have been formed in Germany to handle this transport service. The following are the largest and the most energetic among such companies specialising in German transports into Russia: Deutsch-Russische Transport und Lager Aktien-Gesellschaft "Derutra" of Stettin; this Company is the principal forwarding agent, for the Russian exports of the well known German chemical trust I. G. Farbenindustrie, of Ludwigshafen, on the Rhine. Other firms are: Baltische Russische Transport und Lager Aktiengesellschaft "Baltrustra" Deutsch Russischer Lloyd of Stettin, and the Company Russtransit of Berlin.

(The last named Company, the financial dependence of which on the Reichswehr Ministry is notorious, specialises in the transport of arms, munitions and poison gas to South Russia and to Persia via Batum.)

In order to camouflage the true nature of the shipments, the forwarding companies employ various ingenious means. For instance, armoured cars are being sent as lorries, light machine-guns and gas-cylinders are transported in piano-boxes carrying the labels of world-famous German pianoforte manufacturers; and hand grenades, the form of which resembles small fire extinguishers of a certain German manufacture, are actually being declared as such. Very simple is the process of sending from Germany to Russia of chemicals which are being re-made into poison gas in the factories established in Russia by the Germans. The principal purveyor of ready-made poison gas (in small quantities only), for Russia is the I. G. Farbenindustrie Gesellschaft, which, moreover regularly ships quantities of chemicals for the manufacture of gas. The shipments are made through the Russian Transport Company Igerussko, of Berlin, and Derutra and Russtransit or through other German firms. The bills of lading for shipments are drawn in two copies, one of which is received by the Forwarding Company, say "Jakob and Valentin of Berlin", the second by the Igerussko Company. Both copies have the same running numbers and identical marks and signs on the cases and crates. But while on the copy retained by the shipper the declaration in the bills of lading innocently states that the goods consist of

ordinary chemicals, the duplicate handed over under the same number and date to the Igerussko Company specifies the real contents of the shipment, for instance chloride of beziol, calcium cyanide, pikrine acid, etc. In the annexe to this book are reproduced the exact copies of such bills of lading referring to one and the same shipment, but specifying the contents in one case as innocuous chemicals ("Harmlose Chemikalien"), and in the other stating their true nature.[1]

In addition a number of German chemical companies other than the I. G. Farbenindustrie maintain permanent business relations with Soviet Russia. Among them the following deserve to be mentioned: Chemical factories of Stettin, Krezin and Seifert, Norddeutsche Chemische Fabrik and Felix Prenzlau (all of Hamburg) Chemical Factories of Premnitz (Koln Rottweiler Aktien-Gesellschaft branch), and the well known huge nitrate Leuna Werke, near Halle an der Sale, specially interested in poison gas factories in Russia.

The firm Stolzenberg in Hamburg has already been mentioned. In March, 1925, the "Anilin Gallia Germania Cmp." conducted negotiations with the Russian Government for the lease of a factory in Moscow for the manufacture of gas masks. The firm Kreber, in Koenigsberg, in December, 1923, concluded an agreement with the Soviet Government for the supply of raw materials for the manufacture of levisite, and German chemists are producing this gas in the Moscow factory as well as in other Russian

[1] See annexe, page 216.

Government factories. The raw materials for the manufacture of chloride of arsen in the Perm factory are supplied by the chemical factory Kontinental, of Berlin. The management of the Perm factory is in the hands of the German specialist Dr. Tanks. The firm of Bayer, of Cologne, sent two engineers and one chemist to the poison gas factory in Moscow, Ufa, and Saratov as managers. A special commission of German experts sent to Russia prospected in the Don basin for raw materials suitable for the manufacture of poison gas. The firm Heinrich Kopper, of Essen, was deeply interested in these prospects.

Monsieur Rene Marchand, in his articles in the Paris La Liberte of June 13th, 1931, gave a list of the most important chemical factories and enterprises in Russia which permanently employ German experts; included in the list are: The Sixth Government Chemical Military Factory; The Experimental Poison Gas Factory of Kharkov; and the Second Chemical Factory of Professor Ipatieff (formerly the Kharkov Gas Factory) "Dugas"—the Board of Directors of this factory includes Dr. Stolzenberg, and it was this factory which first produced a new kind of poison gas named "zol". Also: the Gas Institute of Moscow, under the management of Professor Gruenfeld; the Gelbinger and Grabbe Factories of Leningrad which specialised in the production of poison gas; the factory in Perm, manufacturing chloride of arsen from raw materials supplied by the Berlin Cmp. Continental; the experimental laboratory and factory of poison gas in Volinkin, and the Ekan factories of Leningrad,

employing two German chemists, Herren Hugo Hoffe and Heinrich Falk; the Second State chemical factory of Leningrad; the chemical section of the Trubotsch-naya factory of Leningrad, also employing German chemists; new factories near Moscow, Ufa, Saratov; and, finally, all the great factories of the State Trust Severokhim, in the Ural industrial district.

In addition to the already mentioned German chemists employed in the chemical war industries of Russia, there were also working: Professor Haber, Dr. Foerster, Gragge, Bulle, Grossmann, Dr. Unruhe, Webert; the German engineering officer, Bunting; artillery captains Knopp and Zedlits as instructors in the chemical battalions; and Major von Schutz as commander of the poison gas factory of Seforsoff, with the technical manager Ginsburg.

The organisation of the chemical factories for military purposes in Russia, and gas production generally, was in the hands of the chemist, Dr. Speich, an officer in active service of the Reichswehr.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the illicit arms traffic is in two directions—from Russia to Germany, and from Germany to Russia. In some cases war-material for the German Army is manufactured in Soviet factories. In others, German war-material is exported to, and stored in, Russia. Also, on many occasions, Germany supplies military raw-materials which are made into the finished article in Russia.

CHAPTER VII

THE ROLE OF KRUPP'S

THE firm of Krupp's of Essen—Krupp the German "Kanonenkoenig"—deserves a chapter to itself in this review of the German war industries in Russia. It deserves a separate chapter—not because of its prewar and war-time fame as an universal purveyor of armaments—or because of its post-war industrial activities which German propaganda asserts are of a purely peaceful nature—but because its activity upon Soviet territory has grown to tremendous proportions, serving to arm both Germany and Russia far beyond the limits allowed by the Treaty of Versailles.

The sort of German-Russian collaboration exemplified by the Krupp activities in the Soviet Union has this additional value for Germany that the big capital of private enterprise serves in this case the secret military aims of the Reich, without burdening her with investments which she would not be able to undertake.

The fact that the Soviets applied to Germany for assistance in the reorganisation of the Russian army after the Russo-Polish war had this principal value for the leaders of the Reichswehr, that it gave them the opportunity to establish for themselves, outside

the frontiers of the Reich, arsenals and stores of all kinds of arms and equipment free of all control on the part of the Allies; the possibility of experimenting with new military inventions; and the means of creating training and experimental stations for the schooling of officers and non-commissioned officers. Such an agreement with Russia, moreover, gave her the means of supplying the German army with equipment without any loss of time. Thus it is obvious why the heavy German industries started their expansion in Russia already during the period of inflation and began it with strong financial support in the form of credits and guarantees granted by the German Government.

After having disposed of the surplus arms and ammunition which had been concealed from the Disarmament Commission, the German Government made strenuous efforts in Moscow, even before the Rapalio Treaty, to bring about the realisation of their far-reaching schemes. The German Ambassador, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, together with a representative of the Reichswehr, were entrusted with this work. It was suggested to the Soviets that they should grant to Germany the lease of the Izevsk and Okhtonsk arms factories and later on of the Izhorsk factories and the Putilovsk works and the Armavir factories in Armavir. Russia lacking technical experts, and with her numerous pre-war and war armament factories utterly disorganised, agreed to delegate to the Germans the technical management of the said factories. Russia agreed to the further concession of running in

these factories special departments equipped with German machinery for Germany's permanent production which was different from the Russian models.

The firm of Krupp's in Essen was one of the first which entered on a large scale into these branches of the war industries in Russia. Apart from the profits expected from the supplies to the Soviet Army and the secret supplies to the Reichswehr, the undertaking of this work in Russia offered Krupp's the attraction of considerably shortening the routes to their old Eastern markets, particularly to the Turkish and Persian ones. Limited only to Germany Krupp's saw themselves threatened by the loss or a considerable contraction of their old and very remunerative connections. In fact Krupp's business affairs in Russia developed very favourably in every respect, following the undertaking to manufacture armaments in Russia for both the German and Russian armies.

Krupp's relations with Persia, for instance, were renewed after the long interruption caused by the war years. The relations with Turkey had never suffered such an interruption. Although from time to time there arose between the Soviet Government and Krupp's friction and misunderstandings similar to that suffered by other German firms in Russia, Krupp's were always able to smooth them over by a sensible policy composed of a mixture of concessions to Russia with demands for new concessions from Russia. In this way the Germans ceded to Russia certain supplies for the railways in course of construction in Persia, which enabled Russia to enter into

direct contact with an American group which previously had been with the Germans in Persia. In exchange, the Germans obtained great facilities and tariff reductions on the Russian railways for the transport of material in both directions, from and to Germany.

In all the above-mentioned Russian factories and enterprises Krupp's re-established a firm footing. Very soon they took over, after its considerable extension, the former Kolomentsev arms-factory in Moscow, manufacturing cannons according to the Russian system. Gradually the circle of Krupp's interests in Russia was extended over the Leningrad Steel Factory, the Perm Factory, the Ekaterinburg factory, the Zlatoust factory in Samara, and the erection of the dockyard for the construction of submarines in Kherson managed by German naval experts.

The factories of the Krupp group in Russia comprise the same wide scale of manufacture as the parent works in Essen. In particular they produce 6 inch siege guns, 6 inch howitzers, 42 bore cannons and 48 bore howitzers, 3 inch field and mountain guns.

The final consolidation of the dominating position Krupp's occupy in Russia, was the formation of a separate Company "Manych" to which the Soviet Government granted a liberal concession, running for thirty-five years, for the exploitations of the vast territories in the Don Basin. This company is but a branch establishment of the firm of Krupp's in Russia. Negotiation concerning these concessions for the company were conducted in Moscow, for several

months; and the composition of the delegation appointed by Krupp's for the purpose of these negotiations was very characteristic. The delegation comprised: the Consul-General Schlesinger from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Counsellor Hilger, of the German Embassy in Moscow; the deputy chairman of the Supervisory Council of Krupp's, Tilo von Wilmowsky; Dr. Fritz Janusen, a director of Krupp's of Essen; Carl Reinhardt, member of the Supervisory Council of the new "Manych" comp.; and the principal plenipotentiary of the Supervisory Council of the "Manych" company, Svyeykovsky. The main concession agreement was supplemented by an additional agreement of October, 1927. The strength of Krupp's in Russia may be gauged by the fact that in their agreements with the "Manych" company the Soviet Government undertook the financing of the production of the company by means of credits for the repayment of which the company made itself responsible in the first instance. Should, however, the turnover of the company prove inadequate to cover the credits they will be repaid on the strength of the guarantees given by the German Reich.

There is no need to dwell upon the great importance for the German military machine of the strong position which Krupp's were able to establish for themselves in Russia, for the firm of Krupp's was for half a century a synonym of German military supremacy. In fact, from small fire-arms to the "Big Berta", from an ordinary military transport wagon to an

armoured car and tanks, from steel plates for dreadnoughts to submarine craft, there is not a single arm of military equipment which Krupp's are not able to manufacture with the highest degree of technical perfection and in quantities limited only by the amounts of the orders. Germans may well point to the "exclusively pacifistic" production of Krupp's in Essen and thus maintain that they are disarmed and that they do not possess any special arms prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles.

As long as Krupp's or "Manych" develop under the protection of the Soviets, they will be able to achieve production on a scale far surpassing that of their pre-war work at Essen. Likewise, so long as there exists the conspiracy between the Reichswehr Ministry in Berlin and the War Commissariat in Moscow, there will continue to be justification for the prophecy of M. Gauvain that the German arsenals and war-stores in neighbouring countries will assure to Germany a military power which will constitute an ever-growing menace to the peace and security of Europe.

The centre of gravity of Krupp's production has now definitely shifted to Russia, a fact which is of prime importance to Germany's present and future military power.

CHAPTER VIII

SECRET MILITARY TRAINING, EXPERIMENT AND FINANCE

IT is obvious that no gun-factory of any considerable dimensions can work without its own facilities for experiment, as every cannon must be fully tested before it leaves the factory. It follows that where there are experimental facilities there are also opportunities for the training of officers and non-commissioned officers in the use both of ordinary and special arms.

All the opportunities for such training, which had been ostensibly eliminated by the Treaty of Versailles, have been restored thanks to the German-Russian conspiracy. From the moment of the inception of the German war industries in Russia, the training of the Reichswehr staff officers in the type of war technique forbidden to Germany by the Treaty immediately became an important adjunct of the Russo-German military collaboration.

Gradually there was formed in Russia a chain of experimental training camps, and artillery parks. These are under the management of German officers, and they are invariably teeming with Germans either arriving to undergo a course of training, or leaving after the completion of the course. Thus, at Lipeck,

in the province of Tambov, German pilot-officers undergo special courses in the piloting of high-powered and scouting aeroplanes. The training in the piloting of battle planes is carried out in the Aviation School of Borisoglebsk, where a new group of German officers arrives every few months. In Luga, in the Leningrad military district, German artillery manufactured in Russia possesses a huge experimental camp, and an artillery park, where training goes on practically all the year round. The artillery park in Luga is also used by the Russian Army.

In the vicinity of Kazan, on the river Kama, deep in the interior of European Russia, there has been established a camp in which German officers not only supply the instructors but constitute also the majority of those receiving instruction.

Space does not permit dwelling upon the numerical strength of the two armies and their respective military budgets. Everybody other than those who have been hypnotised by German propaganda should know that the so-called disarmament of Germany is a modern fairy tale and that the budget of the military expenses of the Reich is one huge camouflage. It will suffice, therefore, to give only a few of the more important figures in this connection.

In his already quoted Memorandum on German disarmament policy (Memorandum zur Deutschen Abrustungspolitik) of September, 1930, Carl Mertens states that Germany has at her disposal a land army of 374,000 ready to march. There are 99,000 effectives of the Reischswehr, and 110,000 of the militarised

police, frontier guards and railway guards (Grenzformationen and Bahnschutz); the two last named bodies being organised and armed on a military basis, while the police are even equipped with guns and undergo field training. There are, in addition, at least 150,000 members of such armed German associations (Wehrverbande) as the Stahlhelm. These 150,000 men are all veterans of the Great War, and represent to-day the lowest figures subject to complete military control as in the case of the army reserves and Landwehr before the war. To the above figures, moreover, must be added also that of the 15,000 "civilian" employees of the Reichswehr (Zivilangestellte) in the various departments of military organisation and administration, those who in other countries— in France, for instance—are included in the Army Budget.

For purposes of comparison Mertens states that the man-power of the French Army on a peace footing amounts to 575,000, of which 205,000 remain in the colonies, while for the first call to the colours in Europe, France has at her disposal 370,000 men, including office employees. The strength of the Polish Army on a peace footing is given by Mertens as 266,000 soldiers and 63,000 police and frontier guards, in all 329,000 men.

I accept the German military calculations to the effect that on a war-footing France could put four million men in the field, Poland two million and Germany between two and three million. In addition, however, it must be stated—a fact, by the way, already

established by the Republican Press in Germany—that in spite of the stipulations in the Treaty of Versailles to the effect that Germany shall abstain from the registration of the population capable of bearing arms, the organisation of the control of the reserve man-power has been fully re-established and now functions as before the war. This means that the final man-power in Germany is necessarily higher still.

The Soviets officially give the strength of the Red Army on a peace footing at 30 divisions of infantry, and 10 divisions and 7 independent cavalry brigades. In all 562,000 men. But over and above this first line army there is another armed force, known as the territorial army, amounting to 40 divisions of infantry and 3 divisions of cavalry. In all 600,000. These territorials are either actually in training or ready to be called to the colours. There are besides some tens of thousands of railway troops, frontier guards and convoy trooops. Last, but not least, there are the so-called "troops for special tasks", the best equipped, best fed and best paid corps in Russia. These are the real "praetorian guards" of Bolshevism, the notorious "G.P.U.", comprising 150,000 bayonets. The grand total of all these troops approaches about a million and a half of men ready to march, or about half a million more than the peace footing of the former Russian Imperial Army, in spite of the fact that in those days Russia had as neighbours the two great military powers of Imperial Germany and Imperial Austria.

The total population of Russia amounts to about 160 millions and her annual contingent of recruits totals between 800,000 and 900,000 men. Thus the "Russian Steam Roller", of which so much was said in 1914, continues to exist; but to-day it exists as a threat to Western Europe. Thanks to German assistance it is in possession of immense war industries at home, quite apart from the technical collaboration with German officers in staff matters.

This being the case, the potentialities of the "Russian Steam Roller" must be estimated differently under the Red Flag than its former achievements under the Czarist banner would warrant. It need hardly be said, moreover, that the Red Army of to-day is quite different from the army which the Poles defeated outside the walls of Warsaw in August, 1920, in that "Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World" as Lord D'Abernon described it.

According to the Army and Navy Gazette of July 16th, 1930, the military budget of Russia increased from 244 million gold roubles in 1922-23 to 1,390 million gold roubles in 1930-31.

The military budget of Germany is a masterpiece of deliberate confusion. In order to find the actual total of German expenditure on the Reichswehr and the navy it would be necessary to study not only the budget of the Reichswehr but also the budgets of all the civil departments, in all the Federal States and even of the communes. A considerable part of the expenditure (for instance: the cost of erecting and maintaining military barracks) is being borne by the

communal and municipal authorities. In his Memorandum Carl Mertens points out that in the budgets of German Civil Departments and in the municipal budgets there are concealed not less than 556 million marks of annual expenses for military purposes; expenses which, in France for instance, are included in the military, naval and air force budgets.

While in 1928-29 France spent for military purposes 1,509 million gold marks (pensions and invalid pensions not included), German expenditure in that year amounted to 1,222 million gold marks, although the German military forces were supposed to consist of only 100,000 Reichswehr and 15,000 naval ratings (i.e. five times smaller than the French forces).

Such a disproportion of expenditure cannot be explained only by the fact that France has conscription while Germany has a professional army on a volunteer basis. For apart from the concealment of about five hundred millions spent on military purposes in the budgets of civil departments, an analysis of the published military budget of Germany leads one into a veritable jungle of clumsily concealed Reichswehr secrets.

The published budget of the Reichswehr Ministry, and of the German Navy, for the year 1931-32, amounts to 774.8 millions of gold marks. This budget includes 112 items, amounting in all to 187 million marks, which the Ministry can transfer at will for purposes other than those voted by the Reichstag.

It stands to reason that in this way the Reichswehr Ministry allots these sums in advance for purposes

which it does not wish openly to avow. The military budgets of every country of course contain their measures of secrets, but in no military budget in the world other than the German do those secrets amount to twenty-nine per cent of the total expenditure for which the consent of Parliament has been obtained.

By an indirect method it is possible to calculate the sums spent on the Reichswehr investments. This calculation computes such sums at 117,220,000 marks or twenty-three per cent of the budget. France, with an army of 317,000 men, apart from the colonial establishment, spends in arms, motor cars, equipment, etc., a sum of 738 million French francs. It will be seen therefore that Germany, with her official army of 100,000 men, spends for the same purpose a sum of 703 million French francs, or, in proportion, three times as much as France.

In the Reichswehr budget the expenses for the purchase and preservation of arms are given under one head. An analysis of this item leads to amazing results. Thus, for example, the estimates provide the sum of 5,233,322 marks for the preservation of old and the purchase of new rifles. As the Treaty of Versailles fixed the number of rifles allowed to the German army at 102,000 (rifles and carbines) it is possible to calculate the customary allowance every army makes for the expenses in connection with the preservation of rifles. After deducting this allowance there remains of the sum stipulated in the Estimates the amount of 4,661,322 marks. When it is considered that according to the Treaty the Germans are allowed

to purchase only 4,040 new rifles annually it would appear that one Reichswehr rifle costs as much as 1,100 marks, which is an obvious absurdity, especially in view of the fact that the Reichswehr Ministry itself has stated that the price of a new rifle amounts to 200 marks and that its preservation costs twenty per cent of this amount. It may be added, by the way that the price of a rifle in France amounts to 100 marks.

Similar absurdities are revealed by analysis of the other items, concerning the purchase and preservation of other arms. If we are to believe its budget the Reichswehr pays for the thirty-two heavy machine guns and forty-five light machine guns, which it is allowed to purchase annually, 100,000 marks apiece. For the four field guns and the two howitzers allowed, it spends 1,000,000 marks apiece. For the ten minethrowers, it spends 237,000 marks apiece. These calculations are public property in Germany and have been repeated every year in the Republican Press of Berlin on the occasions of the introduction of the budget. Consequently they must be known to members of the Reichstag. Nevertheless, the Reichstag accepts and passes such accounts presented to it by the Minister of the Reichswehr and agrees that the sums voted for these fancy accounts should actually be spent on the purchase of stores of arms which are considerably larger than the Treaty permits or than "disarmed" Germany should possess according to her own assurances of compliance with the Treaty. Of course part of these sums is being spent on the support of Soviet armaments.

There cannot be any doubt as to the aims of this deceit. They are the aims behind the secret armaments conspiracy of Germany and Russia.

All this swindle—for it can hardly be called anything else—goes on with the knowledge and tacit consent of successive Governments of the Reich. It even went on, as I have pointed out before, during the tenure of office at the Wilhelmstrasse of the late Dr. Stresemann, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his peaceful policy.

The deceit goes on with the tacit consent of practically all the political parties represented in the Reichstag, for even the Communists in Germany, obedient to the orders of Moscow, do not protest against it.

In a word: the conspiracy of the Reichswehr Ministry with the Russian Bolsheviks against the peace and security of Europe had and has to this day the approval of the German Governments of the hour. This has been the case since 1921. It is still the case. And there is no reason to suppose that it will not continue to be the case for many years to come.

CHAPTER IX

THE BLACK-RED MENACE: SOME CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE

The Prussian Ascendency.

GERMANY is the strongest nation on the continent of Europe. By dint of numbers, perseverance, organising capacity and thoroughness; by their activities in the spheres of science and mechanics; and their high level of education: the Germans have outdistanced all their neighbours. The power of their economic system is second only to that of the United States of America. Indeed, in view of the fact that Europe is an old and small continent, whereas the American economic colossus is built upon the virgin soil of a vast continent, it may be said that in many respects the predominance of Germany over the rest of Europe is relatively greater than the predominance of the United States over the two Americas.

In such an estimate one cannot take into account the present economic system, or such demographic symptoms as the sudden and pronounced decline of the German birth rate which has taken place during the last few years. Just because they are—as a European nation—the best equipped economic body, the Germans may be sure that once the world crisis

passes they will retain for a considerable time to come the dynamic nature of their development which has been their characteristic ever since the middle of the nineteenth century. None may forecast how the biological factor will react to the return of prosperity in Germany. It should be noted that the problem of population in Germany will show an actual decrease in the numerical strength of the nation only in about twenty years' time.

In view of these facts it cannot be a matter of indifference to the other nations of Europe whether the Germanic peoples are going back to their ancient and mediaeval traditions, to the adventurous migrations of the Cymbrians and the Teutons, to the conquering expeditions of the "Roman" emperors to the West, South and East, or whether the German nation desires to march side by side with the other nations of Europe towards a common goal for the good of the whole of humanity.

It cannot be a matter of indifference whether in the very centre of the continent there will be seventy or eighty million people inbued with the mentality of the ancient Goths and Vandals, but equipped with all the technical achievements of the twentieth century, and, moreover, closely allied with Asiatic Europe, or whether these same millions will possess the sense of solidarity and the sense of duty necessary for a peaceful co-operation in the perfection of human culture and civilisation.

It must, therefore, necessarily be a question of prime importance whether the new Germany intends to

work for the things of the spirit or to pursue purely material aims. As Count Keyserling—to whom I have previously referred in these pages—has pointed out: the former course has invariably enriched the world, while the latter has invariably brought ruin upon Germany (and her neighbours).

In short, it cannot be a matter of indifference who holds the reins of power in Germany. For it must not be forgotten, as the Chancellor Prince Bulow repeated so frequently, that in Germany all the directions of collective activity are always determined by the Government. During the historical periods when the German nation was deprived of a central and determined Government initiative—and in German history such periods lasted very long sometimes—the German masses decayed in political inactivity. Immediately an energetic centre of authority was established the entire mass of the German people followed it blindly. And let us add—what Prince Bulow was too careful to remember—that every time Germany had a Government determined in its initiative, it at once became a danger to all it neighbours.

To the question "Who governs Germany to-day?" there is only one answer. The German Republic is not governed by Parliament, nor by the Chancellor, nor even by the President. Germany is being governed by the Reichswehr Ministry, and this Ministry is in the hands of the same caste of officers and Junkers, militarists and imperialists, which for twenty-five years before the outbreak of the Great War, during

the reign of William II, had been the ruling class.

Prince Bismarck, the founder of the Hohenzollern Empire, tells several times in his memoirs of the pitched battles which he had to fight with the General Staff and the military household of the Prussian King (subsequently the German Emperor), in order to retain in his hands the direction of policy, and to prevent the militant military camarilla from seizing absolute power in the Reich and so determining the destinies of Germany and of the whole of Europe.

Bismarck himself was the superman of Junkerdom and the worshipper of power and might, but his worship was diluted by a strong streak of rationalism. His rationalism told him that the whole world will always be stronger than even the strongest Germany. That is why he directed, with all his brutality, the power and might of Germany against those who, at a given moment, were isolated, and therefore weaker than Germany. But to the very end of his political career, he avoided such extremes of provocation as would lead to the union of all against Germany. Bismarck's famous cauchemar de coalition was the most precious jewel in the rich treasure of his experience as a diplomatist and statesman. And because he had that cauchemar de coalition, he, a Prussian of the Prussians, was the first and only Minister in Prussia who succeeded in breaking the Prussian tradition dating back to the Great Kurfurst and Frederick the Great, that Prussia was always governed by soldiers.

When, in 1890, William II got rid of the old Chancellor, he was under the illusion that he was taking the reins of power into his own hands. Actually, of course, the government fell once more into the hands of those who had been the real directors of internal and foreign policy ever since the existence of Prussian militarism; the military caste by whose power the little piratical State of Prussia had grown between the first Silesian War of Frederick the Great in 1740 and the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 into the strongest Power on the European Continent. For Prussia had grown by robbery—by robbing Austria, by robbing Poland, by robbing the smaller German States, and by robbing Denmark and France.

Bismarck was aware that there must be a limit to such robberies, and his famous words "Deutschland ist saturiert" ("Germany is saturated") form a precious metaphor; the aphorism of a beast of prey which, at the height of its strength, would like to transform itself into a political sage.

But for the appetites of the Prussian militarists, Germany—which for them meant Prussia—was not saturated yet. It is enough to recall the drafts of the peace treaties which were being prepared in Germany when the officers and Junkers were still dreaming of the conquest of the world. Belgium and Luxemburg were to be annexed; the frontier with France pushed back as far as the Somme, the Meuse and the Port of Calais; Poland, Lithuania, Courland were to be annexed; Finland put under a German ruler and Austria, Hungary, Turkey, Serbia, Bulgaria and

Persia to become the vassals of Germany. Moreover, we should remember particularly at the present moment—when Germany is declaring her unwillingness to pay reparations for war damages—that Germany intended to ask for 150 thousand million marks, not as reparations for war damages which she did not suffer, but as repayment for the cost of the war. Never before in the history of the world has the military hybrid shown itself so glaringly as in these projects for that Pads Teutonicae which was to impose Prussian dominion upon the free nations of Western Europe.

To-day Europe is approaching the decisive historical moment in which the most fatal omission of the Treaty of Versailles may recoil upon the moderation of the victors in the Great War. This omission was that the Allies, while respecting the national unity of Germany, did not appreciate the fact that Prussia —as the principle and largest State organism within the German federation—represents the greatest obstacle on the road to a true democratisation and spiritual regeneration of Germany.

President Wilson committed the most fundamental mistake when he declared that the negotiations for the Armistice and the Peace would be opened only after a change of the regime in Germany. For, though the Hohenzollerns ceased to represent the spirit of Potsdam and the Kaiser became a deserter in Holland, there remained the men from the German General Staff, Prussian officers and Prussian Junkers. For the time being they resigned themselves to the removal of the Crown from the summit of the structure

of the State, only to lay their hands all the more surely upon the real mainspring of power. By these means, they hope to draw the strength necessary for the restoration of Prussian political hegemony in Europe. And that strength is represented by the spirit of the German nation.

For three generations, ever since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, Prussia held the undisputed mastery over this spirit. The Prussianisation of Germany was effected in the German schools. The purpose was achieved by the very simple means of instilling into the minds of the younger generations that the history of Prussia is the history of the German nation, that the Prussian kings are the heroes of national unification, and that the Prussian robberies of other countries are but the revindications of the rights of the German nation to alleged ancient German territories.

Only because in the German schools the Prussian legend was so intimately bound up with the Hohenzollern legend, could President Wilson—a doctrinaire and theoretician—who admired so much the spirit of the State organisation in Germany—be unaware that he was admiring Prussian organisation, and so cherish the illusion that if he freed Germany from the Hohenzollerns he would be opening up for Germany the path to some spiritual regeneration. He would have become a real benefactor of Germany and of all other nations if he had freed Germany of the Prussian schoolmaster, of the Prussian officer and the Prussian Junker. After the so-called revolution in

Germany, the Hohenzollerns disappeared. But there remained the Prussian officers and imperialists, and, most important of all, there remained all the Prussian schoolmasters, from the teachers in the elementary schools to the nationalist University professors. It is they (just as in 1914, and even as their predecessors during many decades) who keep up the nation's furor teutonicus, not so much for the good of the German people as for ad majorem Borussiae gloriam. It is they who go on teaching that the world war for Germany was a righteous war of defence, that Germany was not defeated in the field, that every single article of the Treaty of Versailles is a flagrant violation of right and justice; and that the first duty of the German people is to shake off the slavery of Versailles and the infamy of the "tribute" of Reparation payments, in order that they may regain all the lost provinces, and finally take revenge on the victors of 1918.

For the benefit of an insignificant part of the German people, for the benefit of those intellectuals who profess republican and pacifist ideals, the slogan is being discreetly coined that many items in this programme can be realised by "peaceful means". This small fraction of the German people is being told nothing of retribution and revenge. But the recent elections in Germany may be regarded as conclusive evidence that to-day the whole German nation is seized by the nationalist fever, and that in the event of an acute international political crisis even those elements which to-day seem to be the most reluctant, will easily let themselves be dragged

into the general paroxysm, just as happened in 1914. If we add to this the effects of a profound economic crisis which is being explained by nationalist propaganda as being solely due to the injustices of the peace treaties, and the Reparations tribute, we shall easily understand that the real masters of the situation in Germany are neither the Hitlerists nor the Hugenbergists, neither the Socialists nor the Communists, and least of all the Chancellor and the Centre Party, but the General Staff, the Commander of the Reichswehr and the Minister for War.

Germany's Two Faces.

People who are sceptical about the absolute Prussianisation of Germany, and who refuse to credit the unchanging nature of Prussia's piratical proclivities, invariably point to the activities of the late Dr. Stresemann as proof of the existence of a "new" Germany.

Dr. Stresemann was a pan-German nationalist before the War. During the War he was among the most rabid of annexationalists. After the War he founded the German People's Party (Deutsche Volks-partei), which united the chauvinist nationalist elements amongst the industrialists, as a pendent to the German National People's Party (Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei), which was composed of equally chauvinist element, amongst the agrarians. Then, suddenly, after a conversation with Herr Helfferich, he was converted to the policy of appeasement and pacification.

Those who really believe in the reality of such a conversion should remember the moment in which Dr. Stresemann, called upon to take over the reins in the Wilhelmstrasse, came forward with his "peace" programme, with the programme of a detente between Germany and the victorious Allies (with France in the first instance).

Stresemann, appointed Chancellor on August 13th, 1923, took over the task of extricating Germany from the mess into which the hotspurs of Prussian militarism had driven her. During the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, the extremists among the leading generals and officers in Prussia had everything prepared to instigate Sicilian Vespers for the French in the Ruhr, and to launch a sudden attack of the "Black Reichswehr" on Poland.

Apart from the many republican journals in Germany which discussed these plans of provoking a new general war in Europe in the years 1924 and 1925, their existence was confirmed by Herr Arthur Mahraun, the Grand Master of the Young German Order (Jungdeutscher Orden) in his book directed against Hugenberg and entitled: "Against camouflaged Powers —The Way and Struggle of a popular Movement," Berlin 1928. (Gegen getarnte Gewalten—Weg und Kampf einer Volksbewegung). The notorious Colonel Nicolai himself confessed to such plans. During the War he was head of the Intelligence Section of the German General Staff, and till recently he was still employed as an official of the Ministry of the Reichswehr.

The plans envisaged that after provoking a conflict

with France, German troops (i.e., the Reichswehr and the armed patriotic organisations) were to retire to the line of the Elbe, leaving for the time being the whole of Western and Southern Germany defenceless. All the German forces in alliance with the Soviets were to turn against Poland, and after the crushing of Poland, the German troops, reinforced by the Red Armies, were to march against the Allies to the Rhine.

These starkly mad schemes were too much even for the Reichswehr Minister Dr. Gessler , and the Commander of the Reichswehr, General von Seeckt. After the Kustrin Putsch both General von Seeckt and Dr. Gessler dissociated themselves from the more impatient and dangerous elements, who wanted to speed up the harvest sown by the policy conducted by the leading generals and the Minister for War. This policy was already based upon an understanding with Soviet Russia and upon a close German Bolshevik collaboration in the sphere of Armaments.

It would be difficult to assume that the adventurous schemes of a handful of German generals and other German officers were at the time entirely unknown in Paris, Brussels or London. The plans were known to very wide circles in Germany, which is understandable if one remembers that throughout Germany at that time volunteers were being recruited for participation in the Sicilian Vespers in the Ruhr, and the appeals for volunteers were addressed in the first instance to the members of the armed patriotic organisations, including the Jungdeutscher Orden,

as confirmed by its Grand Master, Herr Mahraun. There are indications that some hints of the Prussian-Bolshevik conspiracy reached the French Intelligence Service. But the appointment of Dr. Stresemann to the chief office of State had been brought about not because of this, but by the economic and financial disaster which overwhelmed Germany in consequence of the so-called "war in the Ruhr".

While the dollar in Germany soared to hundreds, millions and thousands of millions of paper marks, General von Seeckt, the Reichswehr Minister, Dr. Gessler, the whole German Government, Herr Hugo Stinnes and the captains of the heavy industries, and, finally, even the nationalists themselves, understood at last that it was impossible at that time, for purely military reasons, to carry out the plans for the restarting of the war against the Allies with the assistance of the Soviets. They also realised that it was then equally impossible to upset the Treaty of Versailles by sabotaging Reparations.

German inflation enriched all the "Stinnesia", all the German industrial magnates, while the masses of the German people were impoverished. Speculators in England and America lost on it huge amounts in pounds and dollars, by buying enough paper marks to fill gladstone bags. Inflation freed Germany from pre-War and War debts. It also directly brought to a standstill the whole economic machinery and the whole apparatus of State. Both machines were simply jammed by the flood of fiat money.

It became imperative for Germany to save herself

urgently from this impasse. This task was undertaken by Dr. Stresemann, who became first Chancellor and then Minister of Foreign Affairs, under the Chan-cellorships of Dr. Luther and Dr. Marx.

Salvation could come only by way of an understanding with France. It would be superfluous to recount all the phases of the policy conducted by Dr. Stresemann. They are only too well known, although some of their undesirable consequences are not so widely understood. What I desire to stress and reiterate here with the utmost emphasis is the fact that throughout the whole of the six years during which Dr. Stresemann was carrying out his policy of the alleged detente in the West, which had such magnificent results in the financial sphere—as exemplified by the twenty-eight thousand millions of gold marks of foreign loans, which the Germans refuse to repay now—as well as in the sphere of pure politics—as exemplified by the admittance to the League of Nations and the accelerated evacuation of the Rhineland— during the whole of those six years the German General Staff continued to carry out its policy in the East.

This policy was carried out with the knowledge of Dr. Stresemann. The Reichswehr Minister, Dr. Gessler, continued to have at his disposal hundreds of millions of marks for the erection of factories in Russia for the manufacture of arms and munitions. General von Seeckt, General von Hammerstein, Colonel (now General) Schleicher and Colonel Nicolai continued to send to Russia engineers, artillery officers, military engineers, airmen, munition workers.

Often the Herren Hammerstein, Schleicher and Nicolai used to visit Russia themselves. Joint German-Soviet military conferences were being held both in Berlin and in Moscow. Simultaneously with the steps undertaken to gain Germany's admittance to the League of Nations, Dr. Stresemann himself, although he sent Baron von Maltzan away to Washington, was negotiating with the Soviets—through Count Brockdorff-Rantzau—for the conclusion of a new German-Soviet Treaty. The Treaty signed in April, 1926, contains the mutual obligation upon Germany and Russia, that neither of the high contracting parties should join any group of Powers directed against either of them. That much and nothing more was revealed of this Treaty. But even were we to suppose that the German-Soviet Treaty really does not contain any other clauses, it is perfectly obvious that by its conclusion Dr. Stresemann gave the ruling militarists in Germany a solemn pledge to the effect that nothing he would do in the conduct of foreign policy should disturb the continuation of their military policy of collaboration with the Soviets, a policy which any day may find itself in direct opposition to the official foreign policy of the Reich.

Less indulgent critics might be tempted to say that the conclusion of the Treaty of April, 1926, was the price which Dr. Stresemann paid for the consent of the Reichswehr, and the Soviets, to the entry of Germany into the League of Nations.

Germany dotted the i's and crossed the t's by entering the League on conditions which abolish for

the potentially strongest power on the Continent of Europe the most important rule in the policies of that Mutual Peace Insurance Company. The Reich declared that she would not participate in any sanctions that might be applied against an aggressor as stipulated by Article XVI of the Covenant of the League. Moreover, when the Powers which signed the Locarno agreements brought themselves—in their famous letter of interpretation, written in the best Genevan slang—to issue an assurance that Article XVI continued to be binding, Dr. Stresemann took it upon himself to dispel in the Reichstag any distrust in him which might have been lingering among his partners in the Prussian-Bolshevik plot.

The German Minister who had just got up from the table of the Council of the League of Nations, declared expressly that Germany would not permit the transport across her territory of any troops which, in conformity with Article XVI of the Covenant, the League might send against an aggressor. In other words, this means that Germany shall always decide for herself whether at a given time or in a given case she regards herself as a member of the League of Nations or not. It means, moreover, that she will not be a member in any case of aggression on the part of Soviet Russia, while in all other cases she will be free to think the matter over.

Thus the entry of Germany into the League effected by the Minister crowned with the laurel of peace, instead of strengthening the League, reduced it to absurdity. Such a pass could come only because—

as the French Ambassador, Count de Saint Aulaire once wrote—for every other nation peace represents in itself an ultimate purpose, while for Germany, it is but a provisional measure.

The application of the peace policy as a provisional measure enabled Dr. Stresemann to save Germany from the direct monetary, financial and economic disaster. After the elaboration of the Dawes Plan and after the receipt of the loan connected with this plan, Germany recovered her strength so quickly that the extreme wing of Prussian imperialism represented by the Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei, and, to a certain extent, by the captains of heavy industries in Dr. Stresemann's own party, the Deutsche Volkspartei, began to show signs of impatience. These people believed that the Western European countries were already sufficiently drugged by the Agreements of Locarno, and that the time had already arrived for Germany to regain at least her lost position in the East.

Supping with the Devil.

Even before the year of Locarno—1925—was out, as confirmed by Herr Arthur Mahraun in his already mentioned book, new plottings were begun for the provocation of war with Poland. And, as in 1923, important personages and military circles were found ready to enter upon the path of such an adventurous policy.

Herr Mahraun (who himself is a partisan of an active German policy in the East, not in alliance with the Bolsheviks but through an understanding with

France; the same idea as that put forward in the well-known programme of Herr Arnold Rechberg), opposed the schemes as far as the operation of the Jungdeutscher Orden were concerned, and issued a Memorandum unmasking the intentions of the chauvinists. The Reichswehr Minister, Dr. Gessler, after reading the Memorandum, wrote a letter to Mahraun, in which he stamped the Memorandum as a "denunciation", and declared that he was obliged to suppress all co-operation of the Reichswehr with the patriotic organisations. (Dass ich jedes Zussamenarbeiten der Reichswehr mit Verbaenden alter Art aufs schaerfste bekaempfen muss.) He further stated in his letter that he would bring Mahraun's denunciation as a warning to the notice of the proper authorities responsible for foreign affairs. (Ich werde Ihre Anzeige daher den betreffenden Aussenstellen zur warnenden Kentniss bringen.) (See Mahraun's Getarnte Gewalten, p. 124.) Referring to this letter, Mahraun wrote literally:

> "The information on these impossible conditions was described by Gessler as a 'denunciation,' and he gave expression of his utmost displeasure at the publication. Personally, I find his behaviour comprehensible in the fact that his confidence in Bolshevik wirepullers was so great that he handed over to them the most dangerous battle poison gas."
>
> "In this situation I decided to brand the whole madness of an alliance with the Soviet Power, the dangers of Probolshevism and the criminal nature of this playing with fire."[1]

[1] " Gessler bezeichnete also die Mitteilung von diesen unhaltbaren Zustaenden als eine 'Anzeige' und brachte zum Ausdruck, dass ihm diese Orientierung aeusserst unwillkommen war." "Mir persoenlich gibt die Tatsache Aufschluss ueber sein Verhalten, dass sein Vertrauen

The Grand Master of the Jungdeutscher Orden began to circulate more widely his Memorandum on the provocative activities of the Prussian chauvinists, and even to deliver public speeches on the subject of these German-Bolshevik secrets. As a result he was prosecuted for State treason. Herr Mahraun maintains that the instigator of the prosecution was Colonel Nicolai, whom he met in a railway train shortly before the opening of the examination of the case. Colonel Nicolai tried to win Mahraun over to the idea of collaboration with Soviet Russia, and expressed his opinion to the effect that Lenin ought to repeat the part of Napoleon. When he learned from Herr Mahraun that the latter was going to Kassel in order to suppress something like a rebellion in the local Jungdeutscher Orden (a handful of members of this organisation let themselves be persuaded by the pro-Bolshevik German Nationalists) he said to him: "If you suppress it there it will break out in another place." [Wenn Sie diese Sache niederschlagen, dann geht es an anderer Stelle los.) (Mahraun, loc. cit., p. 143.) Herr Mahraun says that after this conversation he had the feeling that the prophesy of Herr Arnold Rechberg would come true, when Rechberg warned him that Nicolai will surely "get you involved in a prosecution for

zu den Bolschevistischen Drahtziehern so gross war, dass er Ihnen das gefaehrlichste Kampfgas ausgeliefert hatte.

In dieser Lage ging ich dazu ueber, den ganzen Wahnsinn eines Buendnissess mit der Sovietmacht, die Gefar des Probolschevismus und das Verbrechen dieses Spiels mit dem Feuer anzuprangern". (Mahraun, loc. cit., p. 125.)

State Treason". (Er haengt Ihnen sicher noch ein Landes-verratverfahren anden Hals.) (Mahraun, p. 143.)

In fact, soon after this chance meeting, the Hugen-berg Press, with which Colonel Nicolai maintained close relations, started a sustained campaign against Mahraun, accusing him of treason and supporting the accusation by false quotations from his Memorandum. The case dragged on for several months.

On November 24th, 1926, a question was put in the Reichstag. On that occasion—writes Mahraun—the Reichswehr Minister had the opportunity to declare openly:

> "Herr Mahraun opposes in his Memorandum adventurous plans with which I have nothing to do, and against which I have always fought and condemned equally with Herr Mahraun himself."[1]

> "But," continues Mahraun, "Dr. Gessler recoiled from this only possible declaration, and before the Reichstag he made a false declaration to the effect that the Memorandum is only a quarrel of former officers as to who amongst them has the truest national spirit. Of course there is not a word about it in the Memorandum. As a politician I found in all these events indications that Moscow succeeded in penetrating the 'system Gesssler.' I am perfectly convinced that the struggles which I and the Jungdeutscher Orden waged for these things contributed towards protecting Germany against these ill-omened developments."[2]

[1] "Herr Mahraun ninmt in seiner Denkschrift gegen abenteuerliche Plaene Stellung, mit denen ich nichts zu tun habe und die ich ebenso scharf bekaempfte und verurteilte wie Herr Mahraun selbst" (loc. cit., p. 125).

[2] "Herr Gessler wich aber dieser einzig moeglichen Erklacrung aus,

The prosecution against Mahraun was stopped by order of the Court. But, in the meantime, owing to the propaganda of the Nationalist Press on behalf of the Eastern orientation of the foreign policy of Germany, the National Bolshevism made further progress in Germany.

It was a considerably more important personage than Dr. Gessler, for it was the creator and Commander of the Reichswehr, General von Seeckt himself, who showed himself ostentatiously as a partisan of the Eastern course of German policy. In 1926 M. Tchitcherin visited Germany again as he had visited her in 1923. The Soviet Commissary for Foreign Affairs was on this occasion the guest of General von Seeckt at a luncheon given in his honour. Of this luncheon, Herr Mahraun wrote rightly that the whole world saw in it the clear proof of the intimate relations existing between Germany and the Soviets. Never before had General von Seeckt received openly such a pronounced political personage. The astonishment at such a gesture must have been all the stronger because it was a glaring contradiction with that rapprochement with the Western neighbour of Germany which was approved by the President of the

gab vor dem Deutschen Reichstag die unwahre Erklaerun ab, dass in dieser Denkschrift sich ehemalige Offiziere stritten, wer die richtige nationale Gesinnung habe. Hiervon steht kein Wort in der Denkschrifts Fuer mich als Politiker wardurch all diese Ereignisse der Indizienbeweis gefuehrt, dass es Moskau gelungen war, in das 'System Gessler' einzudringen. Ich bin fest ueberzeugt, dass der Kampf, den ich mit dem Jungdeutschen Orden um diese Dinge gefuehrt habe, dazu gefuehrt, hat, eine unheilvolle Entwicklung von Deutschland fernzu-halten." (Mahraun, loc. cit., p. 125).

Reich, and represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Stresemann.

Herr Mahraun stated quite rightly that the real significance of the famous luncheon lay in still another fact: that a distinguished German General, who, on the strength of his office, had no obligation at all to converse with one of the leading personalities of Bolshevism, added by his authority new strength to the pro-Bolshevik course.

"No wonder then"—writes Mahraun—"that the new idea of saving Germany in alliance with Moscow has taken strong roots everywhere " (Darum war es kein Wunder dass die neue Idee von der Rettung Deutschlands im Bunde mit Moskau ueppig ins Kraut schoss.) (Mahraun, loc. cit., p. 120.)

And indeed one cannot wonder that as a result of the impression which Tchitcherin's luncheon with General von Seeckt made in Germany, the German Socialists were instrumental in publishing the Manchester Guardian revelations, while the Berlin Vorwaerts of January nth, 1927, published further revelations on the manufacture of poison gas by German military chemists in Prussia.

The Hugenberg Press stamped the Vorwaerts revelation as State treason and the deputy Kunstler was actually impeached for State treason because of his interviews with the workmen who unloaded Russian munitions in the Port of Stettin.

However, there cannot be any doubt that it was General von Seeckt himself who freed the Reichswehr from too close and too dangerous a contact with the more adventurous elements of Prussian militarism and

Prussian imperialism. General von Seeckt was too good a soldier to have been unaware at that time that in spite of all the misunderstandings which have arisen between the Allies, in spite of all the secret armaments of Germany, in spite of the alliance with Russia, the German Reich has not yet recovered such strength as would permit her to throw the gauntlet to the Western Powers.

However, his fundamental views on Germany's foreign policy are of a different matter altogether. Like nearly all German generals, General von Seeckt sticks to the Russian tradition in foreign policy. His ostentatious luncheon to Tchitcherin was in the nature of an anticipated answer of the militarist and imperialist tradition of Prussia to the famous lunch of Stresemann and Briand in Thoiry.

There during his tete-a-tete with M. Briand, Herr Stresemann must have constantly borne in mind the warning given to him by the hospitable reception which M. Tchitcherin found at General von Seeckt's. The sense of this warning was that no German Minister of Foreign Affairs must forget—even if he actually is or is likely to become a Nobel Prize winner—that for Prussianised Germany peace may only be a provisional measure of policy but can never become in itself an aim worthy of achievement.

Stresemann and the New Germany.

Nothing is farther from me, as I have said before in these pages, than the desire to wrong the memory

of the late Dr. Stresemann. I know that during the whole period of his office he had to fight homeric combats behind the scenes of German public life, in order to maintain his political course. I know that among the most rabid opponents of his policy were numerous members of his own party.

During the last two years of his life, particularly, it was increasingly difficult for Dr. Stresemann to carry through his plans because the industrial magnates who are financing the chauvinist and revangiste movement in Germany—from the Stahlhelm of Hugen-berg to the Nazis of Hitler, who to-day are quarrelling with each other—were indeed "saturated"—saturiert, as Bismarck used to say—with the money poured into Germany by the too credulous financiers of the world.

The pitched battle for the ratification of the Young Plan—a ratification which was the condition of an earlier evacuation of the Rhineland—ended finally with the victory of Dr. Stresemann. People who know assert that he paid for this victory with his life. May be this assertion is true. But everything which German foreign policy attempted since the death of Dr. Stresemann—from the sudden confrontation of Europe with the plan of Austro-German union to Dr. Briining's announcement that after the expiration of the Hoover Moratorium Germany will not pay any more Reparations, and that if Reparation payments be demanded Germany will refuse to repay the commercial credits —all this proves that Dr. Stresemann died in time to retain his fame as the "Minister of Peace".

Here, I would like to return, but in more detail,

to an aspect of Stresemann's foreign policy to which I referred briefly in Chapter III, in connection with an opinion I had ventured in the Fortnightly Review some years ago. For I do not think it can be reiterated too often, and with too much emphasis, that Strese-mann achieved more for German Nationalism by his policy of "accommodation" than the avowed Nationalists achieved with their fire-eating methods. One has only to compare the solid achievement of Stresemann with the political operetten of, say, Hugenberg, to realise the truth of this assertion. Any triumphs in foreign policy with which the Nationalists may now be crediting themselves would have been impossible had not Stresemann—in the face of the opposition of these same Nationalists— first achieved the major and more difficult part of the work of emancipating Germany.

Soon after the Allied evacuation of the Rhineland before the time prescribed by the Peace Treaties— an achievement engineered at Geneva by the late Herr Muller, but the foundations of which were laid by Stresemann—there were mass meetings of German Nationalists both of the Stahlhelm and the Hitlerist variety. Demonstrations took place near the French and Polish frontiers respectively. On one of these occasions, the Nationalists sang, in massed chorus, "Siegreich wollen wir Frankreich scklagen" (meaning, broadly, "Let us go and hit the French"). But all this brave array was easy enough after the event. For the last French soldier of the Army of Occupation was already over the Rhine. Indeed, the whole

affair was rather like the kind of situation satirised by Mr. G. K. Chesterton in another context: "Let us sit on a sofa and be a hardy race"!

The difficult work had already been accomplished, mainly, by Stresemann. In the cockney phrase "it was all over bar shouting"—at least virtually so—before Stresemann's death. For Stresemann had succeeded in establishing "confidence"—that most necessary link with the other Powers, the Allied Powers, whereas the professional Nationalists had only succeeded in causing apprehension. Wherefore, I would repeat, Stresemann was not, as fondly imagined in this country, the opponent of Nationalism, but the most effective sort of Nationalist that modern Germany has yet succeeded in producing. The measure of success is in the achievement. Stresemann achieved!

The inestimable advantage to the military chiefs in having Stresemann at the Wilhelmstrasse may be gauged by the high degree of perfection to which the Reichswehr experts were able to carry their "Eastern" policy behind the facade of the Foreign Minister's "Western" policy.

This much is certain, that exactly on this "Eastern" front of German policy—to which he himself applied the slogan that he aimed at the revision of the Versailles Treaty by "peaceful means only"—Dr. Stresemann's success was nil. His success was on the "Western" front policy; and others took advantage of this success to further their aims in the East. Within the framework of his policy the question of the Polish-German frontier remained for him in the background.

He made use of it rather to pacify the chauvinists and to win them from their opposition to his Western policy. It was an eventual rather than an immediate aim of his foreign policy.

The question may, perhaps, be asked: was Strese-mann sincere in his role of peacemaker? His historic lunch with the late M. Briand at Thoiry? His equally historic trip on the lake at Locarno with M. Briand and Sir Austen Chamberlain? Did these things denote sincerity, or were they merely the facade of deceit? To this question I would give the following answer: He honestly believed in the necessity for his policy of accommodation with the Western Powers, but he held this belief from Nationalist motives; because he was convinced that by these peaceful means he would be best able to rehabilitate Germany. Therefore I would say that he was sincere more for the cause of restoring Germany to a dominant position than in the interests of the ultimate peace of Europe.[1]

Germany's Ambitions.

I need not discuss here the German-Polish frontier question, for this by itself is not the final objective of Prussian imperialism.

[1] Since the above was prepared for press there have been published in Germany some memoirs of Stresemann, including a letter he wrote to the ex-Crown Prince, in which he explains frankly the real aims behind his foreign policy. This letter confirms fully the view expressed in this book, i.e. that the real motive of Stresemann's seemingly peaceful policy was a purely nationalistic one. In the course of the letter Stresemann also makes a significant reference to Germany's "Eastern policy " and Russo-German relations.

A translation of the letter is given in the Annexe on page 212.

If Prussia-Germany only wanted to regain the so-called Polish Corridor (i.e., the Province of Posen and Polish Upper Silesia) her conspiracy with the Soviets would be quite unnecessary. For the militarists and imperialists of Prussia, the revision of the Eastern frontier is only the first—even if indispensable—step towards the recovery of military and political hegemony in Europe and in the world.

The extent of Germany's ultimate aim of hegemony and dominion is made perfectly clear by German writers, both pre-War and post-War. In an article in the Fortnightly Review, for July, 1931, written at the time of the diplomatic controversy occasioned by the Austro-German Customs Union project, I quoted a number of these German authorities. Their arguments better than anything else explain the nature of German aims.

For instance, Dr. Hoper, writing on the economic Anschluss idea, states:—

> "It would be a big step in the direction of a Pan-German economic entity embracing the Germans living in connected areas—for example, Switzerland and the German peopled districts in Czechoslovakia, which belong to the future Pan-German economic system."

And Sieveking, in his "Grundzuge der neuren Wirtschaftsgeschichte" ("Outlines of Modern Economic History") says: "The Zollverein (Austro-German) should expand further and ought to develop outwards", and, referring to the ideas of List and Moser, indicates an "expansion to the East via Austria and Turkey" and

adds that there would be a special interest "in seeing that the two routes from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf do not fall into the exclusive possession of England"!

Dr. Hoper, again, in the volume "Anschlussfrage" referring to the politico-economic aims behind the Anschluss idea writes:—

> "Into the first zone of the Austro-German sphere of power would fall the States of Hungary, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia and Roumania."

He also states:—

> "Economic (gain for Germany)—
> "Mineral wealth, huge water-power resources, first-class tourist regions, trade connections with the Balkans and the Orient; political" (gain for Germany)—"the ultimate dominance over the Centre of Europe, new frontiers with Hungary, Jugoslavia and Italy."

And again:—

> That Germany aims to become "the leader of the Central European Economic Unions whether the world wishes it or not."

The phrase "whether the world wishes it or not" is, I think, symptomatic of the German outlook on the question of Teutonic expansion.

These German writings on the subject of the Austro-German Anschluss, and similarly, German writings on the subject of Poland, make it clear that Germany has never given up her policy of Drang nach Osten (The Thrust to the East)—through Poland to the Eastern Baltic, through Austria to the

Balkans, and through the Balkans to the Middle East.

A situation may easily be imagined in which Germany will dare unaided the attempt to revise her Eastern frontier according to her wishes, if she could be sure that Poland, too, will not find assistance anywhere. But a new "Koeniggraetz" of this kind in Central Europe would be useless if it did not open for her the prospect of a new "Sedan" in the West of Europe.

The world war has taught the German militarists the lesson that unaided, without a powerful ally they cannot hope for a new "Sedan" even after a most successful "Koeniggraetz".

That is why they waded so deeply into the conspiracy with Soviet Russia.

This conclusion may be clearly drawn from the speech which General von Seeckt delivered on January 24th, 1931, before the Economic Society of Muenster in Westphalia. (Weltwirtschaftliche Gesellschaft, Muenster', Westfalen.) This speech was published under the title "Paths of German Foreign Policy" ("Wege deutscher Aussenpolitik") by the Verlag von Quelle and Meyer, 1931, Leipzig. Therein we read that policy is based upon might (Politik beruht auf Macht) in spite of the assertions repeated for thirteen years that policy is based on right.

General von Seeckt would be willing to accept this doctrine, but with the correction that it is might which establishes right (dass es die Macht ist, die Recht schafft.) In saying so he is thinking not only of military but also of economic might. The paths of German

policy must lead to the recovery of that superlative degree of military and economic power, which the Treaty of Versailles tried by all means to break down. While discussing the conditions of such a recovery, General von Seeckt gave a review of the situation of all the Powers which would have to be considered. About Russia we find the following characteristic sentences in General von Seeckt's address:

> "The goal of Russia is in the first instance a world-revolution. The nucleus of opposition to such plans must be regarded as the representatives of the capitalist powers, England and France in the first instance, and America close behind them. There follows a certain community of interests with Germany (my italics), which is being threatened by the demands of these powers. The most profound animosity of Russia is directed against Poland, the ally of the world Powers and Russia's immediate neighbour. Herein lies the point of Russia's closest rapprochement with Germany (my italics). Germany finds herself in the difficult position that through her opposition to Communism she is being driven into the anti-Russian camp. It must not be overlooked that in order to achieve her aim of world revolution, Russia is obliged to carry out a Russian policy because the movement for world-revolution can come only from a strong Russia ready to strike. For the purpose of strengthening herself Russia needs the Western Powers. Germany amongst them. The fact that the Western Powers by helping Russia expose themselves to a great danger is too obvious to require further proofs. But none of the Powers is ready to leave Russia as a field of activity to one amongst them, particularly at a time when the opportunities for such activity are becoming ever more narrow. In this support America goes farthest in spite of her enmity towards Communism as such,

> probably because being so far removed she feels secure against the spread of Communist ideals within her own territory.
>
> "As far as we are concerned, this danger exists considerably nearer, but nevertheless our position between France and Poland compels us to try to remain in constant touch and in close understanding with Russia in order not to fall into complete dependence upon the Western countries (my italics). This compulsory position will remain for us no matter whether the present regime in Russia continues or not." (Von Seeckt): Wege deutscher Aussenpolitik (pp. 14-15.)

No further comment is required to make the meaning of the above statement perfectly clear.

With regard to Poland, General von Seeckt says that any understanding between Germany and Poland is impossible.

Very interesting as a mirror of the views of Prussian militarists is the opinion which General von Seeckt gives of the League of Nations. He says:

> "It is very characteristic for it (the League of Nations) that the two Great Powers, America and Russia— for obviously different reasons—keep away from it and up till now they have not regretted their absence. It is also very remarkable that all events of political importance have occurred outside its framework. I have in mind the Treaties of Rapallo and Locarno, the Naval Conference of Washington and London, the preparation of the Dawes and Young Plans, and finally the Kellogg Pact. In the great questions which by their very nature belong to the League of Nations, such as the question of Mandates and of Disarmament, the League has up till now failed completely. This result follows naturally from the fundamental confusions of ideas underlying the structure of the League, namely,

> that it is possible to establish a real equality among its members while excluding the natural law of all politics which says that the stronger has the might on his side. The stronger power will always impose its will, or find the necessary support from a number of States which depend on it to a greater or lesser degree. But the resolutions of the League of Nations had no might behind them which would guarantee their execution, and that is why the League cannot carry out its resolutions, because there is no strong power which would tolerate such a super sovereignty." (Loc. cit. pp. 21, 22.)

This estimate of the League of Nations coincides strangely with the views which Herr von Bulow expressed in his book: "Der versailler Volkerbund—Eine vorlaufige Bilanz" (W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Berlin-Stuttgart-Leipzig, 1923). This book was withdrawn from the booksellers after Herr von Bulow took over the League of Nations Section in the German Foreign Office, of which he is at present a Secretary of State, and a member of the German Delegation at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. It would be interesting to know if Herr von Bulow also shared the opinion of General von Seeckt, who thinks that had Germany remained outside the League she would not be in a worse position and could moreover retain a greater freedom of action. According to General von Seeckt, on the occasion of Germany's entry into the League of Nations, Germany should have received full equality of sovereign rights, which means, at least, immediate evacuation of the Rhineland, a share in Colonial Mandates, and, in the first instance, the right of equality of armaments. Having entered the

League without receiving such a price, Germany "became co-guarantor of the Treaty of Versailles, which was imposed on her because she recognised that its revision is only possible through the League which is but an instrument for the buttressing of the Treaty". A German policy of understanding with France, would have been acceptable, according to General von Seeckt—which means that it could have led to a revision of the Treaty—had one promise not been lacking. France, he infers, accepted the voluntary renunciation by Germany of Alsace and Lorraine, and the guarantee of her Eastern frontier with the help of the German tribute payments. "But the Germans have not obtained the right of equality in armaments which can be the only goal of Germany's co-operation at Disarmament Conferences" (p. 27). In the East, with regard to Poland, nothing has been changed. With regard to Russia, we read in this review of German policy during the Stresemann period that:

> "In spite of many difficulties and in spite of many internal and external burdens, we have succeeded in remaining in such a relationship towards Russia as would offer us a certain protection for our Eastern frontiers and would allow us to undertake certain economic activities, even if the latter have not reached the dimensions hoped for." (p. 27).

General von Seeckt passes over the earlier evacuation of the Rhineland with the remark that this evacuation has not restored to Germany full sovereign rights in this province, and that Germany was obliged to pay a separate price for the evacuation. General von Seeckt has in mind the German consent to the Young

Plan, but does not mention at all that the Young Plan represented an additional profit accruing to Germany from the policy of understanding with France. After this analysis of German foreign policy up till now, the General tries to prove the imperative necessity of finding new paths for this policy. He justifies this necessity by the state of feeling of the German masses, a state of feeling which, as we know, is being formed under the pressure of nationalist, militarist and imperialist propaganda. He says:

> "The conduct of a foreign policy of a State which has been decisively beaten in a war will always be in danger of provoking discontent. But the limit to which such discontent can be tolerated must be drawn where the possibility of its being carried out and its energy are being put in question It seems to me that such a moment has come now. Hence the calls for new paths in German foreign policy." (p. 30).

The first step which General von Seeckt would preferably make would be through the gates leading away from the League of Nations, and he even advises such a step in case the League disappoints Germany in two questions: in the protection of minorities and in the question of Disarmament. Germany could take part in the Conference of Disarmament even if she were not a member of the League, but she would have to state at the outset that:

> "Germany is interested in such a Conference if it recognises the quality of Germany's status in the demand for security based upon her own power, and, as the other Powers are not willing to agree to a reduction of arma-

> merits to the low German level, Germany should regain the right to arm herself until she reaches the necessary degree of equality of security. Germany herself must decide whether, when, and to what an extent she will take advantage of this right." (p. 32).

As further steps on this new path General von Seeckt envisages the revision of the Young Plan and the revision of the Eastern frontiers. Germany will never agree to the present frontiers, and here, in the conclusion of his statements, General von Seeckt mentions the highest and also the most dangerous trump-card, and the one which would be the most difficult to use in Germany's play:

> "In this connection it is necessary once more to point to our relations with Russia, which remain in the closest connection with our hopes for the future" (my italics). "It must finally be stated that in this respect the interest of our foreign policy cannot outweigh considerations of internal politics which demand a ruthless repulse of any attempt of penetration on the part of Bolshevism." (p. 33).

General von Seeckt seems to think that Germany is one of the few who may play with the devil and win. His opinion would not matter were it not for the fact that powerful elements in Germany which stand outside the Prussian-Bolshevik conspiracy succeeded in persuading an overwhelming majority of the German people that without a revision of the Treaty the situation of Germany is hopeless; that salvation can come only from Soviet Russia; and that having achieved her aims with the help of the Bolsheviks, or, in other words, having deprived Europe of all the

fruits of the so dearly bought victory, Germany will be able to protect herself and Europe against the Bolshevik flood. This conviction is so deeply rooted that General von Seeckt assures us in one breath that Germany is the only protective dam of Europe against Bolshevism, and at the same time that German hopes for the future are bound up with the relations of Germany with this same Bolshevism.

Such fallacies would have only a limited importance in a country with a system of government quite different from that of Prussianised Germany.

But in a country in which even a man of Dr. Stresemann's standing was unable to secure the mastery over the General Staff—and where the worship of military power is the heritage of generations—there is but little hope of salvation from the militarist obsession before the end of the road trailed by blind Destiny is reached.

It may be asked: Do the Germans realise what awaits them inevitably at the end of the road? I doubt whether they do. For, as I have said before in these pages, they have a proverbial lack of vision. But this does not mean that the better-informed amongst them are unaware of the existence of risks.

The authors of this Prusso-Bolshevik Conspiracy— the conspiracy which was foreseen by M. Gauvain in 1919—are very well aware of the initial steps along this road. But what next? It would seem that the cleverest of the conspirators, like General von Seeckt, repeat our own English proverb, "the devil take the

hindermost", in the hope that they themselves will not be the "hindermost".

This conspiracy, like the policy which led to the Great War, is a policy of gamblers, a policy which ever since the war of Frederick the Great for the possession of Silesia has appealed to Prussia as a veritable policy of heroes.

The history of Europe abounds with the disasters and misfortunes with which the nations of Europe, during 200 years, have had to pay the cost of such a policy; and to pay in order that with the help of the Russian barbarians the little State of Prussia might become a great Power. We have all fresh in memory the terrible misfortune through which the nations of Europe had to pass in order to free themselves from the nightmare of Prusso-German militarism and imperialism.

Who can tell with what misfortunes the nations of Europe may still have to pay for the Prussian-Bolshevik conspiracy which, in Berlin, has set itself the goal of restoring the supremacy of Prussia, and in Moscow the goal of subjecting Europe to Asiatic slavery?

Germany's Choice—Europe or Moscow.—In these pages I have brought an indictment against Germany, or rather against that Prussian military caste which, so often to Germany's own undoing, has traditionally directed her foreign policy. I am well aware of the seriousness of the charges I have brought, charges justified by their gravity and their truth.

I stand by these charges and by the necessity for their making. But I am also aware that the role of counsel for the prosecution is not enough. However just the indictment, something more than a mere indictment is called for. In a word: accusation should be accompanied by remedy.

What can such a remedy be? As I see it, it must take the form of a final collaboration of Germany with Western Europe. Germany must be prevailed upon to give up her clandestine arrangement with Bolshevist Russia. The peace of Europe fundamentally depends upon the setting up of the European Triangle —London, Paris, Berlin. As General Spears, writing in the Daily Telegraph, has put it: the shortest route to Berlin for France lies through London, and the safest route to Berlin for Britain is via Paris.

The collaboration of Britain, France and Germany — which would include a detente between Germany and Poland—would not mean a hostile alliance against Russia; but it would mean the elimination of the menace of a hostile Russo-German alliance against Europe.

I have frequently made a plea for this European Triangle. Writing in the Westminster Gazette, The Fortnightly Review, and various other publications, I have often re-affirmed that only by the establishment of this triangle can the peace of Europe be permanently guaranteed. I have urged this solution, safe in the knowledge that it is no mere fancy of my own, or of any other publicist, but the considered policy of such statesmen of vision as the late M. Briand, and Sir

Austen Chamberlain. And I believe that in the ultimate, such a policy is not only necessary for Europe as a whole, but specifically in the best interests of the German people themselves.

In his book Germany in Europe, the well known political writer, "Augur", expresses the opinion that the price of this German collaboration with Western Europe must be the treatment of Germany as an equal amongst equals in the international comity of nations. And he associates this statement with another one, to the effect that correspondingly Germany must define her attitude towards Moscow. "In a united Europe," he writes, "no nation has the right of claiming the freedom to associate with a State which does not belong to the community, and the policy of which is a menace to all."

With these views I am thoroughly in accord. They put the whole case in a nutshell.

Bolshevist Russia is modern Germany's evil genius; just as the Prussian military clique of the Reichswehr Ministry are the mauvais sujet of the German Republican organism.

In bringing these charges against the Prussian military camarilla, therefore, I am by no means being prejudicial to the German people as a whole. On the contrary, I know that there are many Germans of the moderate political persuasion who will not quarrel with this view, but who will, on the contrary, share my belief that Germany's true destiny is along lines other than those mapped out by the Reichswehr chiefs and their political allies amongst the extreme Right-wing Nationalists.

I for one, will not be convinced that the splendid German culture can best be symbolised by the figure of, say, one of Frederick-William's seven-foot Brandenburg Grenadiers!

I am profoundly convinced of the wisdom of those enlightened political thinkers in France, and in my own country, who hold that Germany is necessary to Europe, and that therefore Germany should be a strong, healthy and successful citizen of that United States of Europe which one day must come into being.

Holding this conviction sincerely as I do, I am equally certain that for Germany to be such a citizen of Europe, she must abandon friendships with those for whom the idea of such a friendship is anathema.

For Soviet Russia is extra-European. By her own will she is outside the European Comity of Nations. Her interests are inimical to theirs! This fact demonstrates more forcibly than a dozen Bolshevist bogeys that other nations cannot be in alliance, openly or secretly, with Soviet Russia, and themselves remain members of the European family.

With the merits and demerits of the internal political and economic system, as such, in Soviet Russia, I am not concerned here. I am dealing with the Bolshevist State of Russia purely as a factor in the international situation. And Soviet Russia to-day, under the rule of Stalin, is realising a trend which I predicted some five years ago in the Westminster Gazette.

At that time, when the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky was at its fiercest, I wrote what whereas

Trotsky stood for the orthodox Bolshevist conception of carrying on the Revolution by means of active agitation in other countries, Stalin stood for that other interpretation of the Revolution based on the consolidation in the first place of the Russian State, the Bolshevist State of course, but the Russian State nevertheless.

At that time certain Left-wing political observers maintained that I was wrong in my estimation of Bolshevist orthodoxy in regard to these two protagonists. Stalin, they maintained, was orthodox; but Trotsky was a romantic.

Be it far from me to take part in the dispute which the Russian Bolshevist leaders carry on amongst themselves as to who amongst them has received the veritable mantle of Lenin. I would only say that at that time—before "Trotskyism" had become a recognised heresy, and "Stalinism" the new orthodoxy in Moscow—the Stalinist conception of devoting the major energies of the Revolution to the building up of Russia, qua Russia, was only an idea in embryo, whereas to-day it is a full-grown policy. Wherefore, as I say, that early Westminster Gazette prediction has come true, as the present concentration on the Five Year Plan, and the corresponding restriction of the activities of the Third International, clearly prove.

The new Bolshevist orthodoxy of Stalin is probably more dangerous to Europe in the long run than the more spectacular methods of Trotsky and the more vocal methods of Zinoviev in the heyday of the Third International. I say dangerous—not

because Stalin is trying to build up a strong and prosperous Russia, which he has every right and reason to do—but because a fundamental part of the Stalinist conception is that a strong Soviet Russian State is the foundation for world revolution. This is obviously a more formidable, because more practical conception, than the old Trotskyist idea of world revolution as a foundation for a strong Soviet Russian State.

I have gone into this in some detail because it is just the growth of this Stalinist conception which has made possible the continuance, on an ever-increasing scale, of the secret relationship between "Red" Russia and "White" Germany.

This being the case I believe that the view I have put forward in these concluding pages expresses a more constructive friendship for the great German people than does the view held by many of the avowed Germanophiles in this country, and especially by those of the Left-Intelligentsia whose line of country seems to lie between Berlin and Moscow.

Sentimental intellectuals who believe that all the intentions of the new Germany are necessarily pacific are underestimating the virile qualities of their German friends. The Germans are not the sort of people suddenly, overnight, as it were, to assume the role of doves of peace. To assert that they are, is to pay their nationalism and their military quality a poor compliment.

One had better admit frankly that the Germans are a formidable people, and, instead of putting

one's head in the sand, and pretending to oneself that this is not the case, seek ways and means for the harnessing of the Germanic qualities of strength and will for the common good of Europe.

Otherwise there may be a rude awakening!

Germany can either become a good co-operator, or develop again into a beast of prey.

And if she is to become a good co-operator, and work with the other nations for the spiritual and material betterment of Europe and the world, then her first action of good faith should be the discarding of her secret alliance with Red Russia.

Hitlerism and the Abmachungen.

At the time of writing interest is growing in the rising star of Herr Adolf Hitler, the Nazis Leader.

Herr Hitler is regarded as the protagonist par excellence of the Right against the Left in Germany, and, as a Hitlerist regime is anticipated before long, it may perhaps be argued that the Dritte Reich of the Nazis, the sworn enemies of Communism, would not tolerate the Reichswehr-Red Army connection.

Such a conclusion would be inaccurate to the last degree. In the first place, the Nazis movement is composed of an amalgam of Right and Left, and, in the event of Hitler's assuming power and then failing—as he must inevitably fail—to conduct his more humble following into the economic promised land, the Left wing of his party would break away from the Right and join the Communists. I know definitely that Moscow takes this view, and is therefore anticipating the advent of a Hitlerist regime in Germany with the utmost optimism. Stalin, the realist, would therefore have no qualms in collaborating with a Hitlerist Germany.

But more important than this are the following facts:—

The Reichswehr Chiefs and their political allies amongst the civilian politicians and officials have succeeded in nursing their Eastern orientation, their underground military collaboration with the Soviets, in spite of all the changes of political regime in Germany since the end of the War. It has made little or no difference to them whether the Reich Government has been composed of men of the Right, the Centre or the Left. They have just continued their policy uninfluenced by political change.

There is no reason to suppose that they would change their course under a Hitlerist regime, especially when it is remembered that most of the aims, in external policy, of the Nazis leaders are identical with those of the Nationalists and the military leaders themselves.

Furthermore, there are the great German industrialists, of Nationalist colour, who are amongst the principal collaborators, on the war material side, with the Reichswehr Chiefs, and who are therefore hand in glove with the directors of the "Abmachungen" plot. Many of these great industrialists are contributors on a big scale to the Nazis party funds.

A Hitlerist Germany would therefore have no qualms in continuing the collaboration with Soviet Russia.

ANNEXE

ANNEXE I

SOWJETGRANATEN
(SOVIET SHELLS)

Soviet Russia as the supplier
of munitions to the German
Army.

BERLIN MARCH 1927

Published by the Executive of the Social Democratic
Party of Germany

SOVIET RUSSIA AS THE SUPPLIER OF MUNITIONS TO THE GERMAN ARMY

Towards the end of the year 1926 the veil covering the criminal collaboration between the Soviet Government and the German Reichswehr was drawn aside. There followed disclosures and reports which were of world-wide and historic importance, because they revealed —not for the first time, yet in a singularly striking way— the double face of the Moscow Marxians, and the true character of Communist policy.

The revelations in question proved to the German proletarian masses that Moscow is at one and the same time preaching revolution and arming a counter-revolution. The apostles of world-revolution in Moscow are playing a treacherous game at the expense of the German proletariat, the like of which it would be impossible to match. The leading men of Soviet Russia are conducting a policy of unexampled cynicism, in which the life of the German working class means no more than a chessman upon the chequered board of Soviet interests.

The Facts:

1. The "Manchester Guardian" revelations.

The first revelation of the illegal intercourse between the Reichswehr and the Russian-Soviet Government appeared in the great Liberal English daily, the Manchester Guardian, of December 3rd, 1926.

This journal reported:—

It is a fact that Junkers-Werke have erected an aeroplane factory in Russia for the construction of military aeroplanes for the use of both Germany and Russia. German and Russian military experts have also taken measures to erect in Russia chemical factories for the manufacture of poison gas to be used by both countries. The work was undertaken at least five years ago and ever since it has proceeded uninterruptedly.

In order to carry out the necessary work, officers of the German Army travelled to and from Russia with forged passports for which the Russian authorities provided the necessary visas.

General von Seeckt maintained with the Russians, particularly with certain prominent officers of the Soviet Army, the most intimate relations.

Furthermore, the Manchester Guardian reported another very perturbing fact, that in November, 1926, a number of ships arrived in Stettin from Russia.

Their cargoes consisted of:—

Arms and munitions obviously destined for the German Army. Other revelations of the English journal followed and referred in the first instance to the collaboration between the Ministry of the Reichswehr and the Junkers-Werke.

It was reported in particular:—

The German Ministry of the Reichswehr approached the Junkers-Werke during the summer, 1921, inviting their collaboration in the carrying out of certain plans. The plans aimed at the establishment on Russian soil of war industries for German purposes, the expenses of which were to be covered by Germany. The Junkers-

Werke were to be charged with the task of manufacturing aeroplanes, of which a few were to be taken over by Russia, while the greater part were to be put at the disposal of Germany. In December 1921 a delegation of four persons—two representatives of the Junkers-Werke and two representatives of the Ministry of the Reichswehr —visited Moscow in order to submit to the Russian Government the draft of an Agreement. The capital which the German Ministry of the Reichswehr offered to put at the disposal of the firm, amounted to twenty-one million gold marks.

The four delegates travelled under assumed names and with false passports.

The Russians showed a willing readiness to come to terms.

The negotiations were conducted principally by the officers of the Reichswehr. The firm of Junkers became seriously perturbed when they learned that the German Ministry of the Reichswehr had made similar arrangements with other German manufacturers for the purpose of producing various war material in Russia.

In fact, it came out that a regular military Convention existed between the German Ministry of the Reichswehr, the Junkers-Werke and the Russian Government.

In spite of many difficulties, the Agreement was ratified in 1923. On May 5th, 1924, a new Agreement was signed between the German Ministry of the Reichswehr, the Junkers-Werke and the Russian Government.

2. The Poison Gas Factory at Trotsk.

Reports of factory hands:

Very soon the details concerning the chemical factory in Russia for the manufacture of poison gas came to light. As the Deputy Scheidemann stated in his speech in the

Reichstag on December 17th, 1926, the details referred to the erection of a poison gas factory in Trotsk, in the Province of Samara.

The construction of the factory was carried out by the Hamburg firm of Dr. Hugo Stolzenberg on the order of the "Gefu" (the mysterious Society for the Support of Industrial Interests, "Gesellschaft zur Forderung gewerblicher Interessen"), which is connected with the German Ministry of the Reichswehr and of which particulars will be given in the next chapter.

The work on the erection of this factory proceeded from 1923 to 1926. The best information concerning the details is contained in the interview which the Reichstag deputy Kunstler had in December, 1926, with several members of the Socialist Party, who had been employed in this poison gas factory during the first six months of 1926. The interview was as follows:

Question: When have you travelled to Russia?

Answer: In December, 1925.

Q.: What have you been manufacturing in Trotsk?

A.: Phosgen and Lost, or as we called it during the war, Yellow Cross and Blue Cross.

Q..: How was it produced?

A.: Special machinery was installed. One part of the factory consisted of a separate filling-room for the charging of gas grenades with a capacity of one million pieces.

Q.: Who ran the factory?

A.: Since 1924 the firm of Dr. Hugo Stolzenberg, of 28 Muggenburger Street, Hamburg.

Q.: Who commissioned Stolzenberg?

A.: The German Army Company "Gefu".

Q.: What wages did you receive?

A.: Very good wages; we were paid in German money. The wages of a workman amounted to from 700 to 900

marks per month. These wages included the family allowance paid in Germany and the danger-bonus, which was fixed from time to time. The special risk-danger bonus was granted because of the danger of being gassed.

Q.: Were the 700 to 900 marks fully paid in Russia?

A.: No, in Russia we were only being given the accounts. A copy of the wage-list was sent to the Germany Army Company "Gefu" in Berlin, and this company settled the accounts with Stolzenberg. Stolzenberg had an office in Berlin, at 9 Keith Street, while the office of the German Army Company was at 11 Keith Street.

Q.: What wage deductions were being made?

A.: The income tax deductions were made and sent to the respective Treasury Offices in Germany.

Q.: What was the official name of the factory?

A.: Russo-Germanskaya Fabrika Bersol, which means Russian-German Bersol Factory.

Q.: What is Bersol?

A.: Bersol is an explosive salt.

Q.: Was your freedom of movement in any way restricted?

A.: Yes, our letters were being censored and we were not allowed to subscribe to any Socialist papers. The reactionary papers, such as the Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten, the Hamburger Nachrichten or the Dresdener Nachrichten were permitted. Social-democratic papers have never reached us. It was impossible to get them. As compensation, we were allowed to elect to the local Soviet a German colleague who did not speak Russian.

Q.: How did they care for health? The manufacture was very dangerous.

A.: There were two doctors on active service in the German Army sent to Trotsk. One was a Staff doctor, the other a subaltern doctor.

Q.: Did other German officers also come to Trotsk?

A.: Yes, the working of the factory was frequently controlled by German officers who were being sent by the German Company "Gefu".

Q.: How did the Soviet authorities treat these officers?

A.: With great politeness.

Q.: What were the names of those officers?

A.: One was Colonel von der Liedt, another Major Tschunke. The latter went under the assumed name, Teichmann.

Q.: From what places in Germany came the workmen?

A.: From Berlin, Frankfurt a. M., Halle and Hamburg.

Q.: Were you put under the obligation to keep strictly silent?

A. Yes, we were repeatedly threatened with the Tscheka, which would not have let us leave Russia alive if we had written anything home. We were also threatened with prosecutions for state treason in Germany. We were obliged to sign a contract which was as follows:

"You undertake expressly the duty to keep the strictest secrecy about all occurrences in Russia which should come to your knowledge directly or indirectly, as well as about your own work, and all business affairs which should come to your knowledge, both within and outside the factory. You are strictly forbidden to publish anything or to deliver a lecture on any subject whatsoever. Any offence under this clause will lead to immediate dismissal, and, in case of need, to claims for damages, as also ruthless prosecution by the competent Courts."

Q.: Why have you finally stopped work?

A.: We were working until the great floods of May, 1926.

Q.: Were your wages paid punctually?

A.: No, there was immense discontent among the workmen and a great unrest because our families had written to us from Germany to say that they did not receive the money which was supposed to have been remitted to them. We threatened to take the case to German Court and put forward an ultimatum. We were at once told: "For God's sake, don't, this will lead to a greater scandal than the Barmat scandal," and our families received the money due.

Q.: Was everything all right with the wages after that?

A.: No, a number of us went about the middle of May, 1926, to 11 Keith Street, in Berlin and in the office of the Germany Army Company "Gefu" we had to make a row about the arrears of our wages, and we threatened Herr von Borries, who was in the office, that we should take the matter to Court. Herr von Borries said at first, "You ought to apply to Stolzenberg, we have settled the accounts with him." But when we threatened with the Industrial Court, he became soft, like a blanket. Herr von Borries was one of the managers of the "Gefu".

The description given above was fully confirmed by the description of a workman from Halle, who had also been employed in the Trotsk poison gas factory. The informant of the Hallesches Volksblatt was in 1925 engaged by the firm of Stolzenberg and transferred to Russia for "a big assembly work". The Volksblatt of Halle published on January 20th, 1927, a detailed report on the statements of this workman. They agreed in all details with the statements made by the workman interrogated by the deputy Kunstler.

The Free Entry Pass :—

ANNEXE I

In order to safeguard in all circumstances, the secrecy of the work carried on in the poison gas factory of Trotsk, the workmen were allowed to enter the factory only on producing a special Free Entry Pass, which contained the following description:

Chemical Factory "Bersol" Permanent Pass No. . . .
issued to the employee of the factory ....
for daily visits to the territory of the factory at all
times of day and night. The validity of this Pass
expires on January 31, 1926.

Instruction. This Pass must be produced at the entrance to the factory and on demand of the factory watchman.

The bearer of this Pass is not entitled:

(1) to enter departments and rooms which are not mentioned in this Pass

(2) to make any sketches, drawings of the installations or photographs unless it be in execution of his direct duties.

Director: signed:
Uschakoff. Dept.
Manager: Signature illegible. January 10, 1926.

The number of the Pass and the name of its owner have been omitted from the above copy in order not to expose him to prosecution for State treason. The original Pass is one of very few which could be taken out of Russia, and its existence proves that the poison gas factory at Trotsk is not an invention of a fertile imagination but a real fact.

3. The Munition Shipments in Stettin.

Interview with the Stettin dock workers.

First details concerning the transports of munitions which arrived in Stettin were given by the Deputy Scheidemann in his speech before the Reichstag on December 17, 1926. He said:

> "We received from an absolutely trustworthy quarter in Stettin the information that transports of Russian munitions, consisting of several shiploads, have arrived from Leningrad at the end of September and the beginning of October.
>
> "The ships belonged to the Stettin Steamboat Company and their names were: Gothenburg, Arthushoff and Kolberg. Another, the fourth ship, of which I do not know the name, has sunk. The ships were unloaded in Stettin and their cargoes put on rail."

When the Communists attempted brazenfacedly to deny these facts, the Reichstag deputy, Kunstler, went to Stettin in order to examine the facts on the spot. In January, 1927, he had an interview with two Stettin dock workers which is literally reproduced below.

Deputy Kunstler had in the first instance an interview with an attendant who is employed in the Port of Stettin.

The interview was as follows:

I

Question: How did you first find out about the transports of munitions from Russia?

Answer: In October, 1926, we heard that in Cawelwisch at the confluence of the Oder into the Damnsche See, two ships were being unloaded by workmen who offended against the regulations governing the labour of dock workers.

Q.: What kind of regulations were they?

A.: As dock-workers we had an eight hours' day, and we were indignant that overtime was worked in the unloading of the ships in Cawelwisch. We also heard that the workmen had been billeted for three weeks on board the ship and that they received 40 marks per day.

Q.: What are your ordinary wages?

A.: Tariff wages amount to 7.50 marks or 9.75 and by working normal overtime it can be increased to no more than 15 marks per day. Forty marks per day is without precedent. We have many comrades out of work while the workers in Cawelwisch have actually earned between 400 and 500 marks in three weeks.

Q.: Has not your Work Council intervened?

A.: Yes, the Work Council sought information about the unloading of grenades from the agent Hippler, who lives at Krautmarkt, Nr. 7. Hippler attended as agent for the firm, Hautz and Schmidt. Hippler said the matter is a governmental one and that consequently he must keep silent.

Q.: Did your Work Council accept this as satisfactory?

A.: No. On October 2nd the Work Council resolved to inquire into what was going on in Cawelwisch. The Communist Holz of the Red Front-line-Fighters' Union said during this meeting, "I know what is going on in this harbour".

Q.: Were other Communists present during this meeting of the Work Council?

A.: Yes, there were present, beside Holz, the Communists Luebke and Schwellenthin.

Q.: What were the results of the enquiries in Cawelwisch?

A.: Comrade Franz Luebke, one of the Communist Work Councillors, told everybody who wanted to listen

that he had seen two ships in Cawelwisch with uniformed guards, belonging to the Reichswehr, on deck, who prevented every unauthorised person from boarding the ship. He had also seen a lighter loaded with boxes and bags, with a Reichswehr guard on board, ready to go up-river in the direction of Stettin. But Luebke did not write in the Communist Volkswacht about it.

Q.: Has Luebke been on board the steamer?

A.: No, they would not let him.

Q.: What happened afterwards?

A.: On Sunday, October 17th, we had our Sunday meeting, during which the Cawelwisch matter was thoroughly discussed. Our colleagues were indignant about offences against the labour regulations, because there were so many unemployed in the harbour docks. It was decided to invite to the next meeting of the Work Council the five colleagues who work in Cawelwisch. They were expected to attest whether the work was being carried out according to existing labour regulations.

Q.: What did the men say?

A.: Nothing, because the head of the Work Council, the Communist Schwellenthin, frustrated the invitation to the five trade unionists. He knew why he did it.

Q.: Where did the munitions go?

A.: They were taken to Stettin and unloaded into freight trucks. The railway wagons were labelled to Sennelager and other places.

After this conversation the deputy Kunstler had another talk with one of the workmen who were employed at the unloading.

Question: What were your wages when you were unloading the munitions in Cawelwisch?

Answer: The wages were 40 marks per day. During the period of work we had been billetted on board ship.

Q.: What were you unloading?

A.: The Arthushoff was not fully loaded. She had 2,000 tons cargo and we unloaded two loads of 250 tons each, consisting of shells of 7.7 centimetres calibre, into the sailing boat John Brinkmann, which went to Kiel. Each shell weighed 15 lbs. (Thus the number of shells which went to Kiel alone was 66,000.—Author's Note.)

Q.: How many shells were unloaded for Stettin?

A.: About 3,000 tons of artillery munitions. (Thus at least 350,000 shells.—Author's Note.)

Q.: Have you found out where the munitions went?

A.: The shells were put on lighters with cartouches and pipe-powder packed in boxes and sacks, and were taken to the "Schwarze Meer" off Silberwiese in the Stettin Harbour.

Q.: How did you know they are shells?

A.: We broke some of the boxes as we sometimes do.

All this secrecy-mongering appeared to us to be so ridiculous. They told us it was scrap-iron, but we found out it was shells. They are scrap-iron too.

Q.: What did you think about it?

A.: Well, we thought this must be a matter that ought to be kept in the dark.

Q.: How was the unloading organised?

A.: In shifts of five men each, with two shifts a day.

Q.: Who was responsible for the job?

A.: The firm of Hautz and Schmidt, who made an immense lot of money on it.

Q.: What is the exact place in which you unloaded the Arthushoff ?

A.: The Arthushoff lay on September 25th at the Bollwerk 21 of the Stettiner Dampferkompanie Wharf. That's the Wharf which owns the Arthushoff.

Q.: Have you established where the Arthushoff came from?

A. : Of course, we were interested from which port the cargo arrived. The Arthushoff came direct from Leningrad.

Q.: How do you know it?

A.: We knew it from the seamen who told us.

Q. : Are you sure it is right?

A.: Yes, all the seamen from the Arthushoff told us. Why, we lived on board of the Arthushoff for several weeks, and we were all the time together with the seamen. If people are together for that length of time it's easy to find out where the ship has come from.

Q.: Was the Communist cell of the harbour informed of the matter?

A.: Yes, the Communist head of the Work's Council Luebke stood near the steamer. After all, everybody in port talked about it.

Q.: Have these "Communists" remained with their party after having witnessed from the closest quarter the most infamous treachery?

A.: Yes, it suits them to remain Work's Councillors.

4. The "Gefu" of the Reichswehr Ministry.

The bridge between the German Armaments Industry in Russia and the Ministry of the Reichswehr was the "Gefu". This Company (the title is an abridged form of "Gesellschaft zur Forderung gewerblicher Unternehmungen") was founded in 1923 for the purpose of managing the Armaments enterprises of the Reichswehr abroad. The Company had in charge the installation of the Junkers Works, the erection of the poison gas factory at Trotsk and the deliveries of munitions. When, in the Spring, 1925, things became delicate, they quickly changed the

name "Gefu" into "Wiko" (which means: Wirtschafts-konter) without changing in the least the character of the undertaking.

It would lead too far to describe the connection between the "Gefu" and the Reichswehr Ministry in detail. Suffice it to adduce as proof that General von Seeckt declared in his letter addressed to Junkers on August 18th, 1924:

"Chief of the Army Command

494/24 Secret.

"I approve of the behaviour of the Gefu in every part. I see no reason to change anything in the organisation of the Gefu, as you suggest. The Company fulfilled its duties and proved itself in every respect."

In a further letter signed by Lieut.-Colonel Senftleben, of the Reichswehr Ministry, dated October 10th, 1925, Nr. 815/25, it is stated that the "Gefu" is entrusted with the task to "represent the interests of the Ministry of the Reichswehr".

There exist incontrovertible proofs of the connections of this company with Russia. It made regular payments in Russia, amounting to many hundreds of thousands of dollars, into the leading Moscow Banks, such as the Russian State Bank, etc. The payments were made every 8-14 days, the last one in October, 1926. Exceptionally large sums were being transferred from the accounts of the company, which run into millions, with the Darm-stadter National Bank. For instance, in May, 1925— 550,000 dollars (2.2 million gold marks). The right to dispose of these millions was enjoyed by persons who once held military posts.

On March 31st, 1926, the whole account of the "Gefu" was temporarily transferred to the account of Lieut.-Colonel Senftleben, of the Reichswehr Ministry.

The deputy Kunstler read on December, 1926, before the Prussian Landtag a document from which the connections between the "Gefu" and Moscow clearly emerged. The document was a letter from "The Sub-Section of the Russian State Bank" to the Moscow Branch of the "Gefu" was making through the New York Equitable Bank Trust such large payments to the Russian State Bank that it paid to make the transfers by cable in spite of the loss of interest involved.

A pendant to this document is represented by a letter from the "Gefu" to the Branch Office of the Darmstaedter National Bank in Berlin, in which the Company orders the telegraphic transfer of 50,000 dollars to Moscow. The following is a reproduction of this document:

"Wirtschafts Kontor
G.M.B.H.

Berlin W. 62, Nov. 9th,
1926
Kurtz-Strasse 13.

"To the Darmstaedter and National Bank Deposit Office
" Werdorscher Markt.

"We request you to place with the Equitable Trust Company of New York and at the disposal of the Prom-bank of Moscow, to reach Moscow not later than November 20th current.

" $50,000 (fifty thousand dollars) and to cause the Equitrust to advise the Prombank by cable of the inpayment of the above sum for A/c Nr. 184. The costs of the cable transfer New York—Moscow are to be charged to the Prombank.

"We shall await your notification of the debiting of our current Reichsmark A/c and remain,

" WIRTSCHAFTSKONTOR."
(Two signatures
unreadable.)

5. The Confessions of the Communists.

Motto: "Der getroffene Hund bellt".

The Communist Press was raging with fury over the revelations concerning the collaboration between the Reichswehr and Soviet Russia. The Rote Fahne was reeking with calumnies cast upon the Socialists, and was bursting with indignation over the alleged "Grenades-swindle" and the "campaign of lies" of the Socialists. But all the time the men of the headquarters of the Communist Party knew exactly how matters really were, they knew that the assertions of the Socialists were based on truth.

6. What the "Pravda" Wrote:

It was a miserable sight to behold the Communist Party and its mouthpiece fidgeting in order to avoid a clear answer. The Pravda, the central organ of the Communist Party in Moscow, tried for ten days to hide the news of the Manchester Guardian revelations. When the Pravda recovered its speech on December 16th, it was only to decry the whole story as a newspaper canard, though it had to admit that under the multi-coloured feathers of this bird there were some which gave the impression of genuine truth. In order, however, to avoid all explanations concerning the character of such true feathers, the Pravda quickly put forward the plea that military secrets (hear, hear) are involved in it. The Pravda wrote:

"It is being said that according to an agreement between the military authorities of Soviet Russia and Germany, certain German firms a few years ago erected three factories on the territory of the Soviet Union for the purpose of manufacturing articles which are indispensable for our protection. The articles are said to include

aeroplanes, poison gas, cartridges, etc. We do not pretend to be informed about the secrets of our Military Authorities and we do not know if the reports represent the truth or not. If we assume that they are not lies, they are of no importance anyhow."

It would be difficult to state more plainly that the revelations are based on truth.

7. Bucharin's Confession.

A month later Bucharin himself spoke about the Soviet grenades with a considerably lesser reserve. During the second half of January he delivered a speech before the Moscow Communist Organisation in which he declared:

"We are not concealing and have not concealed the fact that we have concluded a contract with the firm of Junkers concerning the construction of aeroplanes, and we can declare quite openly that we shall not renounce the right to employ any capitalist State for the purpose of obtaining instructors, and also that such a State may —against proper payment to us— manufacture on our territory aeroplanes and other arms required for its defence."

In other words Bucharin declared in principle: it is permissible that aeroplanes, grenades, and poison gas should be manufactured on our territory for the German Reichswehr, on condition that we shall be paid for it. This is a fundamental confession of the Soviet grenades practice.

8. The Theory of the Soviet Grenades.

The Moscow "Marxists" have not only armed the Reichswehr in practice, but in the speeches of their leaders

there can be found so many pronouncements which indicate this collaboration that one is bound to speak of a veritable theory concerning Soviet grenades.

Already in June, 1922, during the IVth World Congress, Bucharin delivered a speech in which he presented, as it were, the whole programme of armaments.

In a subsequent speech, in November, 1925, Bucharin tried to justify the military collaboration between Moscow and the Reichswehr.

Even more clearly, Bucharin elaborated the theory of Soviet grenades in a reply sent to an enquiry of the Communist Cell Schwartzkopf, of Berlin, which was addressed to him on the occasion of the Essen Congress of the A.P.O. in March, 1927.

The Schwarzkopf Cell enquired

"whether it is true that he (Bucharin) defended on behalf of the Komintern the standpoint that in 1923 it was the task of the K.P.D., together with the German Bourgeoisie, to support the defence of the Fatherland against the Entente."

Bucharin replied by trying to explain away that in the course of years the part played by Germany has changed. She was imperialist during the War and she is imperialist again now. But in 1923 it was quite different with her.

"The Fatherland," though it still remained bourgeois, ceased to be bourgeois-imperialistic. For Germany the war changed from being imperialistic into a war of national liberation. The Communists could not behave in this war exactly as they behaved in the imperialistic war, all the more so as the international situation pressed Germany into an Alliance with the country of proletarian dictatorship. Hence that "sympathy for Germany", which made itself felt during the occupation of the Ruhr, particularly

on the part of the Komintern and its Sections, as also on the part of the official organs of the proletarian dictatorship of the U.S.S.R.

9. The Programme of Clara Zetkin.

Clara Zetkin, as a delegate of Moscow, spoke quite openly during the Locarno debate in the Reichstag on November 27th, 1925, on the collaboration with the Reichswehr. She declared on that occasion:

"The future of Germany depends upon a close community of interests—in a political, economic and, if it must be, also in a military respect—with the Soviet Union. ... I am even inclined to think that, contrary to the opinion of the deputy Wels, it is not so hopeless as he seems to think that in certain circumstances a co-operation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army may take place."

Only a few appreciated at the time the sense of this declaration. Apart from the Reichswehr officers who were present behind the ministerial seat of Dr. Gessler, probably nobody in the Reichstag appreciated it fully. It is only now that we know what Clara Zetkin had in her mind: Soviet grenades for the Reichswehr, the poison gas factory in Trotsk, the aeroplane manufacture of Junkers.

These ideas of Clara Zetkin, these speeches of Bucharin, fit wonderfully well with the famous Schlageter-Politik of Karl Radek during the time of the war in the Ruhr. They fit with the policy of the Communist Centre which helped to make Hindenburg the President of the German Republic, and they fit in with the enthusiastic leading articles which Radek wrote about the formation of the Government capitalist bourgeoise under Dr. Marx.

10. Pieck and Kreutzburg Admit Everything.

Anybody who would not be satisfied with the statements of the Russian leaders should study the depositions made in this matter by German non-commissioned officers attached to the headquarters in Moscow. The Communist deputy to the Reichstag, Kreutzburg, did not make any secrets of the Soviet grenades affair. When in the First Committee of the Reichstag during a general debate on the naval budget on February 24th, 1926, the deputy Kunstler upbraided him: "Why has Soviet Russia supplied the Reichswehr with munitions for these purposes?" Kreutzburg replied: "These supplies of munitions date back to 1921-22. At that time we had a different Germany than we have to-day."

This is full public confession. But it must be explained that at that period the Communists were running the Republic down, even more than to-day. Under the pressure of cumulative evidence even the Communist deputy to the Prussian Landtag, Pieck, had to admit the facts concerning Junkers and the Trotsk factory, and only tried to deny munition transports of Stettin. He did it in a declaration in the Prussian Landtag of January 19th, 1927.

This declaration took place before the publication of the dispositions made by the Stettin dock workers to the deputy Kunstler. They constitute adequate evidence to disprove finally the attempts at denials made by Pieck.

After the Moscow Pravda made half a confession about the Reichswehr, it was possible for the Rote Fahne, too, to lift the veil a little. The German Communist paper admitted on December 27th, 1926, the erection of the Junkers factory for the construction of battle aeroplanes and the erection of the poison gas factory. Of course, the

Communist journal asserted that it was only a question of defence of Soviet Russia. It soon transpired, however, that though the first part of the assertions of the Rote Fahne was true enough, the second part was false, because, as we shall see below, the German Government admitted themselves that deliveries from these factories had actually taken place on German account and arrived in Germany.

11. The Communists of the Left Confirmed the True Facts.

It is important to know what the Left Opposition of the Communist Party said. The former Communist deputy to the Reichstag, Schwarz—one of the rejected ones, who, however, under the rule of Ruth Fischer became a deputy—delivered a speech in the Reichstag on December 17th, 1926, in which he fully confirmed the revelation concerning the Soviet grenades.

In an open letter to the A.P.D. published in a special issue of February, the acting Executive of the German Communist Workers' Party stated the following:

"The fact that the Pravda (as also Tchitcherin) lacked the courage to deny that German military factories were erected in Russia in conformity with an arrangement between the military authorities of Soviet Russia and Germany, this fact proves conclusively that as in the case of the Junkers factory, the Grenade factory and the Poison Gas factory do not represent concessions granted to private capitalists, but represent the transfer of a part of the German war industries to Russia for the purpose of arming the German bourgeoisie. This fact cannot be denied."

12. The Confession of the Government of the Reich.

It would be too tedious to go on proving the numerous contradictions in the individual denials and in the attempts to disprove the truth made by the Communists. Suffice it to know that all the talk and all the shouting of the Communists were finally disproved by the important fact that the Government of the Reich itself made a confession. Already during the Reichstag debates in the middle of February the Minister of the Reichswehr, Gessler, stated in the presence of the Communist deputies Torgler and Kreutzburg that, after the unfortunate outcome of the Russian Polish war, the Russian Government approached Germany with the request for assistance in their organisation of the Russian Army. The preliminary negotiations took place in 1921. General von Seeckt had taken part in them. They formed the basis upon which all the subsequent deliveries of arms had taken place.

That was the one confession. The other is represented by the declaration of the Government of the Reich of February 24th, made to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag, in which the truth of the assertions of the Social-Democratic Party was fully admitted.

In spite of the confidential nature of the discussion, we have adequate reports published by the Press.

The Rheinische Zeitung reported on February 24th, 1927:

"The discussions were secret, but already a few hours afterwards all the world in the lobbies of the House knew that the Minister of tke Reichswehr, Dr. Gessler, fully confirmed the assertions of the Social-Democrats. He also explained the origins of the vast sums which during the period of acutest inflation were being sent to Russia. Will the Communist Press dare to make any denials in

future? Who will believe in anything it says? Dr. Gessler himself admitted the Munition Agreements and Deliveries."

The Berliner Tageblatt reported on the same date:

"The discussions in the Foreign Affairs Committee did not yield any new information. Nevertheless it was possible to conclude from the declarations of the representatives of the Government of the Reich that in its essentials the information published on the relations existing between certain heads of the Reichswehr Ministry and the more or less official organs of the Soviet Republic obviously conforms with true facts."

This declaration has given the lie to all attempts of the Communist Press to conceal the matter or to deny it.

The Soviet Union has been arming the German Reichswehr and had acted as supplier of munitions and arms from 1921 till the autumn of 1926.

Red Army men and Reichswehr men shoulder to shoulder must have been a fine sight.

13. The Swindle of the faked Agitation Against Soviet Russia.

In their despair over the revelations concerning the collaboration between Moscow and the Reichswehr which followed one another in quick succession, the Communists had recourse to the trick of representing the whole as a campaign against Soviet Russia. They tried to weaken the revelations by insinuating that the whole affair was an anti-Bolshevik intrigue aiming at the encirclement of Soviet Russia.

It is obvious that this noise was only raised as a kind of diversion, because it was impossible to deny the facts as they were known in the Communist country. Nothing is more ridiculous than the assertion that the deputies

Scheidemann and Kunstler are "agents of Chamberlain", who in the service of British Imperialism conducted a "policy of encirclement" of the Soviet Union. Anybody who was uninfluenced in his political thought by the slogans of the Communist Press would at once comprehend the boundless ridiculousness of such an assertion. But the Communist Press still relies on the credulity and political ignorance of the wide masses of the working class.

It is superfluous to prove in detail the nonsensical nature of such talk.

Those, however, who are inclined to believe the assertions of the Communist agents should ask themselves the question: But what is the nature of the crime? Is it the secret alliance between Moscow and the Reichswehr, or is it its unmasking by the Social-Democratic Party?

Social-Democracy is still of the opinion that it is not he who uncovers the crime who is a criminal, but he who committed it.

The Communists point to a threatening war of Great Britain against Soviet Russia. The Communists say: Germany is the ally of England, and the German Socialists who uncovered the deliveries of grenades to the Reichswehr from Soviet Russia are the agents of Chamberlain.

If Germany is the ally of England—as the Communists maintain—the question arises why Soviet Russia should deliver munitions to her enemy?

Have those who try to persuade the German workmen that Russia is threatened by a German attack reflected how nonsensical and thoughtless is such an assertion?

The Reichswehr, which according to the assertions of the Communists, was supposed to be in the pay of England in order to combat Soviet Russia, would—if the Communist assertions were true—bomb Russia with grenades manu-

factured by the Soviets. It would be indeed a wonderful achievement of Bolshevik policy.

The German Social-Democracy has been year after year warning the proletarians against the alleged revolutionary party. The knowledge of the true face of Moscow compelled the Socialists to criticise and combat the Communist movement. It appears now that the criticism made by Social-Democracy was by far not strong enough, because the things which were incontrovertibly proved during the last few months surpassed the worst suspicions.

Those who had eyes to see knew already the true meaning of the luncheon which was given in Berlin by General von Seeckt in honour of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tchitcherin. It is significant that at the time the Rote Fahne had not a word to say about the event. If it was obvious to the politically minded at the time that the two "men of authority" would not talk about the weather during their meeting, we know even better now that their conversation turned round the supplies of grenades, the erection of poison gas factories, and the manufacture of aeroplanes.

Moscow in alliance with the Reichswehr!

Moscow as supplier of munitions for the counter-revolution!

A Red Army man arm in arm with Dr. Gessler!

It is the duty of the German Social-Democracy to show the German working class what is being enacted in and on the part of Moscow. With all the means of demagogy and concealment Moscow knew how to fool the misguided masses. The revelations concerning the brotherly collaboration between the Reichswehr and the Soviet Union, however, gave food for thought to many, who up till now were listening to the revolutionary phraseology of the K.P.D.

In view of the unmasking of Moscow's double dealing, the K.P.D. stands shaken to its core. Moscow was delivering the grenades ordered by the Reichswehr in 1922 until November, 1926. Thus has Moscow been arming the Reichswehr, supplying it with the means to conduct a modern war or a civil war.

The German workmen know to-day that the Russian Government excuse themselves by pleading ignorance of the arrangements made by the Reichswehr in Russia. The Russian industry is nationalised or run under concession granted and controlled by the State. The monopoly of exporting any article from Russia is in the hands of the Government. Nothing can be manufactured and nothing can be exported without the knowledge of the authorities in Russia. There is no escape. Moscow is fully responsible.

The German Communist workman in his boundless credulity, considered it to be his proletarian duty to upset —by armed risings, at the commands of Moscow—the class government of the German republic and to place in its stead the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat". Faithful to the orders of Moscow, they sacrificed hundreds of thousands during the action in March, 1921, Hamburg in 1922, Saxony and Thuringia in 1923. The misguided workmen were being shot down in their hundreds by the machine-guns of the Reichswehr. Thousands were sent to prison. The workmen have the right to put forward the question, whether the machine guns and the cannons of the Reichswehr, which suppressed the Communist revolution of 1923, were charged with Russian munitions.

There never was a more rascally crime committed against the idea of the world revolution than that committed by the leading men of Soviet Russia and their wire-pullers in Germany.

German Social-Democracy must ruthlessly show these facts to the German proletariat in order to speed up the process of healing it from the disease of Communism from which it has been suffering for some time. For this purpose were put together the most important facts which came to light through the revelations of 1926-7. May they act as eye-openers to the German workmen. The facts must penetrate the conscience of the lowest among the partisans of the K.P.D., and make him ask if he can take it upon his responsibility that the life of the German proletariat should still be sacrificed to a policy of such dishonesty as the one conducted by Moscow.

To many of the honest Communists—and we have never denied that there are such among the ranks of the K.P.D.—it may be hard to make the decision. However, they would commit treachery against the working classes if they shunned the conclusions which must be drawn from the facts presented. There is only one solution for every worker who treats the question of the liberation of the working class seriously:

The game of the K.P.D. is up.

The only German workers' party is the Social-Democratic Party.

Every class-conscious proletarian must enter its ranks.

Published by the Executive of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany.

Responsible: George Schmidt, Berlin.

Printed by the Vorwaerts Press, Berlin.

ANNEXE II

Report on German-Russian relations published by the author in the "Sunday Referee", August 31st, 1930.

WORLD PEACE THREATENED BY GERMAN-SOVIET PLANS

(By our Special Correspondent)

I have just returned to England from an extensive tour of investigation in Central and Eastern Europe, and what I have seen and heard has impressed me with the seriousness of the movement, led by Germany, and encouraged by Fascist Italy, for Treaty Revision and the recovery of lost provinces by the Powers which were defeated in the Great War.

Internally, Germany is heading for some kind of dictatorship (whether veiled or open remains to be seen).

PRESIDENT HINDENBURG HAS THROWN OFF THE MASK, AND THE PRESIDENCY AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE OF THE REICH ARE NOW DEFINITELY BEHIND THE IMPENDING MOVES OF THE REICHSWEHR MINISTRY. WHEREBY THE GERMAN REICHS-WEHR WILL SHORTLY BE IN THE HANDS OF THE ACTIVE APOSTLES OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GERMANY AND SOVIET RUSSIA.

In last week's Sunday Referee reference was made to the existence of a plan of joint German-Russian military operations. This plan is that while Germany will attack Poland from the West a "Red" army will operate against Polish Galicia.

I am now able to supplement this information with the following facts:

General von Hammerstein, head of the "Troop Office" of the Reichswehr Ministry; General Groener of the Reich Ministry of Defence; and General Schleicher are the "political" generals behind the new swing to the "Right" in German politics in the direction of what is called "an authoritative regime". They are also the apostles of co-operation between German and Russian armies.

IN THE EVENT OF THE ELEMENTS REPRESENTED BY THESE OFFICERS COMING TO AN AGREEMENT WITH THE HUGENBERG AND HITLER FACTIONS, A VEILED NATIONALIST-FASCIST REGIME, WITH A STRONG MILITARY COLOURING, MAY BE SET UP IN GERMANY, AND THUS A BIG STEP FORWARD TAKEN TOWARDS THE OPENING OF THE MORE DEFINITE PART OF THE REVISIONIST CAMPAIGN.

Herr Treviranus, the spokesman of the Revisionists, is also likely to play a leading role in the new German political dispensation. Another outstanding figure is General von Seeckt, the creator of the modern German army, the Reichswehr.

General von Seeckt is not only Germany's potential "strong man" but is the greatest military genius of the European post-war epoch. Many observers believe that upon the death of President Hindenburg the presidency will go to the General. General von Seeckt is a first-class military officer and philosopher and statesman, and he is cleverly choosing a moderate role for his entry into politics, with a view to being better able to exercise the real power with the Reichswehr, the product of his genius, behind him.

The German Plan

For some time to come the Revisionist campaign will be conducted through such channels as Geneva, diplomacy

and the Press. When these means are exhausted and the hour to strike is chosen, the Revisionist campaign will pass out of the hands of the politicians into those of the soldiers.

The German plan for the recovery of the "Polish Corridor" is as follows:

In the first place, General von Hammerstein is to be appointed head of the "Army Direction" at the Reichs-wehr Ministry. In his present department, the "Troop Office", he has charge of a special branch for "foreign armies ", which enables him to appoint special Reichswehr officers to the H.Q. staff of the "Red" Army in Soviet Russia—ostensibly to study foreign army methods.

SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE GERMAN ATTACK FROM THE WEST AND THE RUSSIAN ATTACK FROM THE EAST, TO WHICH I HAVE ALREADY REFERRED, GERMANY WILL RE-ERECT THE FRONTIER FORTRESSES WHICH WERE DESTROYED BY ORDER OF THE AMBASSADORS' CONFERENCE WITH A VIEW TO ARRESTING ANY POLISH COUNTER-ATTACK ON BERLIN.

In order that the above facts may be fully appreciated, the new war strategy evolved by General von Seeckt must be explained: General von Seeckt turned the Allied ban against Germany having a national conscript army into an advantage. He created a military machine which, although small compared with the pre-war German army, is much more effective under present conditions.

The small professional German Army is capable of rapid action, great mobility and concentrated striking power. Its strength in action, according to the General's plan, is to be kept up by "second-line" reinforcements, under the intensive training of special Reichswehr instructors.

In the event of it being desired to extend the size of the Army, the non-commissioned officers of the professional

troops would become the regimental officers of the "national army". The troopers of the "security police" (most of them ex non-commissioned officers of the Imperial Army) would become the non-commissioned officers of the "national army". The rank and file of that army would be culled from the various national, gymnastic and youth organisations.

The "plum" of the whole scheme, which I have purposely reserved to the last, is the secret formation of the "Companies of Sacrifice".

THESE "COMPANIES OF SACRIFICE" ARE PICKED BODIES OF FANATICAL PATRIOTS WHO WILL VOLUNTEER FOR A SPECIAL SERVICE WHICH INEVITABLY MEANS DEATH. IN THE EVENT OF WAR, THESE COMPANIES WILL BE CONVEYED IN AERO-PLANES (GERMANY'S GROWING AND EFFICIENT "COMMERCIAL AVIATION" WILL BE TURNED TO USE) OVER THE ENEMY FRONTIERS AND DROPPED BEHIND THE LINES. THEY WILL DESTROY COMMUNICATIONS, RAILWAY LINES, BRIDGES, DEPOTS, ETC., AND THUS HOLD UP MOBILISATION AND HINDER TROOP MOVEMENTS AND REINFORCEMENTS.

Their lot will be certain death at the hands of their captors. But, like that strange body of fanatics, the historic "Assassins" of Asia, they will be willing to die at a word of command.

Expert opinion holds the view that whilst the tactics of the "Companies of Death" would not perhaps be so effective on a frontier like that of France (where railway communication is extensive), it might have a disastrous effect upon mobilisation and troop movements in a country like Poland.

Further revelations of the secret Reichswehr-Red Army relations have come to light as the result of the suicide of Frau Elfriede Amlinger.

Frau Amlinger was the widow of Captain Amlinger, of the Reichswehr, who recently met his death in Russia. According to the Reichswehr Ministry Captain Amlinger lost his life whilst riding in a horse race, but the truth has now come out that he was killed in an aeroplane crash in Russia. The Reichswehr Ministry also said that he had left the German Army on account of age, before he went to Russia. As, however, the captain was only thirty-five years of age, this official denial was obviously threadbare, and it is apparent that Captain Amlinger's presence in an aeroplane in Soviet Russia was in connection with the co-operation between the German and Russian armies.

The "Amlinger incident", together with the controversy over the forthcoming appointment of General von Hammerstein as Chief of Army Direction, has revived in Germany the excitement over the secret German-Soviet army co-operation which was first manifest in 1926, when Herr Scheidemann launched his famous indictment of the Abmachungen.

So much for Germany, the leader of the Revisionist Powers.

. . .

In the issue for 24th September, 1931, the Sunday Referee published the following follow-up report by the author:

Soviet and Germany (By Our Diplomatic Correspondent)

There is more than meets the eye in the controversy in Germany concerning the impending changes in the command of the Reichswehr.

The Democratic and Socialist Press of Berlin sees in the forthcoming replacement of General Heye by General Hammerstein, as Chief of Army Direction, the triumph of

those "political generals" who are the advocates of co-operation between the German and Soviet Armies. The Reichswehr Ministry has denied these inferences, but despite their denials the section of the Berlin Press in question is not re-assured.

Whatever may or may not be behind this affair, it is at least significant that it happens at a time when the reactionary Nationalist elements in Germany are beginning to gain the ascendent again. These elements in Germany have always favoured military co-operation with Soviet Russia—the point of contact between the German "Whites" and the Russian "Reds" being a natural antipathy to what was called the "Entente Powers" (i.e. Britain, France and more especially Poland).

In this connection it should also be pointed out that quite recently, upon his appointment as the successor to M. Tchitcherin as Commissar for Foreign Affairs at Moscow, M. Litvinoff made a declaration strongly urging the necessity for increased economic co-operation between the German Reich and the Soviet Republic.

Reichswehr Activity

As late as 1927 it was known that the General Staffs of Germany and Russia had elaborated a joint plan of military action against Poland, and that Reichswehr officers were attached to the H.Q. Staff of the Russian armies which, in the event of war, would operate against Polish Galicia. The various revelations of the Abmachungen also made it clear that German chemists were advising the Soviets on the erection of poison gas factories in Russia.

During the years which followed these revelations, and the subsequent policy of co-operation with Western Europe pursued by the late Dr. Stresemann, it was believed that

this secret co-operation between the German Reichswehr and the Red Army had either ceased or been reduced to a minimum. Furthermore, relations between Germany and Russia became cool owing to the ill-treatment of the German engineers by the Soviet authorities in the matter of the Don Basin scandals.

Quite recently, however, as was pointed out in these columns, the reactionary Nationalist element in Germany has been gaining ground again. It would not be impossible for these elements to revive the old days of the Abmachungen. This possibility becomes all the more pointed since the declarations of Herr Treviranus demanding the revision of the Polish frontier in favour of Germany.

Expert observers are not of the opinion that the Polish frontier is in any real danger of alteration. The hard facts of the existing European realities are all against Germany being able to do anything dramatic in that connection. At the same time the whole situation is important as an example of the growing trend of political and military thought in Germany to-day, a trend which will doubtless become more marked as the Nationalist elements continue, as they bid fair to do, to increase in strength and influence in the counsels of the German Republic.

ANNEXE III

Translation of letter written by Dr. Stresemann to the ex-Crown Prince in 1925.

Thus is set out the question of our entry into the League of Nations. In my opinion, Germany's foreign policy for the near future has three principal aims. First, the solution of the Rhine question in a way possible for Germany and the assurance of peace, without which Germany will not be able to regain her power. Secondly, the protection of ten to twelve million Germans now under foreign yoke. Thirdly, the rectification of our Eastern frontiers, the retaking of Dantzig, and the Polish Corridor, and the modification of the delimitation of the Upper Silesian frontier. Later on, the linking up of Austria with Germany; although I know only too well that this linking up is not likely to be entirely to the advantage of Germany, as it will complicate the problem of our organisation very much indeed.

If we wish to attain these aims, we must use all our efforts to do so. Hence the pact of security which should assure us peace, our Western frontier being henceforth guaranteed by England and even, if Mussolini joined us, by Italy. This pact demands relinquishment on our part, in this sense that we renounce an armed conflict with France to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine; but this relinquishment has only a theoretical interest, since the fact remains that we have no possibility of making war on France. The burden of reparations imposed by the Dawes Plan will probably be insufferable as from 1927. At the

moment we shall be obliged to ask for a new estimate of our capacity for payment; this is a right which the treaty authorises us to make use of at all times. Moreover, comparing the two and a half thousand millions that we have paid as maximum annuity with the amounts that our adversaries have to pay out in the service of their war debts (averaging more than four thousand millions), it is clear that our adversaries are at least as much imposed on as we are.

The care of the interests of Germans in foreign countries forces us to enter the League of Nations. Even those of the extreme Right in the Sarre district are for our entry. At Geneva we shall be the spokesmen of the Germans everywhere, because the whole of Germany will see in our government the champion of "Germanism". They make a big mistake if they think we can be put in the minority at Geneva. It is not possible, since the decisions of the League of Nations Council must be taken unanimously. We have the assurance of a permanent seat at Geneva. Were we at this moment at the League of Nations Council, Poland could not triumph with her pretensions at Dantzig, because the opposition of the German delegate would be enough to rout them. If Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Roumania knew that Germany could speak freely at Geneva, they would have more regard for their minorities, in respect of whom they have pledged themselves through international treaties to respect their rights. Further, all these questions are burning ones for the German people; for instance: the matter of our culpability, the questions of general disarmament, Dantzig, the Basin of the Sarre, etc., are within the province of the League of Nations and a skilful orator could present them to the League Assembly in such a way as to create very serious unpleasantness to the Entente. France is not

at all charmed with the idea of admitting Germany to the League, whilst England wants it in order to balance the preponderating influence of France at Geneva.

To come into the League of Nations does not mean that we choose the West and turn our backs on the East. One can only choose when one has behind one military forces. We can neither be mercenaries in the service of England on the continent, as some think certain, nor can we allow ourselves an alliance with Russia. To seek the good graces of bolshevism seems to me a dangerous Utopia. If the Russians installed themselves in Berlin, they would begin by hoisting the red flag; and since Russia wants universal revolution, she would be very glad to bolshevise Europe as far as the Elbe, giving the rest of Germany to France as a sop. However, we are perfectly ready to come to an understanding on another basis with the Russian State, which, I think, has not yet reached the end of its evolution, but we have no intention of selling ourselves to Western Europe by coming into the League of Nations. It is a subject which I should be happy to discuss verbally one day with your Royal Highness. But the essential is the first of the points which I have enumerated above, the liberation of our soil, the withdrawal of the armies of occupation. It is necessary that our stranglers let go their grip. This is why German policy should, to begin with, follow the formula which Metternich, I believe, adopted in Austria after 1809: i.e. not to show one's hand ("finassieren"; "finasser") and to keep clear of momentous decisions.

I ask your Royal Highness the permission to say nothing further in this letter. Naturally I have to be very discreet. If your Royal Highness will give me the opportunity of discussing at leisure these questions, which are becoming so vital, I am at your complete disposition.

ANNEXE IV

(Copies of bills of lading referred to on page 111)

I. G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft.
Telegramm-Adresse: Anilinfabrik.
Abteilung Export/Versand/.
Versandauftrag Nr.U.22.

Ludwigshafen, a Rh., den 6 September, 1927.

Telegramm Stichwort:
Permora

Für die Firma "Igerussko", Handelsgesellschaft, Berlin.

Die nachstehenden am 5.9.27 in Waggon Köln 16708 durch Jakob & Valentin an "Derutra" zu Ihrer Verfügung gesandten Güter sind wie folgt schnellstens weiterzubefördern:

Anzahl und Art der Packstücke:	Zeichen und Nummer:	In den Konnossementen ist der Inhalt zu deklarieren als:	Rohgewicht Kg.	Versandvorschrift:
15 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad 3618/32	Diphemylanin	1492	Die Konnossemente werden Ihnen von der F-a I. & V. zur weiteren Veranlassung übergeben.
11 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad 7001/11	Arsentrichlorid	1318	Die Lieferung unsererseits erfolgt c.i.f. Leningrad. Die Versicherung wurde von uns bei der "Basler Versicherungsgesellschaft" in Basel gedeckt. Die F-a I. & V. ist entsprechend benachrichtigt.

Deklaration nach Vorschriften
der Handelsvertretung der U.S.S.R.

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft.
———(Signature illegible.)

I.G. Farbenindustrie-Aktiengesellschaft.
Telegramm-Adresse: Anilin Fabrik.
Abteilung Export/Versand/.
Versand-Auftrag Nr.U.24.

Ludwigshafen a Rh. den 21 September, 1927.

Telegramm Stitchwort:
Mikra

Für die Firma Igerusssko, Berlin.

Die nachstehenden, am 20 September 27. in Waggon Hannover 183007 durch Jakob & Valentin an die "Derutra", Stettin, F.o.b. abgesandten Güter sind wie folgt schnellstens weiterzubefördern:

Anzahl und Art der Packstücke:	Zeichen und Nummer:	In den Konnossementen ist der Inhalt zu deklarieren als:	Rohgewicht Kg.	Versandvorschrift:
5 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad 1417/22	Benzychlorid	643	Die Konnossemente werden Ihnen von der F-a I. & V. zur weiteren Veranlassung ausgehändigt.
4 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad 7681/4	Kaliumcyanid	457	Die Versicherung ist von-uns bei der "Baseler Transportversicherungs-Gesellschaft in Basel bis Leningrad gedeckt.
5 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad 4332/6	Natriumarsenit	618	Alle Kosten bis c.i.f. Leningrad gehen zu unseren Lasten.
10 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad A.111/20	Anilin	1,125	
5 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad 4001/5	Pikrinsäure	475	

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft.

Deklaration nach Vorshriften
der Handelsvertretung der U.S.S.R.

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Telegramm-Adresse: Anilinfabrik.
Abteilung Export/Versand/.
Versand-Auftrag Nr. U.22.

Ludwigshafen a Rh. den 6 September, 1927.

Telegramm Stichwort:
Permora

Für die Firma Jakob & Valentin, Spediteure, Berlin.

Die nachstehenden, am 5.9.27 in Waggon Köln 16708 durch Sie an die "Derutra" Stettin, F.o.b. Stettin zur Verfügung der Igerussko, Berlin, abgesandten Güter sind wie folgt schnellstens weiterzubefördern:

Anzahl und Art der Packstücke:	Zeichen und Nummer:	In den Konnossementen ist der Inhalt zu deklarieren als:	Rohgewicht Kg.	Versandvorschrift:
26 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad/deutsch und russisch/3618/32 und 7001/11	Harmlose Chemikalien	1,492 1,318 2,810	Die Kosten bis c.i.f. Leningrad gehen zu unseren Lasten. Die Konnossemente sind der Igerussko Berlin auszuhän digen. Die Transportversicherung ist von uns bis Leningrad gedeckt.

Genaue Deklarationsvorschriften erhalten
Sie von der Igerussko Handelsgesellschaft in Berlin.
Durchschrift an: Igerussko, Berlin.

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft
———(Signature illegible.)

I.G. Farbenindustrie-Aktiengesellschaft
Telegramm-Adresse: Anilin Fabrik.
Abteilung Export/Versand/.

Ludwigshafen a Rh. den 21. September, 1927.

Telegramm Stichwort:
Mikra

Für die Firma Jakob & Valentin, Spediteure, Berlin.

Die nachstehenden, am 20 September, 27. in Waggon Hannover 183007 durch Sie an die "Derutra" Stettin, T.O.B. Stettin zur Verfügung der Igerussko, Berlin, zu liefernden Güter, sind wie folgt schnellstens weiterzubefördern:

Anzahl und Art der Packstücke:	Zeichen und Nummer:	In den Konnossementen ist der Inhalt zu deklarieren als:	Rohgewicht Kg.	Versandvorschrift:
5 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad 1417/22	Harmlose	643	Sämtliche Kosten bis F.o.b. *Stettin zu unseren Lasten.*
4 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad 7681/4	Chemikalien	547	Die Konnossemente sind der Igerussko Handelsgesellschaft auszuhändigen. Die Transportversicherung wird von uns gedeckt.
5 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad 4332/6		618	
10 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad A.111/20	Anilin	1,125	
5 Kisten	I.G. Leningrad 4001/5	Chemikalien	475	Event, weitere Instruktionen wollen Sie von der F-a Igerussko einholen.

Genaue *Deklarationsvorschriften werden Ihnen von der* Igerussko Handelsgesellschaft gegeben.
Durchschrift an: Igerussko Handelsgesellschaft Berlin, N.W.7.

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft.
——(Signature illegible.)